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What is the effect of political exclusion on individual participation in national 
post-conflict justice institutions? To date, most of the post-conflict justice literature has 
examined these institutions (e.g. truth commissions, trials, reparations, etc.) on the 
national level, which prevents us from accounting for strategic motivation in justice 
selection, and from observing variation in implementing the process within a given 
country. I argue that there is a strategic incentive for post-conflict state actors to frame 
conflict events in a politically advantageous way. This frame determines the mandate of 
the post-conflict justice process, which may or may not correspond with an individual’s 
conflict experience.  This strategic selection is important because it creates: 1) a possible 
disjuncture between what events an individual encountered, and what events the justice 
process addresses; and 2) reduced support, and perhaps even animosity, toward the 
justice effort put forward. Depending upon which victim and which violations are 
 
incorporated into the institution, post-conflict justice processes can exclude the 
experiences of certain groups and compel them to (in)action.  
Challenging the aggregated approach in the earlier literature, this dissertation 
advances our understanding of this post-conflict contention by examining individual 
interactions with the state. Toward this end, I argue that individuals can make the 
strategic choice to either accept or deny the national justice process. This choice is 
determined by the potential disjuncture between the individual’s conflict experience and 
the focus of the justice institution. Denial of the process can negatively impact the 
justice process itself – a short-term result (which I examine explicitly in the dissertation) 
– and/or undermine the chances of long-term peace and reconciliation for the country 
(which I will examine in future work). To examine this process, I conducted over 80 
interviews in post-conflict Rwanda and Northern Ireland. In addition, I used quantitative 
disaggregated data on both conflicts to both substantiate the experiences reported in the 
interviews, and pair these experiences with the focus of the existing transitional justice 
process. 
Through the study of transitional justice we can better understand the role of 
institutions in post-conflict states and design more vibrant institutions to address 
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Preface and Acknowledgements 
 
The seeds of this project were planted in 2005, when a Rwandan senator asked 
me my opinion on whether or not the Gacaca process was “working”. She wanted to 
know whether the process would bring peace and reconciliation to post-genocide 
Rwanda as the government had promised. “If Gacaca isn’t working”, Senator 
Nyramillimo told me, “then we have to come up with something else”. I didn’t have an 
answer for her then, and I have even less of an answer for her now, but that question sent 
me back to graduate school and has taken up a large part of my research interests over 
the past six years. This dissertation does not answer Senator Nyramilimo’s question and 
for that I apologize. Academically, we are no closer to knowing if Gacaca is going to 
“work” than we were in 2005. If anything, we have more reason to be skeptical about 
the whole process than we did back then. Yet I now have a deeper understanding of the 
complexity of the human experiences at issue, and upon which the future of Rwanda is 
being built.  
My interests in Northern Ireland came later. I arrived in 2007 to work on a data 
collection project for a human rights NGO in West Belfast. At the time I didn’t think 
there was much that I could learn about conflict and violence from Western Europe 
based on my naïve approach to the low-level violence of the Troubles. I was wrong. 
What I found in Northern Ireland was the same pain and anger I had seen in Rwanda two 
years earlier and many of the same questions of justice. But it was the tireless sprit and 
dedication to making things right among the people who had experienced this violence 
that brought me back as part of my dissertation research in 2009. The innovative 
approaches to justice and information gathering in Northern Ireland, namely my early 
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encounters with the organizers behind the Ardoyne Commemoration project and the 
New Lodge 6 report, challenged my own thinking about transitional justice and what a 
country and a community needs to rebuild.  
In many ways I found more similarities between Rwanda and Northern Ireland 
than I found differences. Both countries suffer from the same societal anger and post-
conflict trauma which can make them challenging places to do research, but both 
countries are also filled with dedicated and strong people who have survived a war and 
came out the other side dedicated to make the world (or their small part of it) a better 
place. It is in their honor that I set out to complete this project. I hope in some ways this 
project demonstrates my desire to continue to work on these questions and to make 
justice (in whatever form it may take) a reality for all people following conflict. 
I am greatly indebted to all the individuals who took the time to tell me their 
stories, share their injustices, and put their trust in a muzungu/American who many 
thought they would never see again. In many cases, particularly in Northern Ireland, I 
did see them again and it has been my privilege to share a small part of their lives. It is 
my hope that this project makes a contribution to the historic record and takes a small 
step in making their roads to truth easier. I also hope that their time and my continuing 
research may help spare others similar experiences and pain.  
As many are quick to acknowledge, a project and life journey of this size aren’t 
accomplished without the help of many talented and dedicated people. I would like to 
begin by thanking my mentor and intellectual compatriot, Christian Davenport. If I was 
scared of him in the beginning then that has only served to make this manuscript more 
rigorous in the process. I would also like to thank my dissertation committee for their 
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time and experience: my chair Johanna Birnir for her attention and support of this 
project; Ken Conca and Paul Huth for their unique theoretical insights; and Roberto 
Patricio Korzeniewicz, my dean’s representative. Conversations with David Backer and 
Monika Nalepa were essential for developing my theory and early research design. In 
addition, there were many others who read chapter drafts and listened to endless 
discussions on my assertions of how these processes really worked. This list includes, 
but is in no way limited to: Will Moore; Helga Malmin Binningsbø; Dan Corstange; and 
Mark Lichbach. On Rwandan history and politics I would like to thank Filip Renyntjens, 
for his genuine interest in this intellectual enterprise, and for providing insightful 
comments along the way. 
My advisor once wrote that it takes a whole city to raise an academic; in my case 
it took a continent. Since I first arrived in Rwanda in 2004, I have amassed a long list of 
friends, colleagues, confidants and drinking buddies whom have all made the process of 
conducting research in a post-genocide country a little easier in their own ways. I would 
like to particularly acknowledge the support I received in my travels to Africa from 
Reva Adler, Manu Kabahizi, Elizabeth Powley, Rulinda (Koko) Rutera, Odette 
Nyiramillimo, Fatuma Ndangiza, Jean de Dieu Mucyo, Elvis Gakuba, Ibrahim Murobafi, 
Nattanael Boarer, Sam Totten, Alyson Smith and Haley Swedlund. Alyson and Haley 
also provided research and writing support upon my return. My field research in Rwanda 
would not have been as successful without my research coordinator Thomas Munyaneza 
and my research assistant Jackson Vugayabagabo. I would like to acknowledge 
institutional support from the Center for Conflict Management at the National University 
of Rwanda, particularly insight from its director, Paul Rutayisire. I received research 
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permission from the Rwandan Ministry in the President’s Office in Charge of Science 
and Technology; I would like to acknowledge them as well. 
My research in Northern Ireland would have been less enjoyable and less 
informed without endless conversations with Mark Thompson, Andre Murphy, the entire 
team at Relatives for Justice, Monsignor Raymond Murray, JJ Magee, John Lounghran, 
Jim Potts, Kieren McEvoy, Patricia Lundy and bottomless pots of tea with Lian 
McGavok. In addition, I would like to acknowledge the research support of the Linen 
Hall Library Northern Ireland Political Collection, South Armagh Rural Women’s 
Network, the Upper Ardoyne Youth Center, FAIR, Saver/Naver, and both the Concord 
and Ardoyne Community Centers.  
For institutional support and funding I would like to acknowledge the University 
of Maryland, particularly the International Relations Subfield and the Harrison Program 
on the Future Global Agenda; as well as the Kroc Institute for International Peace 
Studies at the University of Notre Dame, which gave me a comfortable home from 
which to finish this draft. I would also like to thank Scott Gates and the Center for the 
Study of Civil War at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo for providing me a beautiful 
office in 2008 from which I wrote the prospectus for this project. My editor, Tobey 
Goldfarb, is responsible for every grammar nuance and appropriately spelled word- I 
personally take credit for any misspelled ones. 
My academic support network at the University of Maryland consisted of long 
conversations with Anne Cizmar, Ozan Kalkan and Ben Appel. Anne and Ozan filled 
the roles of critique, consort and general support structure for any obstacle which came 
along. Ben and I went from colleagues to co-authors and I have enjoyed his wit along 
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the way. My two best friends in the world, Kristine Kay and Rich Reyes were there at 
the very beginning. I thank them dearly for every laugh and kindness. Alicia Simoni 
entered the process towards the end, but made up for lost time by being a seemingly 
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have always been endlessly supportive of my desire to do it. My father, Harry Loyle, 
suggested that my 5th grade English project be about the stock market crash of 1987 
instead of about puppies, and nothing has really been the same since. He taught me early 
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we believe to be right. My mother, Barbara Loyle, reminded me to eat, sleep, and use 
chocolate when needed, demonstrating that with these things alone it is possible to be 
the best mother, wife, friend and small-business entrepreneur in the world. My sister, 
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 1 
Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
 
In 2005, I visited Rwanda as part of a project to investigate potential 
psychological determinants of genocide perpetrators. This was right around the time that 
the Gacaca courts were gaining momentum in Rwanda. Gacaca is the Rwandan attempt 
to address the legacy of the 1994 Genocide through a transitional justice system of 
community courts designed to hold lower-level criminals (i.e. violators of property 
crimes, collaborators, etc.) accountable for the abuses they committed. Interested to 
learn more about how Gacaca was being received, I began asking Rwandans about their 
expectations of the process. It was in this way that I met Yvette and Geraldine.1 
Yvette is a genocide widow from the south of the country and lives in a small 
village near Butare, the home of the National University of Rwanda. In 1994, Yvette lost 
her husband as well as three of her children in two separate attacks by Interahamwe 
militiamen (a genocidal militia group). Her house had been burned down and she herself 
had been attacked at a roadblock while she was fleeing towards Zaire (now the 
Democratic Republic of Congo). Despite these tragedies, Yvette was optimistic about 
the arrival of Gacaca and the opportunities offered by the process. She was looking 
forward to attending the process and hoped to use Gacaca to gain additional information 
about the death of her eldest son.  
Geraldine’s story is different. She lives in the north of Rwanda, close to the 
border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. Similar to Yvette, Geraldine lost 
members of her family during the conflict. Both of her parents and four of her siblings 
                                                
1 These names have been changed for purposes of confidentiality. 
 2 
were killed in the violence. Most of the possessions from her home had been either 
stolen or destroyed and Geraldine herself was beaten many times by perpetrators in her 
area. Geraldine, however, did not suffer this violence as a result of Interahamwe 
genocide attacks, but rather she was a victim of violence from the rebel insurgency in 
1997.  
Different from Yvette, Geraldine was not optimistic about the Gacaca process. In 
fact, Geraldine expressed resentment towards the courts because they would address the 
experiences of some members of the community (genocide victims), but not hers. As a 
result she told me that she was not planning to bring information that she had regarding 
the Genocide before the Gacaca courts. In fact, she said she would not be participating in 
Gacaca at all. 
Both Yvette and Geraldine experienced violence during the conflict in Rwanda, 
but their responses to Gacaca seemed to be based on the perpetrator of their violations 
(i.e. Interahamwe versus rebels) not the actual violations themselves (e.g. death of 
family members, personal attacks, property loss, etc.). Though Geraldine had not 
experienced violations as a result of the Genocide she had information that would be 
useful to the Gacaca process and people like Yvette. However, because of the exclusion 
of her own conflict experience she was choosing not to participate. Why was Yvette’s 
experience with the conflict included in the mandate of the Gacaca process while no 
process was put in place to address Geraldine’s experience? And, what affect will 
Geraldine’s decision not to participate have on the implementation of Gacaca itself? 
Four years later, these questions of exclusion from post-conflict justice emerged 
for me again while I was in Belfast working on a project to archive witness statements 
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from people detained during the Troubles (the colloquial name for the 30 years of 
conflict in Northern Ireland). In Northern Ireland, I was struck by the relative silence of 
the national government on justice issues following the conflict. There was the 
Historical Enquiries Team run through the national police force to reinvestigate murder 
cases from the conflict but resources for this effort were limited. Several commissions 
had been created to recommend justice options, but these also received minimal support. 
National justice efforts in Northern Ireland could be classified as ad hoc at best.  
At the same time, there was a proliferation of community and individual justice 
projects. Most noticeably, the latter included community-driven information gathering 
projects such as the New Lodge 6 Report detailing the circumstances surrounding the 
deaths of six men from the New Lodge area in North Belfast and the Ardoyne 
Commemoration Project which resulted in a 500-page book cataloging the deaths of all 
99 people from Ardoyne who were killed during the conflict. These projects were 
massive undertakings often requiring the mobilization of large parts of the community 
and the use of scarce resources (notably time and money). While extensive, these efforts 
were not found throughout Northern Ireland. In fact, they seemed to emerge most 
frequently from communities that had consistently failed to participate in the existing 
state-sponsored justice efforts.  
I came back to the stories of Yvette and Geraldine. Why were some individuals 
refusing to participate in the government-sponsored process? And what affects would 
these parallel community processes have on the national processes more generally? I lay 
out a plan for the investigation of these questions below. 
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This chapter begins with an overview of the research questions and discusses 
why these questions are worthy of investigation. Next I detail the applicability of the 
existing literature to these topics and consider why these questions have not previously 
been addressed. I then briefly introduce my theory on exclusion from post-conflict 
justice, explaining how and why the government creates an exclusionary justice process 
and how individuals interact in the potential disjuncture between their own experiences 
with the conflict and the mandate of the process. From there I discuss the research 
methods with which I evaluate this theory and present a brief summary of the findings 
from that analysis. I close with an outline of the remaining chapters of my dissertation. 
 
The Research Questions 
Following the termination of conflicts and the violence that surrounds them, 
governments have chosen to address past violence in a wide variety of ways: trials, truth 
commissions or other information gathering projects, amnesty agreements, reparation 
payments, lustration and purging legislation or some combination of all of these. I refer 
to these efforts as post-conflict justice (hereafter PCJ). 2  These processes are 
implemented to address the violations of the conflict and the legacy of abuse within the 
country. Post-conflict justice is purported to strengthen accountability, reconciliation, 
stability and potentially democracy within the country, but as we can see from the 
examples above, interacting with PCJ is not always a straightforward process. 
                                                
2 Elsewhere in the literature these justice efforts are referred to as transitional justice (see Bell 2009 for an 
overview and evaluation of the field of transitional justice). Transitional justice is generally defined to 
include justice resulting from a variety of transitions e.g. transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, 
transitions to a greater respect for human rights or, as in the case of post-conflict justice, transitions to 
peace. In this way I consider post-conflict justice to be a narrow and specific subset of transitional justice. 
Post-conflict justice does not presuppose a wide spread political transition, but rather refers to justice 
which is put in place following an armed conflict to address legacy issues resulting from that violence. 
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Two crucial assumptions of the transitional justice literature serve as a focal 
point for both existing analyses as well as my critique. First, the current literature on PCJ 
assumes that these institutions are uniformly implemented throughout a given country 
(i.e. the same procedure is utilized and the same outcome produced in all places within 
the relevant jurisdiction). Thus, in both Rwanda and Northern Ireland we would assume 
that the justice process functions in the same way with reasonably similar levels of 
participation across the country. Here, individuals are perceived to accept and implement 
the process comparably with no regard to individual experiences with the conflict. This 
assumption is a product of the aggregate level from which this topic has primarily been 
studied in the existing literature. 
This leads to the second assumption in the literature that the conflict events being 
addressed by the PCJ are an inclusive and accurate representation of what took place in 
the country. Here, it makes sense for a process to be implemented uniformly because 
there is a presumption that the process uniformly addresses national claims for justice. In 
Rwanda and Northern Ireland we would assume that the justice efforts in both countries 
were designed to include all experiences with the conflict. This assumption is a result of 
the normative focus within the current transitional justice literature and does not allow 
for the potential strategic use or political goal of justice efforts.  
As we can see from the examples in Rwanda and Northern Ireland, the 
assumption that the process is universally implemented across individuals does not hold 
true. Yvette will enthusiastically engage with Gacaca while Geraldine plans to avoid the 
process by not actively participating. Justice in Northern Ireland has caused individuals 
from both the New Lodge and Ardoyne communities to opt-out of existing institutions 
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and put both money and time into parallel information gathering processes. These two 
examples demonstrate variation in the implementation of justice across each country not 
the uniform application assumed in the literature.  
The assumption from the literature that the violence addressed in the process is 
largely representative of the population of conflict experiences also does not hold true. 
The experiences outlined above call into question the presumption of an aggregated 
narrative of the violence in these countries. Yvette’s experiences with the conflict 
certainly do not look the same as Geraldine’s and the Gacaca process is received very 
differently by both. And in Northern Ireland, the lack of justice for certain communities 
is leading to the creation of parallel processes which change the way that people view 
and interact with justice institutions created by the state. 
From these examples two research questions are raised which challenge the main 
assumptions in the literature and serve as the central focus for my research. First, what 
accounts for disjuncture between individual experiences of conflict and the experiences 
addressed by the national justice process? And, second, what affect does the disjuncture 
(if any) have on future participation in PCJ and views towards justice in general? I will 
explore each question below. 
First, as we can see from the examples above, interaction with the national 
justice process can vary across individuals but why is there this variation? While the 
current literature would have us investigate a justice process on the national level, 
attention to sub-national variation demonstrates that participation in and interaction with 
a national process differs across the country. The variation in implementation of the 
justice effort results from a disjuncture between the conflict experience of each 
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individual and the focus of the process itself. In both Rwanda and Northern Ireland we 
see examples of people who experienced violations or violence during the course of the 
conflict which are not being addressed by PCJ. While the current transitional justice 
literature would have us believe that the justice process addresses the legacy of all 
violence in a given country, this is not always the case. A disjuncture between an 
individual’s conflict experience and PCJ suggests that certain individual experiences are 
excluded from the justice process (i.e., the violations these individuals experienced are 
not being addressed). This exclusion could be an oversight, but it could also be 
deliberate strategic and political exclusion on the part of the government. If the 
government has the power to implement the PCJ process, it also has the power to control 
the inclusiveness of the process for strategic reasons.  
The second research question concerns the issue of how exclusion influences the 
justice process in particular and views of justice more broadly. What affect does the 
potential disjuncture between individual conflict experiences and the national justice 
process have on future participation in the process and on views of justice more 
generally? Because the current literature assumes uniform implementation and the full 
inclusion of conflict experiences in PCJ efforts, the possibility and potential effects of 
exclusion remain largely unexamined. As we can see from Yvette and Geraldine’s 
stories, people who are excluded from the national justice process may be more likely to 
deny the existing PCJ either by refusing to interact with the process itself (as with 
Geraldine) or by creating parallel processes to address their own conflict experiences (as 
in the New Lodge and Ardoyne).  
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It is exactly this disjuncture between experiences with conflict and the mandate 
of the post-conflict justice effort that the current literature fails to theorize. 
Understanding this disjuncture and the variation in participation that it produces is 
necessary for determining the effectiveness of PCJ in the long run as well as identifying 
political exclusion and denial of the justice effort which can affect the functioning of the 
process and broader issues of justice in the country. But why are these questions 
important? I turn to this below.  
 
Why is this topic important? 
The study and understanding of post-conflict justice has increased in importance 
as the reliance on PCJ institutions in the post-conflict period has grown (Lutz and 
Sikkink 2004; Binningsbø et al. 2010; Olsen et al. 2010). This reliance on PCJ has been 
driven in large part by the expected outcomes of the processes themselves. Both the 
transitional justice and policy communities argue that the implementation of PCJ brings 
and/or strengthens accountability, reconciliation, democracy and eventually peace in a 
given country.3 As demonstrated above, however, variation in individual participation in 
PCJ can have potentially negative affects for the overall success of the institution itself. 
If individuals fail to accept or attempt to subvert the process, PCJ may be less likely to 
accomplish its goals in the country on a whole. In addition to variation in participation, 
the presence of political exclusion may work to directly compromise the normative goals 
ascribed to these processes.  
                                                
3 For more information on the normative assumptions in the transitional justice literature see Loyle and 
Davenport (2009). 
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While this investigation is important for understanding PCJ institutions 
themselves, post-conflict justice is a particularly appropriate place to situate an analysis 
of post-conflict institutions, institutional implementation and the role of the state. 
Understanding how individuals implement and interact with national post-conflict 
justice institutions will give us greater leverage for understanding: (1) how governments 
assert control through post-conflict institutions, particularly through the strategic 
framing of conflict events; (2) what affects how post-conflict institutions are 
implemented on the local level; and (3) what effect does political exclusion have on the 
functioning of the institutions as a whole. By answering these questions we are able to 
build stronger theories about the role of institutions in the post-conflict state, as well as 
design and implement more vibrant institutions to address grievances against the post-
conflict government.  
Finally, the study of justice and justice institutions provides a unique opportunity 
for examining the ways in which people can interact with and challenge the post-conflict 
state. Justice is an essential issue for people in a post-conflict society (Elster 2004), but 
the quest or need for justice can manifest itself in a variety of ways. Through the study 
of variation in PCJ participation we are able to gauge the ways that people interact with 
national institutions in the post-conflict period. Understanding this interaction can help 
us develop more effective institutions and to alert us to potential manipulations on the 
part of the state. 
I now turn to the existing literature to address questions of participation and 
exclusion in post-conflict justice institutions. 
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Participation and Exclusion in the Existing Literature  
Existing investigations of transitional and post-conflict justice can tell us 
surprisingly little about the potential for political exclusion from the institutions 
themselves. As presented above, the current literature assumes that PCJ is uniformly 
implemented throughout a given country and that the process itself addresses an accurate 
representation of the violations experienced in that country. These assumptions are the 
product of the narrow focus of the PCJ literature. The literature studies post-conflict 
justice on the aggregated level (e.g. assuming a unified process) and from a primarily 
normative perspective (e.g. assuming altruistic motivations for implementation on the 
part of the government). This focus prevents us from: (1) observing variation in the 
process; (2) investigating individual interactions with the process; and (3) challenging 
the potential strategic motivations for implementing the process. Each of these 
limitations is discussed further below.  
To begin with, most of the existing literature on post-conflict justice examines 
the institutions from an aggregated level of analysis. This level of analysis prevents us 
from observing, and therefore investigating, sub-national variation. The work on post-
conflict justice tends to be dichotomous, either a process was implemented in a country 
or it was not (Backer 2009; Binningsbø et al. 2010; Olsen et al. 2010). This work has 
allowed us to make cross-national comparisons about regional variation and global 
trends in institutional selection, however this level of analysis tells us very little about 
the characteristics of the processes themselves.4 Because of this focus we have largely 
                                                
4 Cross-national work on variation across specific institutions has been undertaken (i.e., truth commissions 
(Hayner 2011) and trials (Bass 2002)), but these studies also investigate PCJ at the nation-level. This work 
is primarily concerned with variation across institution (i.e. how the truth commission in South Africa 
differs from that of Chile) not within it (i.e. regional variation within country).  
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failed to ask questions about the possibility of variation in participation across the 
process and the potential impact that this variation might have on the outcomes of 
interest.  
Existing work has also failed to look at how individuals react when they are 
excluded from the justice process or how individuals interact with the process more 
generally. We can gain some leverage on this topic by looking at the current survey 
literature on victim’s perceptions of justice such as the West Africa Transitional Justice 
Project (WATJ). However, this work focuses on victim’s interaction with post-conflict 
justice and it does not allow us any traction on questions of non-victims and justice or 
victims of violence not addressed by PCJ. Survey work by Gibson (2004) in South 
Africa investigates levels of individual and group reconciliation by measuring individual 
experiences with Apartheid and the affect of individual interactions with the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). While this research surveys the entire population, it 
does not challenge the mandate of the TRC itself or ask questions about possible 
resistance to the process. 
There is an equally significant lack of attention to the possible strategic selection 
of post-conflict justice. Decisions to implement PCJ have generally been seen as 
altruistic, structurally conditioned choices. While there has been extensive debate 
surrounding post-conflict justice options and timing there has been very little work on 
the actual motivation for their implementation and the selection of the process mandate. 
This omission leads us to assume that if the structural conditions (e.g. lack of political 
spoilers, demand and resources) exist to implement PCJ, then a process will be 
implemented (Huntington 1991; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). This assumption in the 
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literature has prevented us from asking questions about the political motivations of post-
conflict justice implementation (or lack of implementation) and has left many gaps in 
our understanding about the strategic use of justice on the part of the state and variations 
in implementation that strategic exclusion may cause.  
More recent work is moving to correct this trend. In her 2010 book on lustration 
in Eastern Europe, Nalepa looks at the strategic reasons why opposition parties may 
either choose to block or push for a truth revelation process such as lustration. Subotic 
(2009), in her work on the former Yugoslavia, argues that Serbia and Croatia were able 
to strategically use their cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to gain international favor while actually undermining 
accountability. Additional arguments have been made regarding the more practical 
incentives for post-conflict justice implementation: Lutz and Sikkink’s (2004) on the 
global norm of accountability and Appel and Loyle (2010) on post-conflict justice and 
foreign direct investment. This work investigates the strategic choice for the process on 
a whole (i.e., to implement or not implement a process) but does not theorize the 
government incentives for controlling the mandate of the process itself. To advance this 
research, my work furthers the critical analysis of PCJ by theorizing the strategic reasons 
for institutional selection and the potential outcomes of that selection. 
 
A Theory of Exclusion from Post-Conflict Justice 
Given the lack of attention within the current literature to variation within the 
process or to strategic interactions regarding PCJ, how do we begin to address the 
research questions raised above? Within this dissertation, I argue that variation in PCJ 
 13 
implementation is a product of a possible disjuncture between an individual’s experience 
with the conflict and the mandate of the national PCJ. This disjuncture is created when a 
national justice process fails to address (or excludes) an individual’s conflict experience. 
I argue that this potential exclusion is a strategic decision on the part of the government 
and that an individual’s participation (or lack of) in PCJ is an equally strategic response. 
I outline the mechanisms of this argument below. 
As conceived, my theory begins with political conflict. Specifically, violence 
related to the governance of a society takes place across the relevant territory; conflict 
takes place. Accordingly, during the conflict period, people may experience diverse 
types of violations (i.e., death of a family member, property loss, personal assault) often 
from different perpetrators (i.e., the government, rebels, and vigilantes) with variation in 
the intensity and duration of those violations. Given these elements, an individual’s 
conflict experience can vary significantly across geographic location within the country 
and demographic characteristics (e.g. ethnicity, social status, level of education).  
When the conflict is over, both the individual and the government attempt to 
address what was experienced. At this point in time, governments have a strategic 
incentive to frame the experience of the conflict in a politically strategic way. While 
there will be many competing individual experiences with the violence, the government 
has an incentive to create one predominate understanding of events. The government 
seeks to create an understanding of the conflict that contributes to political consolidation 
in the post-conflict period.  
The government, therefore, constructs a conflict frame (i.e., the government’s 
understanding of conflict events) to represent the official interpretation of the conflict. 
 14 
Like all frames, the conflict frame advanced by the government highlights certain 
experiences over others. The frame determines what will be considered a crime and who 
will be considered the victim as well as the perpetrator. It is never the case that all 
events and experiences involved in a conflict would be considered in a conflict frame. In 
cases of a more open society where citizens have a greater level of veto (Davenport 
2007), the government may try to be as inclusive as possible. In a closed or repressive 
state, the government may choose an exclusionary frame that greatly reduces the number 
of experiences included. The government has the advantage in such constructions and 
creates the frame with access to resources, media, legislation, memorials, educational 
curriculum, and important for this project, through the creation of justice institutions.  
Once a conflict frame has been selected, an essential part of its implementation is 
matching the post-conflict justice institution to the frame. To assure consistency and 
some degree of legitimacy, a post-conflict justice effort is selected with a mandate to 
address the violence as outlined in the government frame. Through the PCJ process, the 
frame is able to enforce its previous construction of what types of violations or which 
events of the conflict will be considered criminal and therefore addressed/prosecuted 
through the justice institution. 
As conceived, a conflict frame is limited in scope and as a result PCJ institutions 
based on activities identified within the frame result in exclusion of certain experiences. 
Since the government chooses to implement a justice process that does not address all 
(or any) of the violence from a conflict, someone’s experience is left out. For example, if 
an individual experienced violations at the hands of the government, but the PCJ process 
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only addressed violence from rebel attacks, then the individual’s experience would be 
considered excluded from the justice effort.  
This disjuncture between an individual’s experience with conflict on the one 
hand and the government’s framing of the conflict and PCJ on the other is important 
politically. The justice process either addresses an individual’s experience or it does not. 
Once the government has created and begun to implement PCJ it is up to an individual 
to determine how he/she will interact with the process. Based on his/her own 
experiences with the conflict, individuals can choose to either accept or deny the 
process. Specifically, I maintain that the difference (i.e., the potential disjuncture) 
between an individual’s conflict experience and the focus or mandate of the PCJ affects 
whether an individual accepts or denies the process. When a PCJ is accepted, individuals 
adhere to the form of the national justice process and participate in the process fully. 
When a process is denied, an individual will either reject the process outright and refuse 
to participate, or more often, present ‘everyday forms of resistance’ (Scott 1985) such as 
low levels of participation or the creation of a parallel process designed to address 
excluded experiences. 
This decision to accept or deny the PCJ is the individual’s choice, however 
structural factors can influence the form of denial. The degree of political openness or 
voice (Davenport 2007) within a given society is essential for understanding the form 
that denial of a PCJ will take. Individuals who choose to deny a PCJ in a more open 
society, such as Northern Ireland, will be more likely to use overt measures of resistance 
such as creating a parallel process or publicly opposing the disjuncture. Individuals 
living under a repressive or less open system, such as Rwanda, will be more likely to use 
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passive, private acts of resistance such as foot-dragging or reduced participation in the 
PCJ. 
Below, I discuss how I study this process and why I choose the methods that I 
do. 
 
Introducing the Research Methods 
As discussed above, the current literature on post-conflict justice addresses 
questions of PCJ implementation and individual participation in the process from an 
aggregated, normative approach. Because of this methodological orientation we fail to 
challenge the existing PCJ mandate and therefore we are only able to measure violations 
included in the strategic conflict frame created by the government. In this way, we are 
missing the individual experience of the conflict and the subsequent variation in 
interaction with the justice process that this experience produces. An aggregated unit of 
analysis allows for cross-national comparison and a state or conflict-level analysis but 
does not allow for either a disaggregated understanding of the conflict or individual 
victim experiences.  
The conflict literature is increasingly moving towards a greater reliance on a 
micro-foundational approach to the study of conflict and the disaggregation of local as 
well as regional experiences (e.g. Wood 2003; Wilkinson 2004; Kalyvas 2006; 
Weinstein 2006; and Davenport and Stam 2009). Unfortunately, these methods have 
rarely filtered across to the post-conflict literature. This dissertation suggests a shift in 
focus from PCJ implementation on the national level to a greater attention to sub-
national variation. Paralleling the current focus in the conflict literature, a disaggregated 
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approach to the study of post-conflict justice will allow us to better understand the 
conflict of interest as well as the experiences of individuals across the conflict. I argue 
that these experiences are essential for understanding PCJ implementation and views 
towards justice on a whole. 
To accomplish this shift, my dissertation takes a multi-methods approach to the 
study of PCJ, using micro-level data on two conflicts (Rwanda and Northern Ireland) 
combined with in-depth interviews to investigate the range of individual conflict 
experiences in each country and the effect that this variation in experiences has on the 
implementation of the national justice process. Micro-level data is used for establishing 
the range of possible conflict experiences as well as selecting the interview sites. The 
interviews are used for elaborating the experiences outside of the conflict frame, 
determining individual interactions with PCJ and the motivations behind that behavior. 
These two types of data fit together to triangulate the experiences of individuals and 
variation in PCJ interaction without relying on government data sources that may favor 
the conflict frame. This analysis is conducted in Rwanda and Northern Ireland. 
Instead of relying exclusively on the aggregated understanding of a conflict 
presented in the existing data, my dissertation relies on disaggregated data to determine 
the range of experiences that could have become part of the conflict frame. For Rwanda, 
I use data from the GenoDynamics project by Christian Davenport and Allan Stam 
(2009). This project combines multiple data sources to create predictions for battle 
deaths and perpetrators across Rwanda from April 1994 through July 1994. For Northern 
Ireland, I rely on the disaggregated tabulation of people killed during the conflict from 
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Sutton’s Index of Deaths.5 This tabulation relies on media sources to catalogue all 
people killed as a result of the conflict from 1968 through 1998 (the duration of the 
Troubles). 
In addition to existing quantitative data, the second part of my analysis involved 
personally conducting 80 in-depth interviews in both Rwanda and Northern Ireland to 
identify the conflict experiences and subsequent interaction with the justice process that 
these experiences produced. Unlike existing interview and survey work in this field, 
respondents were not sampled on conflict experience (i.e., perceived victim status) but 
rather by random sample across geographic location. This technique allowed me to come 
across a wider variety of experiences, including people who did not consider themselves 
“victims” and to gain a greater understanding of the possible range of conflict 
experiences in each country. 
Rwanda and Northern Ireland were selected as cases for three reasons. First, in 
each county the conditions exist to create demand for a post-conflict justice process. 
Both Rwanda and Northern Ireland are post-conflict countries where people experienced 
human rights violations during the conflict period. Second, across both countries there 
was a wide range of conflict experiences, allowing for variation on the most important 
theoretical variable of interest. The conflict was widespread enough to produce a range 
of experiences across the population hence making it possible to test the effect of 
variation in conflict experience (and potential exclusion) on participation in the national 
justice process. And finally, in both cases the justice efforts selected by the government 
are locally implemented, allowing me to measure variation in individual participation in 
each process. Individuals have an ability to directly participate in each justice process 
                                                
5 http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/ Accessed on December 18, 2010. 
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without additional barriers to entry (e.g. lack of information about the process or 
resources to travel to the process), which may confound my theory. 
Despite these similarities, Rwanda and Northern Ireland differ in two important 
ways. First, Rwanda and Northern Ireland represent different types as well as patterns of 
violence. The conflict in Rwanda is known for its extreme levels of violence in a ten-
year period, while the conflict in Northern Ireland took place with relatively low 
intensity over a 30-year period. Investigating the effects of conflict experience across 
both extremes of violence (high and low) allows me to note potential influences that the 
actual intensity of the experience may present. Second, the two countries have different 
political systems. Investigating both a democracy (Northern Ireland) and a semi-
autocracy (Rwanda) allows me to note ways in which the degree of openness (measured 
as veto and voice) of a country’s political system can influence the relationship between 
the PCJ disjuncture and the subsequent individual interaction with the national justice 
process. This difference also allows me to investigate possible ways in which the 
conflict frame may emerge or be constructed differently across political system. While 
there are differences in conflict and system, similar mechanisms are at work. 
An overview of the findings from this analysis is presented below.  
 
Summary of Findings 
In this dissertation I argue that the justice process that is selected and 
implemented does not adequately address every individual’s conflict experience. This is 
hardly surprising as conflicts are generally an incredibly complex series of events and 
experiences. However, this disjuncture between justice process and experience can be 
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the direct effect of strategic political exclusion on the part of the post-conflict 
government and this exclusion can affect levels of participation across excluded groups. 
I find evidence to support this argument in both Rwanda and Northern Ireland. 
Findings from this research suggest that in both Rwanda and Northern Ireland 
the government constructed a conflict frame, which highlighted certain events in the 
conflict while ignoring others. This conflict frame was then used to determine which 
experiences would be addressed through a justice process and which experiences would 
be systematically overlooked or excluded. Furthermore, my research finds that political 
exclusion matters. Individuals in Rwanda and Northern Ireland who are excluded from 
the conflict frame and the national justice process are less likely to participate in the PCJ 
threatening the functioning of the processes themselves. These individuals are also less 
likely to have positive feelings towards justice in the post-conflict period on the whole. 
The lack of cooperation with or subversion of PCJ affects both the functioning of the 
process and creates resentment towards the process. This is not the case for individuals 
whose conflict experience is included in the PCJ mandate. 
In addition I find that regime type matters for this interaction. In Northern 
Ireland individuals who choose to deny the national justice process use overt forms of 
resistance such as public denouncement of the PCJ, and the creation of parallel justice 
processes which address experiences outside of the government conflict frame. In 
Rwanda, this is not the case. The restricted political context in Rwanda means that 
denying the justice process takes a different form. Here, denial of the justice process 
involves more passive acts of resistance such as failing to bring a case before Gacaca, 
not offering evidence for existing cases, or expressing resentment towards the process. 
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The findings of this research are essential for broadening our understanding of 
how PCJ is created and operates. Particularly because of the alleged role of these 
institutions in post-conflict reconciliation and stability, the structure and function of PCJ 
is important. As my research in Rwanda and Northern Ireland demonstrates, if we want 
to support justice institutions to work towards peace and democracy (their alleged 
goals), we have to expend more effort to ensure that these processes are as inclusive as 
possible. Exclusion from the justice process can not only have a negative impact on the 
process itself, but also on the likelihood that the process will contribute to social 
reconciliation and peace for the country on the whole. 
 
The Way Forward 
In the remainder of my dissertation, I outline a broader understanding of post-
conflict justice (PCJ), which allows us to contextualize the disjuncture between national 
institutions and individual conflict experiences as well as individual reactions to political 
exclusion from the justice process. In Chapter 2, I begin with a comprehensive overview 
of the existing literature on transitional justice and PCJ, focusing on the definition of 
each concept as well as the universe of cases. I use existing data on post-conflict justice 
to trace patterns in implementation across time and space. This chapter also looks at the 
existing work on government selection of justice processes. Finally, I close with the 
current understanding of individual interactions with transitional justice. 
Chapter 3 presents my theory. In this chapter I discuss the range of possible 
individual conflict experiences and I lay out the strategic incentive for states to reduce 
these individual experiences into a single conflict frame. I explain how this is done and 
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how the strategic selection of the frame leads to the creation of an equally strategic PCJ 
process. I then discuss the potential source of disjuncture between the conflict frame and 
an individual’s conflict experience. This chapter hypothesizes the ways in which 
individuals can accept or deny the state conflict frame and justice process through their 
participation (or lack thereof). The selection of acceptance and denial is affected both by 
the individual’s experience with conflict and the regime type under which they live. 
Following from the theory in Chapter 4, I move to an overview of the 
methodology that is used to test the theory. This chapter presents the reasoning and 
rationale for using a microfoundational approach and introduces the specific methods 
that I use in my dissertation. This includes a discussion of disaggregated conflict data 
and the use of individual level data on participation and conflict experiences. I also 
discuss the sample size used in my research design and justify the number of cases based 
on qualitative methodology and current best practices in the literature. I close this 
chapter with an in-depth overview of my research design including case selection, 
participant selection and the interview protocol. 
In Chapter 5, I move to an examination of the cases beginning with an overview 
of the conflict in Rwanda. This chapter presents a disaggregated understanding of 
violence in Rwanda from 1990 through 2002 including the different types of violations 
and perpetrators of violence that people experienced over that period. Relying on 
existing data sources as well as interviews from survivors of the conflict, I outline the 
universe of possible conflict experiences. From there, I move to an elaboration of the 
conflict frame selected by the Rwandan government, how the current Rwandan 
government was able to frame the conflict and why the government chose to do so in the 
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way that it did. In addition, I examine the creation and implementation of the Gacaca 
process, Rwanda’s post-conflict justice process, to reinforce this frame. 
Chapter 6 provides the same disaggregated analysis of conflict for Northern 
Ireland. This chapter broadens our understanding of the violence in Northern Ireland 
from the existing conflict frame to the range of experiences that people had over the 
course of the violence. I then move to an elaboration of the existing conflict frame 
looking at the way the British government has attempted both to write itself out of the 
history of the violence and to minimize the impact and level of violence in general. This 
discussion includes an analysis of the interview data I collected presenting the range of 
individual experiences with the conflict. Next, I turn to an elaboration of existing PCJ in 
Northern Ireland. The discussion focuses on the ad hoc nature of post-conflict justice in 
Northern Ireland. 
Chapter 7 tests the hypotheses raised in Chapter 3 by examining individual 
responses to the conflict frames in both Rwanda and Northern Ireland as well as 
individual views towards justice in the country in general. In addition to examining the 
ways that excluded individuals respond to the PCJ process in each case, this chapter 
looks at the ways that the degree of political openness within the country affects the 
options of individuals wishing to subvert the justice process. In a politically restricted 
country, as in Rwanda, denial of the justice process is manifested through passive acts of 
resistance. In Northern Ireland, however, there is more room for active subversion. This 
chapter catalogs and examines this denial across case. 
Finally, the dissertation concludes with an overview of the general theoretical 
argument as well as a discussion of the empirical findings from my analysis. I end with a 
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call for a more critical evaluation of existing justice processes globally. If all justice 
efforts have the potential to be exclusionary what does this mean for the ability of a 
justice project to reconcile and rebuild a country in the post-conflict period? And what 
do these finding suggest about the current global reliance on the implementation of 
justice efforts in the post-conflict period? 
  
 25 
Chapter 2:  
The Literature on Post-Conflict Justice 
 
As introduced in the preceding chapter, the existing literature on transitional 
justice (TJ) and post-conflict justice (PCJ) can tell us surprisingly little about the 
potential for political exclusion in these institutions and the reaction of individuals to 
this potential exclusion. I argue that this lack of investigation is due to the focus of the 
transitional justice literature on an aggregated level of analysis (e.g. assuming a unified 
process and testing theories of transitional justice across process not within) and the 
normative assumptions within the existing literature (e.g. assuming altruistic motivations 
for transitional justice implementation). These two points of departure within the 
literature have prevented us from addressing the potential strategic motivations for the 
implementation of transitional justice on the part of the state as well as the response to 
TJ exclusion by individuals. 
In this chapter I explore the current state of the transitional justice and post-
conflict justice literature. I begin with an understanding of what we currently know 
about transitional justice focusing on the definitions of transitional justice and post-
conflict justice, institutional types of transitional justice and patterns of transitional and 
post-conflict justice across time and space. In the second section I present the existing 
theoretical literature on TJ implementation including the goals and reasoning behind it. I 
then move on to an overview of our current understanding of the role of governments in 
selecting TJ. This section discusses how TJ is selected as well as the potential for use 
and misuse of TJ on the part of the government. I close this chapter with a discussion of 
individual interactions with transitional justice.  
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The Universe of Cases 
In the last decade there has been a proliferation of work on the topic of 
transitional justice (TJ). Spanning the fields of international law (Orentlicher 1995; 
Minow 1998; Teitel 2002), political transitions and democratization (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986; Huntington 1991; Kritz 1995; Nalepa 2010) and post-conflict studies 
(Lie et al. 2007), the TJ literature attempts to address the normative and practical 
considerations of justice in the period after transitions. While keeping pace with the 
recent rise of transitional justice institutions implemented following political transitions 
and civil conflict, this literature is still in its infancy and as such suffers from 
definitional, methodological and theoretical problems. Below, I review the state of the 
transitional justice literature focusing on how these problems have impacted our current 
understanding. Specifically, three different dimensions of transitional justice are 
addressed: (1) the definition of transitional justice and post-conflict justice, (2) 
institutional types of TJ and (3) patterns of TJ and PCJ across time and space. 
 
The Definition of Transitional Justice and Post-Conflict Justice 
While the academic field of transitional justice has grown rapidly in the last 
decade, there is a great deal of discussion within the literature about exactly what is 
included in the domain of interest. In her Human Rights Quarterly article, Arthur (2009) 
carefully traces the historical evolution of the study of transitional justice including its 
emergence from the democratic transitions literature in the 1980s and the intellectual 
origins of the topic as closely linked to the human rights movement. Despite this 
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understandings of the epistemological origins of the field there is still active debate 
regarding the definition of transitional justice and the institutions under study. 
Most simply, transitional justice is understood to be: (1) a justice process 
implemented following; (2) a transition to address; (3) a period of past violence or gross 
abuses of human rights. Each of these three components of the definition is explored 
further below. 
To begin with, transitional justice is a process or institution that is implemented 
to address issues of justice and accountability. The institution can be legal (as in the case 
of trials) or quasi-legal (as in the case of truth commissions). In addition, the process 
may or may not adhere to international law. A transitional justice institution may be a 
completely new institution (e.g. a truth commission created solely to address particular 
issues of accountability) or a pre-existing component of the national justice system (e.g. 
ad hoc tribunals). In most cases, transitional justice is established outside of pre-existing 
legal structures.  
The second component of the definition of transitional justice requires a 
transition. Most often this is defined as a transition from a period of authoritarian 
government to one of democracy marked by the implementation of free and fair 
elections (Sikkink and Walling 2007). Kritz (1994), for example, specifically limits the 
term to measures undertaken by “emerging democracies”. However, transitional justice 
can include a justice process resulting from a variety of transitions. The transition could 
be a political transition from one government to the next, generally following a coup or 
military victory. The transition could be the movement from violence to peace at the end 
of a civil conflict. Or the transition could include the transition from a period of gross 
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human rights abuse to a period of respect for human rights. In practice, transitional 
justice in this third type of transition is rare without a shift in the government, as a 
transition of power is usually needed to create the political space necessary for TJ to be 
proposed and implemented. 
Finally, transitional justice is implemented to address a period of past violence or 
gross abuses of human rights. The implementation of transitional justice presupposes 
that there are violations for which individuals need to be held accountable. In other 
words, without atrocities or violations of human rights there would be no need for a 
justice process in the first place. In the case of transitions from authoritarianism to 
democracy, these abuses are generally the abuses of past regimes. In transitions to peace, 
these abuses could be either from the government or on the part of the rebel group. And 
in transitions to reduced human rights violations, these abuses are generally on the part 
of the government who is now choosing to sanction itself. 
By definition, transitional justice is implemented to address the legacies of past 
violence. There is no set timeframe, however, for when this justice must take place. 
Transitional justice can be enacted at anytime in the post-conflict period. In some cases, 
promises of TJ are attached to ceasefire agreements and TJ begins even when low levels 
of violence persist in the country. TJ can also be implemented decades after the violence 
has ceased. In 2007, for example, the Spanish Parliament voted to reexamine the 
amnesty legislation that followed the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and potentially 
prosecute accordingly. 
This definition of transitional justice presents three central problems. First, as is 
obvious above, the type of transition needed for transitional justice to occur is unclear. 
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The transitional justice literature emerged mostly from the democratic transitions in 
Central America; however, the definition has been expanded to include many different 
political contexts (Arthur 2009). Second, the actual structure of transitional justice is 
ambiguous. For example, do transitional justice institutions adhere to international or 
domestic law? There is also no convention for the scope of accountability necessary in a 
transitional justice institution (e.g. should the institution apply to all wrongdoers or only 
elites). And finally, along similar lines, there is no agreement as to which crimes are and 
should be addressed by transitional justice. It is clear that transitional justice is 
implemented to address past abuses, but the scale and scope of the abuses necessary to 
consider transitional justice has not been addressed. 
Due to these definitional uncertainties, outlining the potential universe of cases 
for transitional justice is not easy. For one, not all political transitions result from or are 
surrounded by a period of violence. Some transitions, such as democratic elections, take 
place peacefully and without a precedence of abuse. If there is no abuse, there is no 
justification for transitional justice and therefore it is unlikely to be proposed. The 
evolution of international law has also changed the global conditions for transitional 
justice making the implementation of TJ more likely over time. However, these 
uncertainties have presented methodological challenges for researchers interested in 
understanding when and where transitional justice “could” be implemented in order to 
evaluate questions of if and when it is. 
In part as a way to address these definitional and methodological issues, in my 
dissertation I focus specifically on post-conflict justice, or justice institutions that are 
implemented in the post-conflict period. Here I investigate processes put in place 
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following a period of violent conflict to address the abuses that resulted from that period 
of violence. Post-conflict justice (PCJ) is a subset of transitional justice focusing only on 
justice institutions in the post-conflict period. For that reason, the universe of potential 
PCJ cases is all terminated conflicts. For this dissertation I look at post-conflict justice 
following the conflicts in Rwanda and Northern Ireland.  
 
 Below I turn to the various institutional types that comprise our current 
understanding of transitional justice. 
 
Institutional Types of Transitional Justice 
In more applied terms, transitional justice is generally understood to consist of 
the following types of institutions: trials, truth commissions, purging/lustration, 
reparation schemes as well as amnesty and forced exile.6 Each of these institutions is 
defined further below. 
Trials include the formal judicial proceedings either within or outside of pre-
existing domestic legal structures to prosecute wrongdoers. In some cases, new 
jurisprudence is created in order to address previous violations, while in other cases, 
wrongdoers are tried according to existing domestic laws. Trials are generally domestic, 
but can also include international tribunals such as the ICTR and ICTY (International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia), or hybrid courts such as the tribunal implemented for East Timor. Some of 
                                                
6 In addition to these generally agreed upon forms of transitional justice, David Backer (2009) has 
collected information on Human Rights legislation or institutional reform as a form of transitional justice. 
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the most prominent trials include the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials following the Second 
World War. 
Truth commissions are defined as officially sanctioned, temporary investigative 
bodies that focus on a particular abuse or patterns of abuse over a given period of time 
(Hayner 2001, 14). Truth commissions are often non-judicial in nature meaning that they 
do not rely on the rules of domestic (or international) judicial proceedings. Truth 
commissions generally provide a mechanism for national acknowledgement of past 
abuses through public information gathering sometimes including public apology. Truth 
commissions can be both a mechanisms for a country to address past wrongdoing and a 
way for individuals and communities to gain knowledge about what happened to family 
and loved ones. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission is one of the 
most commonly referenced truth commissions and has served as an intellectual model 
for many commissions created after its establishment in 1995. 
Purging or lustration is defined as the act of screening politicians, armed forces 
members or other members of society for their collaboration with or participation in a 
past regime or conflict and restricting their membership in the new government 
accordingly (Kaminski & Nalepa 2006; Nalepa 2010). Here past collaborators are 
identified and sanctioned for their collaboration, generally by restricting their 
participation in the current government. The target of purging is commonly the armed 
forces, often following military coups (Binningsbø et al. 2010). After a coup, the 
victorious party publicly restricts the participation of former collaborators in the new 
military. Lustration was particularly common in Eastern Europe following the fall of the 
Soviet Union as a means of restricting former communist collaborators from 
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participating in the new democratic governments (Nalepa 2010). In a few cases a purge 
has also been undertaken in the Judiciary. In China, after the communists won over the 
Chiang Kai-shek government in 1949, the government launched a judicial reform where 
judges sympathetic to the former regime were expelled from the courts. Likewise in Iran 
in the early 1980s, members of the Mujahedin eKhalq were not allowed to serve in the 
national courts (Binningsbø et al. 2010). 
Reparations schemes are the process by which victims of a given violation or 
abuses are compensated (generally monetarily) for the harms they experienced. In 
addition to monetary reparations, policies can include property restoration, education 
subsidies, preferential employment programs, etc. These programs are put in place to 
compensate individuals who suffered abuse and to restore, to the extent possible, their 
former life trajectory. In Chile, for example, a reparations program was put in place to 
address the needs of victims of human rights violations committed during the military 
regimes (1973-1990). This program provided various forms of pensions, social services, 
educational benefits, and health assistance, mainly in the form of mental health services 
(Lira 2006).  
In addition to accountability and truth granting institutions, transitional justice 
also includes official processes of granting amnesty and exile. 
Amnesty or the granting of immunity to wrongdoers is quite common in 
transitions or post-conflict societies. In negotiating political transitions or peace 
agreements leaders often choose to forgo traditional definitions of justice in order to 
secure an end to the violence despite past violations of human rights. Amnesty 
proceedings are a promise (or in some cases formal legislation) on the part of the ruling 
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party to not prosecute or punish past violators. Amnesty legislation can extend to former 
heads of state, government officials, members of the military or active participants in the 
violations. In most cases amnesty is extended to the losing party of the conflict, giving 
strength to the belief that granting amnesty is a way of bargaining for peace (Binningsbø 
et al. 2010). In some cases general amnesties can be given to lesser participants such as 
the armed forces when leaders face trials. In South Africa (post-1994) it was possible to 
apply for amnesty through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission only after a full 
disclosure of one’s wrongdoings.  
And finally, exile is the forced removal of individuals from the post-conflict 
country. Exile provides an opportunity for a new government to reduce the influence of 
past wrongdoers without going through lengthy legal processes and extraditions. Similar 
to amnesty, exile agreements can be de facto or de jure. Often exile is granted in 
exchange for a peaceful transition or the decision to end the conflict. In this way, exile is 
used as a bargaining tool by the incoming government to secure power or peace.  
 
The Universe of Cases 
Most of the recent empirical work on transitional justice has focused on 
classifying and collecting information on transitional justice across time and space. 
Originally this work consisted of single institution case studies, which focused on 
collecting comparable information on a specific institution across time (e.g. Hayner 
(2011)’s work on truth commissions). Recently, however, empirical work has expanded 
to include a number of global datasets on transitional justice. Some of these efforts have 
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focused on a specific institution type (e.g. the Amnesty Law Database7) while others 
attempt to catalogue all transitional justice institutions across a given period of time. 
While a necessary evolution in the study of transitional justice, these datasets suffer 
from the same definitional, methodological and theoretical limitations that have affected 
other areas of the field. 
Of the data collection efforts which have been undertaken three are particularly 
worthy of note: the Transitional Justice Database (TJDB) which includes data on 
transitional justice institutions from 1970-2007 (Olsen et al. 2010), Sikkink and Walling 
(2007)’s collection of human rights trials and truth commissions from 1979 through 
2004 and the Post-Conflict Justice Database (PCJD) on post-conflict justice institutions 
from 1946-2006 (Binningsbø et al. 2010). Each of these is described further below. 
The Transitional Justice Database includes data on five transitional justice 
mechanisms—trials, truth commissions, amnesties, reparations and lustration. This data 
is collected for all countries from 1970-2007. This database focuses on institutions put in 
place following a political transition, as defined by Polity IV’s ‘regime transition’ 
variable. Based on this coding the TJDB includes 91 transitions to democracy in 74 
countries. Within these countries, the TJDB codes 49 trials, 30 truth commissions and 46 
amnesties (Olsen et al. 2010). 
Sikkink and Walling’s (2007) data includes domestic truth commissions as well 
as domestic, foreign and international trials for past human rights abuses. This data looks 
at 192 countries and territories over a 26-year period (1979-2004). The dataset reports 
34 truth commissions and 49 countries with at least one human rights trial. When the 
                                                
7http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/InstituteofCriminologyandCriminalJustice/Researc
h/BeyondLegalism/ Accessed on Dec. 22, 2010. 
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sample is reduced to 84 new and/or transitioning countries, Sikkink and Walling report 
over half of the countries attempting some form of judicial proceeding and more than 
two-thirds of the countries using transitional justice. 
The Post-Conflict Justice (PCJD) database by Binningsbø et al. (2010) codes 
occurrences of post-conflict justice from 1946-2006. This dataset includes all justice 
efforts implemented in the five-year period following the termination of a conflict to 
address violations from that conflict. This dataset focuses solely on PCJ or transitional 
justice implemented following a transition to peace or the termination of a conflict. The 
universe of cases for this dataset includes all post-conflict periods in the time frame of 
reference. The PCJD includes 355 conflicts from 1946 through 2006. There are a total of 
203 post-conflict justice efforts included in the dataset. In this dataset 61.5 percent of 
post-conflict countries implement at least one PCJ.  
  The total number of transitional justice institutions varies across these sources 
because of definitional and methodological differences. The Sikkink and Walling data, 
for example, focuses only on human rights trials and truth commissions with the 
smallest time frame. This dataset limits its definition of transitional justice to record 
information on accountability for human rights abuses. The TJDB uses political 
transitions as the potential universe of cases and therefore presupposes the level of 
political transition needed for transitional justice to take place (e.g. a three point gain on 
the Polity scale is needed to be included in the TJDB). The PCJD codes both the largest 
time period as well as the largest number of potential transitional justice institutions. 
However, this coding is limited to institutions that were implemented in a post-conflict 
period. 
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Each of these data sources provides specific information about global patterns of 
transitional justice. Here I rely on the PCJD to present some of the basic patterns 
regarding post-conflict justice across time and space as this data source most closely 
adheres to the topic of study for this dissertation- post-conflict justice.  
 
Transitional and Post-Conflict Justice Across Time and Space 
In order to explore patterns of transitional justice across time and space, I rely on 
the PCJD. As outlined above, this dataset collects information on post-conflict justice 
institutions implemented following periods of violent conflict. Because of definitional 
and methodological differences across datasets, patterns of TJ or PCJ implementation 
vary slightly across data source. Because my dissertation focuses specifically on post-
conflict justice, I use the PCJD to elaborate patterns in PCJ implementation. Below I 
present some general information about PCJ implementation across time and across 
region. In addition to presenting patterns of implementation I also discuss potential 
variation in the types of institutions that are implemented. 
While the general consensus in the literature is that transitional justice 
implementation is increasing over time (Lutz and Sikkink 2001), an important 
contribution of the PCJD is to demonstrate that while the overall number of PCJs seems 
to be on the rise, the proportion of armed conflicts terminating with PCJ is decreasing 
over time (see Figure 1 below). PCJ implementation peaked in the 1980s when post-
conflict justice was implemented in the democratic transitions in Central America and 
lustration processes were put in place in Eastern Europe following the fall of 
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Communism. However this proportion sharply declined in the 2000s and currently 
accounts for less than 30 percent of conflict terminations.  
 
Figure 1. Proportion of Armed Conflicts with Post-Conflict Justice across Time8 
 
 
N=205 of 326 
 
Figure 2. Number of Armed Conflicts with and without PCJ Efforts, by Region 
 
N=326 
In addition to temporal patterns, PCJ implementation varies across space. 
Figure 2 presents the regional variation in PCJ implementation. Here we can see that 
implementation varies both in the overall number of PCJs which are implemented and 
also in the proportion of PCJ implementation to non-implementation. For example, 
                                                


































according to the PCJD, the majority of conflicts in Europe, Central Asia, Latin America 
and sub-Saharan Africa end in a post-conflict justice institution. This pattern does not 
hold for East Asia, the Middle East or South Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa also has a 
noticeably higher number of PCJs than any other region. Regional affects suggest that 
patterns of PCJ implementation may be related to political, cultural or social factors. 
The type of PCJ implemented also varies by region (see Figure 3). Again, sub-
Saharan Africa has a higher number of PCJs than any other region, but this prominence 
favors amnesty and exile, which are not information gathering processes. Judicial trials, 
on the other hand, are the most prominent PCJ type in Europe and Latin America, while 
amnesty is more popular in sub-Saharan African, East Asia and the Middle East. There 
were also no truth commissions implemented in the Middle East.  
 
































While recent quantitative data on PCJ has allowed us to determine certain 
patterns of PCJ implementation over time and space, the theoretical understanding of 
these patterns remains weak. Temporal and regional variation suggests that political as 
well as cultural and social factors can influence patterns of PCJ implementation. The 
nature of conflict has also changed over time as well as the international legal structure 
to support PCJ implementation. These are some possible explanations for the patterns, 
but the empirical relationships between these mechanisms have yet to be adequately 
theorized. Below I return to the broader literature on transitional justice and address the 
current theorizing on the goals and alleged outcomes of TJ. 
 
The Theory of Transitional Justice 
In the early 1990s the theoretical literature on transitional justice was primarily 
concerned with making the case for justice implementation (Kritz 1994; Zalquett 1995). 
These authors tried to understand the structural and political conditions that made 
transitional justice possible (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Huntington 1991). Once 
transitional justice became a more widely implemented institutional outcome, the second 
wave of the theoretical literature wrestled with when and why transitional justice should 
be implemented. Known as the “peace versus justice” debate, scholars argued that under 
certain political conditions, justice could do more harm than good towards advancing 
goals of peace and democracy (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003/04; Paris 2004). The third 
theoretical trend in the literature concerns the type of institution that should be created 
(known as the “truth versus justice” debate). Here, scholars debate when or if truth and 
acknowledgement should even be traded for justice (e.g. as in the case of South Africa 
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where individuals were able, in specific cases, to exchange information about 
wrongdoings for amnesty). 
Despite the ongoing debates in the transitional justice literature, there is a 
pervasive assumption that transitional justice is implemented to advance normatively 
“good” goals. Arthur (2009) argues that this normative focus is the result of the 
“dominant lens through which political change” has historically been viewed, namely 
“transitions to democracy” (325). Support for democracy has lead to support for all 
institutions seen to promote democracy. In this section I outline the alleged goals of 
transitional justice and discuss the empirical literature, which investigates the 
effectiveness of TJ in achieving these goals. 
 
Goals of Transitional Justice 
The literature has generally agreed that transitional justice is implemented to 
serve three main goals: (1) to maintain peace and prevent the resumption of conflict; (2) 
to bring knowledge or “truth” to a population about the crimes that were committed; and 
(3) to contribute to democratization. Each of these goals is elaborated further below.  
First, transitional justice is implemented in an attempt to prevent future violence 
(Zalquett 1995). By systematically and procedurally addressing past abuse, governments 
hope to prevent retribution killings or a resumption of violence. This mechanism works 
by demonstrating that individuals who commit violations will be held accountable for 
their actions. Orentlicher (1995) argues that domestic accountability prevents future 
violence on both the national and international level potentially discouraging those in 
neighboring countries from violating human rights. 
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Second, transitional justice is implemented to bring knowledge and “truth” to a 
population, thereby reconciling that society by addressing the causes and legacies of 
violence (Kritz 1995). Here one of the main goals of transitional justice is to bring to 
light information about past crimes. Hamber (2009) argues that greater information on 
violations can lead to social and psychological healing for the victims of abuse. These 
patterns of healing are thought to be transferable to society on the whole (Gibson 2004). 
And third, transitional justice is used to increase the political legitimization of a 
particular government, often in times of democratic consolidation (Boraine 2006). 
Transitional justice ushers in rule-of-law, which may have been absent or systematically 
ignored during the previous period. Here, a new government can distance itself from 
past abuses by demonstrating its adherence to the rule of law, a key tenant of democracy. 
Addressing victim’s rights and the rule of law further strengthens democratic values 
within the country (Gutmann and Thompson 2000).  
While dominant, the normative trend in the literature has been challenged. Loyle 
and Davenport (2009), for example, argue that in addition to the favorable outcomes of 
transitional justice, TJ can also, or alternatively, be used to increase violence and state 
repression, promote denial and forgetting and strengthen authoritarianism. As Bell 
(2009) writes, it is unclear whether in practice transitional justice is “ ‘good’ (an 
extension of human rights discourse, or necessary for democratization or peace), ‘bad’ 
(imperialist, hegemonic, impunity serving or promoting a dangerous legal 
exceptionalism) or a value-neutral tool with which both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ goals can be 
pursued” (6). While recent scholarship has begun to question the overall goals of 
transitional justice, the normative goals predominate.  
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While these “good” goals have been widely ascribed to transitional justice by the 
academic and policy communities, as well as through the mandate of the institutions 
themselves, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that transitional justice actually 
advances these goals. I turn to this now.  
 
Empirical Investigations of Transitional Justice Outcomes 
As introduced above, the general assumption in the transitional justice literature 
is that TJ is implemented for normatively “good” goals based on an altruistic intention 
on the part of the government. For that reason, much of the empirical work on 
transitional justice has focused on the relationship between transitional justice and these 
normatively good outcomes. This focus is one of the limitations of the current literature. 
Despite this focus there is little conclusive evidence that transitional justice has the 
desired normative effects over time.  
This lack of evidence is apparent in recent studies on the effect of transitional 
justice on peace duration, human rights abuse and democracy. For example, when 
studying the effects of transitional justice implementation on the duration of peace, Lie 
et al. (2007) find that only trials contribute to a more durable peace and this result is 
sensitive to the type of conflict termination (e.g. military victory versus negotiated 
settlement). Brahm (2005)’s work on transitional justice and human rights abuses finds 
that transitioning countries that implement TJ do not have significantly improved human 
rights records in the post-conflict period compared to those countries that do not 
implement TJ. Using the TJDB data, Olsen et al. (2010) find that transitional justice 
does have a positive effect on human rights and democracy, but only when the 
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institutions are implemented in certain combinations (e.g. trials and amnesties, or trials, 
amnesties and truth commissions). The lack of substantial and consistent empirical 
evidence regarding outcomes, however, has done little to temper normative claims.  
In part because of this lack of consistent empirical evidence, scholarship has 
recently begun to question the ability of governments to use transitional justice for 
politically motivated ends. I turn to this literature in the following section. 
 
Governments and Transitional Justice 
Until very recently, the normative focus of the transitional justice literature lead 
us to assume that transitional justice is a normative good that should be implemented, 
conditions permitting. A product of this assumption is that very little work has focused 
on how transitional justice processes are chosen. The literature has generally assumed 
that all transition or post-conflict governments want to implement a justice process, but 
structural conditions, generally regarding the type of transition, get in the way. 
Below, I detail the current literature on how transitional justice is chosen 
including data from the PCJ dataset which addresses the affect that conflict termination 
type has on both the decision to implement a PCJ and the type of PCJ which is chosen. 
In addition, I discuss the new literature on political motivations for transitional justice 
implementation. 
 
How is Transitional Justice Chosen? 
The early literature on transitional justice focused on the structural determinants 
for TJ implementation. In his work The Third Wave, Huntington (1991) outlined the type 
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of structural elements that influenced whether the new elites chose to prosecute former 
leaders or not. These factors were mostly determined by the type of political transition 
that took place, such as the relative power balance between old and new elites. This 
framework assumes that all states want to punish past wrongdoers, but it is possible for 
balance of power and structural determinants to get in the way. These structural factors 
were mostly related to the influence of the past regime in contemporary politics. 
Concentrating on the components of the transition itself, O’Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986) focus their argument on the significance of bargaining for transitional 
justice outcomes, specifically the form of pacts among elite groups. They argue that 
transitional justice is particularly difficult when collaborators with the past regime are 
still in positions of power, namely the military, police or judiciary. Despite these 
obstacles, in their study of transitions from authoritarian regimes to democracy 
O’Donnell and Schmitter find that “settling past accounts” is one of the essential 
characteristics which contributed to a successful transition.  
Turning to the empirical evidence, the effects of elite bargaining are evident in 
data on PCJ implementation following conflict. For example, Binningsbø et al. (2010) 
demonstrate that PCJ implementation is more common following a conflict which is 
terminated by a military victory than one which is terminated through low levels of 
violence (see Figure 4). This suggests that the power of the new government (or elite) 
following the conflict is an important determinant of the ability of that new government 










In addition to the implementation of PCJ, the type of PCJ that is implemented is 
also affected by the way in which the conflict was terminated. For example, trials are the 
dominant institutional outcome when a conflict is terminated by a military victory while 
amnesty and exile are more common with a bargained solution (see Figure 5 below). 
This finding, similar to Huntington’s (1991) theory suggests that the strength of the 
opposition following the conflict is essential for understanding the justice policy that the 
government will select as well as the power that new elites have to take that course. 
More recent literature has focused on domestic civil society and international 
influences on selecting transitional justice. Both Crocker (1999, 2000) and 
Hayner (2011) point to the role of civil society in the decision for a new government to 
choose to address past violations. Here it is argued that strong civil society is able to 
entice (or force) governments to implement transitional justice. Lutz and Sikkink (2001) 
argue that the growing proliferation of transitional justice is a result of an international 











for their actions. International norms of accountability challenge governments to 
implement transitional justice through political pressure and international socialization. 
 




In addition to the structural and bargaining components to transitional justice 
implementation, there are also political motivations for the implementation of 
transitional justice. Below, I present some of the recent literature on both domestic and 
international political motivations for governments to implement transitional justice. 
 
Political Motivations for Transitional Justice Implementation 
Recently, the current literature has begun to question the strategic motivations 
for transitional justice implementation and to view justice institutions as “value neutral 
tools” through which both normatively “good” and “bad” goals have been pursed (Bell 
2009). A new government may have both domestic and international political 
motivations for implementing a transitional justice process and may do so for strategic 

















Nalepa (2010) looks at these strategic reasons in regards to lustration policy in 
Eastern Europe. Nalepa argues that the decision between implementing a transitional 
justice process or keeping promises of amnesty for past crimes is a product of the level 
to which the current opposition government is complicit in those crimes. In other words, 
it is a product of the number of “skeletons in their closet”. Opposition parties who are 
likely to be implicated in collaborating with the past regime, or implicated in past 
violations in some way, may be less likely to support transitional justice and more able 
to credibly commit to amnesty during regime transitions. In this way transitional justice 
can be used as a strategic tool on the part of the current government to secure its own 
political future. 
Subotic (2009), in her work on the former Yugoslavia, demonstrates that Serbia 
and Croatia were able to strategically use their cooperation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to gain international favor while 
actually undermining domestic accountability. Subotic argues that both the governments 
of Serbia and Croatia were able to use the ICTY to give the appearance of cooperating 
with international legal norms strengthening their case for EU membership, while at the 
same time merely serving their own domestic political interest, strengthening their 
domestic political base without any real concern for justice or accountability. 
Additional arguments have been made regarding the more practical incentives 
for transitional justice implementation. For example, Appel and Loyle (2010) make the 
case for post-conflict justice as a signaling mechanism for international investors. Appel 
and Loyle argue that governments are able use the implementation of post-conflict 
justice as a signal of future stability and adherence to the rule of law increasing levels of 
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foreign direct investment in the post-conflict period. Lutz and Sikkink (2004) argue that 
governments implement transitional justice, in part, to adhere to international norms and 
demonstrate their membership in the global legal community. 
Despite these current advances, the recent literature focuses on the strategic 
motivations of governments in transitional justice implementation without much 
attention to the potential role of individuals in this process. In the final section I present 
an overview of our current understanding of individual interactions with transitional 
justice. 
 
Individual Interaction with Transitional Justice 
While the government plays a central and powerful role in the selection and 
implementation of domestic institutions, individual interactions with the process are 
often essential to the success or general functioning of the institutions themselves. There 
is a growing recognition within the TJ literature that individual attitudes and preferences 
towards the transitional justice process matter. This is particularly true in regards to the 
attitudes of victims of past violations. Individuals allegedly benefit from transitional 
through the termination of conflict, social reconciliation, reduction of human rights 
abuses and democratization (Hamber 2009), however little is actually known about these 
effects and outcomes. Understanding individual interactions with transitional justice and 
the motivations behind those interactions requires individual level data on people’s 
preferences and responses. 
Most of what we know about individual interactions with transitional justice is a 
product of extensive survey work in the country of interest. This work has generally 
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been single country focused (e.g. Gibson’s work in South Africa (2004) and Lundy and 
McGovern (2006)’s work in Northern Ireland). Here surveys have been used to 
understand individual attitudes towards transitional justice (Lundy and McGovern 2006, 
Nalepa 2010), the interaction between individuals and the justice process (Pham et al. 
2004) or the long-term effects of transitional justice on victims of violations and 
attitudes towards justice more broadly (Gibson 2004). 
Community and individual characteristics have been demonstrated to be effective 
predictors of transitional justice attitudes. For example, Lundy and McGovern (2006), in 
their 2006 survey of citizens in Northern Ireland, found that an individual's religious 
community (e.g. Protestant or Catholic) affected their support for a truth commission. In 
their public health survey of victims of violence in Rwanda, Pham et al. (2004) find that 
exposure to trauma and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder are predictors of how 
an individual will view and interact with the national justice process. In addition, Gibson 
(2004)’s survey work in South Africa demonstrated that ethnic or racial identity is a 
determinant of how receptive an individual was to the message (or “truths”) of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission. 
While generally robust in scope, these surveys have not been designed to be 
comparable across countries. Recent work by the West African Transitional Justice 
(WATJ) project is working to address this limitation (Kulkarni et al. 2009). Between 
2007 and 2008, WATJ conducted over 2,600 surveys of victims of violations in Ghana, 
Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. This project focused on individuals who had been 
victims of violations and their subsequent views and interactions with the justice 
process. Analysis and results from this project have yet to be released. 
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While survey work has been essential in developing our understanding of the 
effects of TJ and the reactions to the process, there has been little theoretical elaboration 
on the comparable nature of these findings. It is here where I situate the work of my 
dissertation. I develop and test a theory for individual participation and exclusion from 
transitional justice and test this theory using cross-national comparable data from 
Rwanda and Northern Ireland.  
 
Conclusion 
The literature on transitional justice suffers from definitional, methodological 
and theoretical under-development. While a rapidly growing field, there are still 
questions about the concept of transitional justice (Arthur 2009) and the boundaries of 
the field itself (Bell 2009). In this chapter I have outlined the existing theoretical and 
empirical work on transitional justice. I presented a general definition for transitional 
justice and post-conflict justice based on the existence of a power transition and the 
presence of past abuse. This chapter also demonstrated the universe of cases of post-
conflict justice across time and space based on existing data collection efforts. Moving 
beyond the basic definition and occurrence of transitional justice, I presented the 
existing literature on the normative goals of TJ as well as existing critiques of this 
normative perspective. Finally, this chapter included an overview of our general 
theoretical understanding of the government and individual motivations surrounding 
transitional justice implementation. 
While far from an exhaustive review of the literature, this chapter demonstrates 
the current limitations of the transitional justice debate. Aside from conceptual 
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problems, the literature has only begun to address the potential for strategic 
manipulation of transitional justice (e.g. the potential for a disjuncture between 
individual experiences and the national process) and the effect of individual interactions 
with the justice process (e.g. the potential for individual acceptance or denial of the 
process). In the following chapter, I develop a unique theory of participation and 
exclusion from post-conflict justice picking up where the existing literature has left off. 
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Chapter 3:  
A Theory of Exclusion from Post-Conflict Justice 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the current literature on post-conflict justice (PCJ) has 
failed to address questions of individual participation and potential exclusion from PCJ 
because of the normative focus of the literature and the aggregated way in which PCJ is 
studied. Existing work focuses on the structural conditions that lead to a particular 
transitional justice outcome without allowing for the possible political and strategic 
reasons for PCJ selection and the variation in participation that this may cause. This 
work goes a long way in explaining institutional selection, but it fails to address 
potentially strategic motivations behind the mandate of the processes themselves (i.e., 
the types of violations and perpetrators of violence that are addressed). The selection of 
a truth commission (institution type), for example, tells us nothing of which crimes will 
be included in the information gathering process, which victims will be consulted, which 
timeframe will be considered, and, ultimately, which political agenda will be put forth. 
In short, the “what” (mandate) of the process is just as important, if not more so, as the 
“which” (institution type). 
I argue that the structure of the process matters. As introduced in Chapter 1, the 
experiences of Yvette and Geraldine in Rwanda and the two communities in Northern 
Ireland, cannot be explained without a deeper understanding of political exclusion from 
post-conflict justice and the variation in participation which that exclusion produces. 
Returning to the research questions I raised in the introduction: (1) what accounts for the 
disjuncture between individual experiences of conflict and the experiences addressed by 
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the national justice process; and (2) what effect (if any) does the disjuncture have on 
future participation in post-conflict justice and views of justice in general?  
In this chapter, I lay out a theory to address these two questions. Towards this 
end, I discuss political conflict and violence, individual experiences with conflict, state 
construction of conflict frames, the subsequent selection of post-conflict justice and, 
finally, the interaction of individuals with the process put before them. Each element is 
discussed below.  
 
The Basic Theoretical Model 
Potential exclusion from a post-conflict justice effort and the variation in 
individual interaction with the process that it produces is a multi-stage process (as seen 
in Figure 6). This process begins with a conflict (represented by Circle A) and the 
collection of individual experiences included in the conflict (represented by the +/– 
within Circle A). Here an individual has a particular experience with the conflict 
measured by the type of violation, perpetrator of the violation, duration of the event and 
intensity of the violation. All of these individual experiences exist within the conflict 
(Circle A). Once a conflict has ended, the individual seeks justice for his/her own 
experience. Simultaneously in the post-conflict period, the government is working to 
consolidate power in light of the previous conflict events. To this end, the government 
creates a conflict frame (represented by Circle B). The conflict frame is the 
government’s interpretation and synthesis of conflict events into a political 
advantageous frame that is used to determine post-conflict policy. The conflict frame 
overlaps to varying degrees with the actual events of the conflict (i.e. it can be an 
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accurate interpretation of events or it can represent a limited political interpretation of 
events). The government uses the conflict frame to create a post-conflict justice 
institution (represented by Circle C).  
 














B. Conflict Frame 
C. Post-Conflict Justice Institution 
 
Once the post-conflict justice institution is created, its mandate may or may not 
match an individual’s experience with the conflict. The mandate of the process may be 
such that not all violations that occurred during the conflict are included (i.e. prosecuted 
or addressed) or not all perpetrators of these violations are considered (i.e. only certain 
people are held accountable by the process). Some individual conflict experiences will 
be included in the process (represented by +) and others will be excluded (represented 
by -). It is at this point that a potential disjuncture occurs between the events addressed 
by the PCJ and an individual’s conflict experience. The degree of this disjuncture 
determines whether an individual will be more likely to accept or deny the national 


















then he/she will be more likely to accept the process. If an individual’s experience is 
excluded from the PCJ (-) then that individual is more likely to deny the process. 
 I outline this argument in the sections that follow beginning with a brief 
discussion of conflict and the individual experience of conflict events. I then move on to 
discuss the creation of the government conflict frame and include an argument for the 
role of regime type in frame construction (as measured by veto) and the level of 
inclusivity or exclusivity of the frame. From here I elaborate how a post-conflict justice 
process is chosen and structured based on the conflict frame. I close this chapter with a 
discussion of individual reactions to the conflict frame based on an individual’s 
experience with the conflict itself. Here I derive two hypotheses based on the potential 
disjuncture between the focus of the justice effort and an individual’s experience with 
the conflict. I bring regime type back into the discussion by arguing that the level of 
political openness in the country (as measured by voice) determines the range of 
potential reactions to the disjuncture available to individuals. Here I present two 
additional hypotheses based on the potential eafect of regime type on the forms of 
resistance against the PCJ available to individuals. 
 
The Conflict 
Conflicts vary in terms of the actors involved (i.e., government vs. government 
or government vs. non-government), the conflict issues (i.e., an incompatibility over 
territory or a desire to take control of the government), the types of events (i.e., 
conventional war, guerilla war, terrorist attacks, genocide and/or civil war), the duration, 
and the intensity of the violence. Typically, these characteristics are conveyed as an 
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aggregated description of the conflict. For example, in the conflict literature duration is 
generally calculated based on the first battle-related death in a given country and the 
conflict is considered terminated when the number of battle deaths falls below a certain 
threshold in a given period of time (e.g. the UCDP Battle-deaths dataset (Lacina and 
Gleditsch 2005)). This measure of duration is calculated for the country on a whole. 
Communicated in this fashion this does not tell us about regional variation where the 
conflict may have arrived later and ended earlier or about individual experiences with 
the violence over the same timeframe. 
Theoretically there exists a universe of events and individual experiences, which 
embody the conflict, illustrated as Circle A in the model (see Figure 7 below). The 
conflict is defined as the entirety of all violations, by all perpetrators, which were 
experienced by all individuals. The conflict itself is a theoretical construction and it may 
not be possible to ever know or fully catalogue every experience that took place as part 
of the conflict. For this reason, the circle is represented as bounded by a fuzzy border. 
 










Individual Conflict Experience(s) 
Included within every conflict are all the experiences of the individuals who 
were caught up in it. Therefore, by definition, all individual conflict experiences must be 
included within the conflict (within Circle A).  
Regardless of the characteristics being considered, individuals within a country 
experience the violence differently. Individuals experience different events composed of 
potentially different violations by different perpetrators at different times. Take 
Kalyvas’s (2006) analysis of the Greek Civil War, for example. In his work, he found 
that there was a large amount of variation in the patterns of violence experienced by 
individuals across the country as well as the level of participation in the violence. 
Kalyvas begins his analysis with a study of two similar villages in Greece during the 
German occupation. While the demographic characteristics of these villages were 
similar, one village experienced the massacre of five local families by an invading rebel 
group, while the other village was successful in thwarting a similar attack. The 
individuals within these two communities had a very different experience of violence 
over the course of the Civil War. 
As concerned for this dissertation, an individual’s experience with the conflict 
can vary across four variables: (1) type(s) of violations experienced; (2) perpetrator(s) of 




Types of Violations 
The type(s) of violation(s) an individual experiences is a categorization of the 
act(s) of violence committed against him/her. Types of violations can range from 
property violations to physical integrity violations to intangible violations or any 
combination of these three.9 Property violations are material and involve the loss of 
property (either personal or communal such as a school or roads). These violations are 
generally one-off experiences such as a robbery or destruction of a house. During the 
course of the conflict property violations can be the result of direct targeting, such as an 
individual’s pub being blown up by an IRA bomb during the Troubles in Northern 
Ireland. Or the experience could be the result of a more systematic policy of violation 
such as the consignment of Jewish goods in Germany during World War II. 
Physical integrity violations are human rights violations that involve physical 
contact such as experiencing torture or other physical violence (e.g. being beaten, 
physically threatened, shot). These violations are often single occurrences (one-off 
events), but can occur multiple times. For example, a person could be shot multiple 
times over the course of the conflict in unique events. Physical integrity violations can 
be the result of an official state or rebel policy of violence towards civilians, but they can 
also be an accident (such as when an individual is caught in cross-fire between two 
armed combatant groups) or random targeting (such as being the victim of a terrorist 
attack). 
Finally, intangible violations are those conflict experiences consisting of the 
“lack or loss of opportunity”. These experiences cannot be easily measured (Elster 2004, 
180). Intangible violations are generally systematic policies such as employment 
                                                
9 Elster (2004) delineates violations into three similar categories: material, personal or intangible. 
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discrimination, the implementation of school quotas or racial/ethnic segregation and 
occur over an extended period of time (generally the entire length of the conflict). Often 
individuals will not recognize that they are or have been the victims of intangible 
violations until after the conflict has ended. Two of the most prominent cases of 
intangible violations are the long-term effects of slavery on the African American 
community in the United States and the economic and emotional legacy of Apartheid in 
South Africa. Also included in this category is the experience of fear, such as fear of 
movement, which can have physical as well as psychological consequences for 
individuals yet these effects remain intangible.  
In addition to personally experiencing violations, an individual’s conflict 
experience includes those violations experienced by an individual’s family members or 
the violations experienced by other members in the individual’s community. These 
categories are important for understanding the context of violence (i.e., broader 
community violence) in which the individual may have lived. Family members and 
members of the community could experience each of the three categories: property 
violations, physical integrity violations and intangible violations.  
 
Perpetrator of the Violation(s) 
An individual’s experience with conflict is also a product of the perpetrator of 
his/her violations. A perpetrator of a given violation is the person or group of people 
who commit or perpetrate the violation against an individual. Perpetrators could be the 
government, rebels or vigilantes. Government perpetrators include the army, police or 
security forces or any other armed wing connected to the state. Rebel perpetrators are 
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associated with the other side (Side B) in the conflict. These rebels are a group in armed 
opposition to the government and may target civilians as a tactic in that opposition. And 
finally, vigilantes are those perpetrators who take advantage of the conflict and 
lawlessness that may follow to perpetrate violence against other individuals. This 
violence could be motivated by greed, fear, retribution etc., but these motivations are 
outside of the goals of the conflict itself and are not associated with either the 
government or the rebel group. Each perpetrator group is capable of perpetrating each 
type of violation (property, physical integrity and/or intangible), however intangible 
violations are most commonly perpetrated by the government. 
Violations from any of these perpetrator categories could be either intentional or 
accidental. The rebel group could directly target a particular individual accused of 
informing on the group or it is possible for the government to perpetrate physical 
integrity violations when an individual gets caught in the cross-fire between the army 
and the rebel group. In this example, the government is not directly targeting the 




Individual experiences with conflict can vary according to the length of time in 
which he/she experiences the violence. The duration of an individual experience with 
violence is simply the length of time over which the violation or series of violations 
occur. The duration of an individual’s conflict experience is distinct from the duration of 
the conflict itself. For example, if a coup erupts in the capital city, it is possible for rural 
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communities outside of the capital to avoid the affects of the violence until the civil war 
erupts. Here individual experiences with the conflict may not begin until the violence 
reaches the rural area. By this same reasoning, it is also possible for individuals to live 
within the geographic boundaries of a conflict area (i.e., where the violence is taking 
place), but to not have any conflict experience at all. This is the case for some members 
of affluent communities in Northern Ireland, who, for example, did not experience or 
witness violence during the Troubles.  
It is often difficult to determine when a conflict begins or ends. For this reason, 
individuals may experience violations that occur before or after the main episode of 
conflict. Even after a peace agreement has been signed between two warring parties, 
individuals could experience retribution killings or other attacks directly related to the 
previous violence. While these types of violence are often under recorded, they can 
become a very contentious issue when the mandate of a national justice process is being 
determined. For example, in South Africa, the negotiated date for the “end” of Apartheid 
(1993) became the marker for granting amnesty for politically motivated crimes. Crimes 
(or violations) experienced after this date were not considered part of the conflict, and 
therefore the perpetrators of these crimes were not eligible for amnesty. This temporal 
definition prevented members of AWB (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) who 
participated in election violence in early 1994 from being eligible for amnesty. 
 
Intensity of Violence 
Finally, an individual’s conflict experience can vary according to the intensity of 
violation(s) he/she experienced. The actual intensity of an individual’s experience with 
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violence is more difficult to measure than the type, perpetrator or duration of that 
violence. The intensity of the violence is the severity of the violation experienced by the 
individual, however, this is often challenging to scale. A researcher could assume that 
property violations such as being robbed are of lower intensity than physical integrity 
violations such as being shot which is comparatively lower than the death of a family 
member, but this need not be the case. Individuals often scale the intensity of certain 
experiences in ways that differ from traditional social science conceptions of intensity. 
For example, despite the murder of her grandfather in a paramilitary attack, one 
interview respondent from Belfast claimed that an army search of her home was the 
worst (highest intensity) violation that she experienced during the conflict. The 
respondent argued that while the death of her grandfather was tragic, it was a single 
event, while the raid of her home made her fearful of her living situation for the 
remainder of the conflict (A-4).10 
The intensity of violence can therefore be conceived in multiple ways. It could 
be (1) the severity of the violations as scaled by the individual respondent, (2) the 
severity of the violations as scaled by the researcher or (3) a count variable of the 
number of violations experienced by the individual (their family and their community) 
across the course of the conflict. 
 
Reasons for Variation 
An individual’s experience with the conflict can vary according to the person’s 
ethnicity, religion, social status, education level, geographic location during the conflict, 
                                                
10 Interviews are labeled according to the first two letters of the location where the interview was 
conducted and a number representing the order in which that interview was collected from the research 
location.  
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etc. By definition, an individual’s conflict experience is included in the broader conflict 
(represented by “–” within Circle A in Figure 8). What is most important here is that 
anyone in a given society, regardless of the characteristics outlined above, could 
experience any violation across a variety of types, perpetrators, durations and intensities. 
Experiences are rarely unique to an individual or group. Certainly there are some 
violations that are more probable for certain groups than for others. For example, women 
are more likely to be the victims of sexual assault then men or members of the 
government opposition are more likely to be targeted by the government than 
government supporters. But there are exceptions across both of these examples. Finally, 
it is possible that some individuals experienced no violence during the conflict. The 
probability of not experiencing violations is a product of the level of diffusion of the 
conflict itself, but also individual characteristics such as personal wealth/resources and 
education level. The diverse nature of individual conflict experiences foreshadows the 
difficulty that governments will have in implementing a justice effort to address all of 
these experiences. 
 



















The Post-Conflict Period 
Eventually, the conflict and individual violations will end. To prevent conflict 
reoccurrence or a sudden shift in power, the post-conflict government must work quickly 
to secure its own future. The primary motivation of the government during this period is 
to ensure the consolidation and strengthening of its political power (also called “political 
integration” in the early institutions literature (Zolberg 1966)). Institutions and processes 
implemented by the government in the post-conflict period will work towards this aim. 
Individuals in the post-conflict period work to rebuild their lives and begin to reckon 
with their own experiences of conflict. 
Once the violence has ended, questions of justice are raised. While the 
government’s main focus in addressing issues of justice is political consolidation, the 
individuals who experienced the conflict are working to address their own justice needs 
(i.e., locating the bodies of those who were killed or disappeared, punishing the person 
responsible for their injuries, gaining reparations for the damages that they suffered, 
etc.). At the most basic level, an individual has a preference for his/her personal conflict 
experience to be addressed. 
Within the state, there are two main actors with preferences about what should be 
done: the government and its citizens. It is possible for outside actors, such as 
neighboring states or the international legal community to establish justice preferences 
as well but for the purpose of this argument I will focus only on the aforementioned two 
actors. So while the state’s concerns about justice are confined to ensuring political 
consolidation, individuals are concerned with having their personal experiences of 
conflict addressed in some way. 
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The Creation of the Government Conflict Frame 
In the period immediately following the conflict, the government must decide 
what, if anything, will be done to address the legacy of violence from the conflict. The 
government must decide whom, if anyone will be held accountable, for what and how. 
Instead of relying on an individual’s conflict experience (as individuals do), 
governments create a conflict frame that is used to make decisions regarding the 
selection and implementation of justice efforts as well as the mandate of those efforts. 
The conflict frame is also an efficient way to present those decisions to its citizens. 
The process by which the conflict frame is created is theorized below, but I begin 
with an understanding of what a conflict frame is and why a government would choose 
to create one. 
 
Defining the Conflict Frame  
Framing “refers to the process of selecting and highlighting some aspects of a 
perceived reality, and enhancing the salience of an interpretation and evaluation of that 
reality” (Entman 2004, 26).11 Through a frame, the government “seek[s] to establish a 
dominant definition or construction of an issue” (Nelson and Oxley 1999, 1059). In the 
case of the conflict frame, the government seeks to construct the conflict itself. Because 
the government does not have an individual conflict experience, per se, it must create a 
frame through which to understand the conflict and make relevant policy decisions (in 
this case, regarding post-conflict justice). The conflict frame is a deliberate, strategic 
interpretation of the events and experiences of the conflict. The frame emphasizes 
                                                
11 I would like to thank Anne Cizmar for her help in dissecting the American Politics framing literature. 
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certain events, actors and experiences over others to create an account of who did what 
to whom, when and where.  
As with other types of issue frames, the conflict frame is “a declaration of what a 
policy dispute is really about and what it has nothing to do with” (Nelson and Oxley 
1999, 1059). Here the government is able to use the conflict frame both to determine its 
own policy choices and to convince the public to accept those choices. Nelson, Clawson 
and Oxley (1997) argue that frames work by increasing the “psychological importance” 
or weight given to some beliefs with regards to the specific issue of concern. In the case 
of a previous conflict, the frame gives weight to particular violations or experiences that 
contribute to one version of events over another. The conflict frame is, therefore, a 
categorization of the issues. For example, a government may choose to highlight a rebel 
attack on the capital city, but may minimize a government attack on a neighboring 
village. While both events occurred and are therefore included in the conflict (refer back 
to circle A in Figure 7), including only the rebel attack in the conflict frame emphasizes 
that event over others and gives it greater importance and policy relevance. 
The government creates a conflict frame. The political/strategic nature of a 
conflict frame means that the “accuracy” of the frame itself is susceptible to political 
will. The conflict frame may accurately represent conflict events or it may not. The 
frame may include multiple experiences or a single version of events. The conflict frame 
need not be a good faith effort to represent the broader experience of the conflict, but 
rather it could be the representation of a single type of experience because the 
representation of that experience is politically advantageous for the government. 
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Following this argument we can see that there are three conceptions of the 
violence: (1) the conflict, (2) the individual conflict experience, and (3) the government 
conflict frame. The conflict is the abstract conceptualization, which includes all events 
and individual experiences of a given period of violence. This conceptualization most 
closely reflects the actual conflict experience of the country. The individual conflict 
experience, as laid out above, is the events (defined as type[s] of violations, 
perpetrator[s] of these violations, intensity and duration) experienced by a single 
individual over the course of the conflict. The conflict frame is the events and 
experiences chosen by the government to represent the national experience of the 
conflict. 
 
Figure 9. Conflict and Conflict Frames 
 
As we can see from the diagrams in 
Figure 9, these three concepts can be mutually 
exclusive and/or overlapping to varying degrees. 
Circle A represents the conflict and Circle B 
represents the conflict frame while the + and – 
represent individual conflict experiences which are 
either included or excluded from the conflict frame. 
The conflict frame (Circle B) is generally included 
within the set of experiences and events of the 
conflict (Circle A) as represented in the first and 
second diagrams. In the first diagram, the conflict 
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frame captures nearly all of the events and experiences that occurred during the conflict. 
Nearly all individual conflict experiences are included in the conflict frame (represented 
by +). In the second diagram, the state has chosen a conflict frame that represents only a 
subset of the events of the actual conflict. Here certain individual experiences are both 
included (+) and excluded (-). In the third diagram the government conflict frame 
includes both a subset of events and experiences from the conflict as well as a set of 
events outside of the conflict. Here, the government has fabricated certain events or 
experiences that didn’t really occur (these events are entirely a product of the conflict 
frame). And finally in the last diagram, the conflict frame shares no events or 
experiences with the actual conflict. The government has entirely invented these events. 
While this fourth conceptualization is a theoretical possibility in reality it is almost 
impossible to imagine. It would be a situation such as the Dustin Hoffman movie, Wag 
the Dog, in which the American government scripted an imaginary war with Albania in 
order to distract attention from a presidential sex scandal. In practice, a conflict frame 
will almost certainly be based on some experiences from the conflict; the variation is in 
the degree the “inclusivity” of the conflict frame. 
 
Why create a frame? 
 The goal of framing is for the government to win support for its issue or policy. 
Frames are strategically constructed to favor particular outcomes (i.e. a vote or political 
support) around an issue or event (Entman 2004). A conflict frame is therefore created 
with three main purposes: (1) simplifying the understanding of the experience of the 
conflict for domestic audiences, (2) expediting government decision making regarding 
-   - 
- - 
- - - 
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the conflict and (3) strategically consolidating power after the conflict. Each of these 
purposes is elaborated further below. 
First, the frame simplifies the complex experience of the conflict to make it 
easier to understand for domestic audiences (Simpson 2007). Because a conflict is an 
elaborate series of experiences and events, individuals and the government use the 
conflict frame as the primary source for understanding an otherwise complicated 
experience. Frames can be used to educate the public by providing “correct, helpful 
information”, but there are other circumstances where leaders “influence public opinion 
by providing incorrect, biased, or selective information” which can be used to deceive or 
mislead the public (Page and Shapiro 1992, 356). Deception and exclusion occur when 
the conflict frame does not (largely) overlap with the actual conflict (represented by the 
second, third and fourth diagrams in Figure 9).  
The second purpose of a conflict frame is to allow the events of the conflict to be 
viewed in a way that is politically advantageous for the current government. The conflict 
frame allows the government to efficiently make policy decisions in the post-conflict 
period related to issues surrounding the conflict. Once the frame is created policies and 
institutions are selected to match the frame. Through simplifying the experience the 
government is able to focus political debates, identify victim and perpetrator groups and 
allocate post-conflict resources in a strategic and coherent way. For this reason, the 
construction of a conflict frame is an essential tool in post-conflict nation building (Marx 
1998). 
Third, political consolidation is accomplished through the conflict frame by 
strategically including and excluding certain events and individual experiences from the 
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fame. The government uses the frame to support or exclude certain individuals by 
defining the winners and losers of the conflict as well as the perpetrators and the victims. 
Political rivals, for example, could be linked to the losing or perpetrator group through 
the conflict frame, thus portraying them as a threat to the post-conflict state. Equally 
common, the dominant political party could be cast in a virtuous light by the conflict 
frame as either the victor or the victim of the conflict. Victor or victim status can be 
useful for gathering domestic (and often international) political support as well as 
fending off domestic political opposition. In the case of Rwanda, this outcome of the 
conflict frame is known as the “genocide credit” (i.e., gaining political traction through 
leveraging genocide guilt against the domestic and international community) (Reyntjens 
2004). The conflict frame can also strategically exclude certain contentious events. For 
example, following the end of Apartheid the ANC’s role in terrorism and the “black on 
black” violence of the Inkatha Freedom Party were minimized in the conflict frame and 
instead the military abuses of the Apartheid government were highlighted. 
 
How the Conflict Frame is Created 
The conflict frame influences the greater understanding of the conflict by 
“suggesting which of many, possibly conflicting, considerations [regarding the events of 
the conflict] should predominate” (Nelson and Oxley 1999, 1059). In the American 
politics literature the conceptualization of framing has been primarily linked to issue 
areas. Here the concept of issue framing is stretched to include the broader interpretation 
of historical and political events that make up the conflict. In this case “how citizens 
think about a public issue… depends on how it is framed” (Sniderman and Theriault 
 71 
2004, 135). In order for a frame to function it must be widely disseminated to the 
population. The conflict frame is propagated through media, political speeches, 
legislation, memorials, educational curriculum, and, important for this project, through 
post-conflict justice institutions. Once the frame is disseminated it is continually 
reinforced through new government policies and institutions.  
 
Regime Type and Its Effect on the Conflict Frame 
The level of inclusively or exclusivity of the conflict frame is a product of many 
factors (e.g. the resources of the government, historical effects, strength of the 
opposition etc.). I argue that one of the most important factors is the regime type of the 
post-conflict government. The degree to which a government seeks and is able to attain 
political consolidation through exclusion is a product of the political structure of the 
government itself. More open regimes (such as democracies) should be more likely to 
create an inclusive conflict frame. More closed regimes, on the other hand, will have a 
greater ability and incentive to create an exclusive frame.  
The level of inclusion of the conflict frame is a product of the state’s ability to 
restrict the content of the frame. This is due, in part, to the level of “veto” across a given 
population. Veto is the degree to which an individual is able to sanction their 
government for unpopular policies (Davenport 2007). I argue that the competitive 
process of a more open political system restricts the potential for exclusion because the 
government has a certain level of obligation to its citizens in order to stay in power and 
the citizens have the opportunity to remove the government from power if those 
obligations are not meet. If a given individual, for example, has the opportunity to vote 
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the current government out of power, then the government has an incentive to include 
that individual’s conflict experience therefore avoiding sanctioning.  
Open regimes are also more likely to create an inclusive conflict frame because 
of the greater access to information of it citizens. Free press and open discourse within a 
country makes it more difficult for a government to create a frame that does not match 
individual conflict experiences. An exclusive conflict frame may not convince 
individuals if they are informed about the range of conflict experiences across the 
country. However, this effect requires access to information about the conflict. Open 
regimes are more likely to produce inclusive conflict frames reducing the need for denial 
or subversion of the process, which is discussed further below. 
  Closed, or less representative, political systems do not have this incentive. 
Closed regimes are more likely to have a government held in power by a small coalition 
of elites (Bueno de Mesquita 2003) therefore reducing the number of experiences that 
need to be included in the conflict frame. In a closed system, a government’s obligation 
to its citizens is less of a constraint. Through control of the media, for example, the state 
is more easily and effectively able to construct an exclusionary conflict frame that may 
capture very few conflict experiences. Because its citizens cannot sanction the 
government as easily as they could in an open system, the government has less of an 
incentive to create an inclusive frame. In a closed system, the government’s incentive is 
to construct a frame to include experiences that pacify the group that can keep the 
government in power. The greater ability of the government to control or influence 
national academic debates on the conflict, regional media and other sources of 
information, the higher the potential of exclusion for the frame.  
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The creation of conflict frames is further explored through the case analysis of 
Rwanda (Chapter 5) and Northern Ireland (Chapter 6). 
 
Implementing Post-Conflict Justice 
Once a conflict frame is created, the government uses the frame to select a post-
conflict justice process. The government uses the conflict frame to determine the type of 
justice process, but more importantly, the mandate of the process. The type of the 
process refers to the institution type while the mandate of the process refers to which 
violations, perpetrators, intensity (level of severity) and duration (time frame) the 
process will address. 
As previously defined, a post-conflict justice (PCJ) effort is implemented to 
address systematic patterns of abuse, individual violations and events which occurred 
during the conflict, but how these violations will be addressed along with which crimes 
and which perpetrators will be included in the process is not predetermined by the 
implementation of an institution itself. Which violations become relevant for PCJ and 
are therefore included in the PCJ mandate is a direct result of the violence accounted for 
in the conflict frame. For example, if one type or source of violence becomes significant 
as part of the frame, then the logical progression is to create a justice process which 
deals only with that type of violence. First, the government constructs the frame; then 
the justice institution follows. PCJ becomes a tool through which the government can 
reinforce the conflict frame defining who is a victim and who is not, who is a perpetrator 
and who is not, and which crimes will be punished and which will not. The PCJ effort is 
used to strengthen these categories and distribute justice accordingly.  
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As discussed above, the government creates a conflict frame based on a strategic 
political calculus. Because the conflict frame is rarely identical to the conflict (refer back 
to Figure 9), there will be individual conflict experiences that are included in the 
mandate of the PCJ process and experiences that are excluded. Exclusion from the 
conflict frame creates a disjuncture between an individual’s conflict experience and the 
actual institution that was put in place by the government to address these experiences. 
Faced with this potential disjuncture individuals have the choice to either accept the 
process or to deny it in some way.  
By definition, the justice process must exist within the government conflict 
frame. As Figure 10 demonstrates, the events addressed by the PCJ (Circle C) exist 
within the conflict frame and can exist to varying degrees within the conflict itself 
(Circle A). The degree to which the PCJ does or does not overlap with the actual conflict 
determines the potential disjuncture between individual experiences and the justice 
process. 
 






















I will discuss the process of individual acceptance and denial below, but for now 
I turn to political exclusion and the decision by the government to exclude certain 
individuals and groups from the justice effort. 
 
Political Exclusion and Post-Conflict Justice 
The government may have a strategic incentive to exclude certain individuals 
from the justice process for reasons of political consolidation as outlined above. By 
restricting the conflict frame to include only certain types of violence and certain events 
from the conflict, the government is able to consolidate political support. Often this 
consolidation is aided by highlighting violent events in which the current government 
was not involved or events in which the current government can be identified as the hero 
or victor. As Elster (2004) outlines in regards to political transitions, incoming elites (or 
governments in general) are either vote seeking or vote denying. Here the PCJ can be 
used as a tool to strengthen relations with particular included individuals and deny the 
access of others. 
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This potential exclusion is represented in Figure 11 above. Here some individual 
conflict experiences are addressed by the PCJ (represented by +) and others are ignored 
or excluded by the effort (represented by – ). 
One example of this type of political exclusion occurred in South Africa 
following the Apartheid regime. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
mandated a focus on people who experienced “extreme violations”. This decision 
excluded people who had been victims of other types of violations such as systematic 
discrimination and low levels of abuse, which were arguably the hallmark of the 
Apartheid regime (Wilson 2001). This restriction was a strategic decision on the part of 
the transition government to control the scope of the TRC and the potential political and 
monetary claims of victims. A similar restriction of mandate was evident in Chile when 
the new government elected to form a truth commission to investigate ‘disappearances’ 
during the previous regime. While disappearances were a widespread and systematic 
problem during the conflict in Chile, the truth commission was limited to dealing with a 
very specific subset of crimes (i.e. one type of violation). This restriction limited the 
number of potential victims and excluded those individuals and families who had been 
victims of other types of violence (Simpson 2007). This outcome was the product of an 
exclusionary justice process that strategically focused on a particular crime without 
criminalizing the entire Chilean military. 
 
Individual Reactions to Post-Conflict Justice 
Once a post-conflict justice effort has been selected and implemented by the 
government, it is up to the individual to determine how he/she will interact with the 
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effort. Individuals have the choice of whether they will accept the PCJ and implement it 
accordingly or whether they will deny the process. When a PCJ is accepted an individual 
adheres to the process’s mandate and the individual participates in the process fully. 
When a process is denied, an individual will either: reject the process outright and refuse 
to participate; or, more often, present ‘everyday forms of resistance’ (Scott 1985) such 
as low-level participation in the process or the creation of parallel processes. 
I argue that the decision to accept or deny the justice process is based on the 
potential disjuncture between an individual’s conflict experience, as outlined above, and 
the PCJ which is selected. If the PCJ mandate focuses on violations and perpetrators that 
the individual did not experience, and fails to address the individual’s personal 
experience then the individual is presented with a disjuncture between the PCJ effort and 
his/her own conflict experience. There will be variation in the degree of the disjuncture 
between an individual’s conflict experience and PCJ, but for the purpose of this project I 
test two hypotheses on the extreme of either case. I argue that an individual who is 
presented with a justice process which matches his/her conflict experience (e.g. no 
disjuncture) will be more likely to accept the process. In addition, I argue that an 
individual whose conflict experience is excluded from the justice process (e.g. the 
process does not address the conflict experience of the individual) will be more likely to 
deny the process. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): When PCJ includes an individual’s conflict 
experience the individual will be more likely to accept the process. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): When PCJ excludes an individual’s conflict 
experience the individual will be more likely to deny the process. 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are illustrated in the complete causal model in Figure 12. 
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Regime Type and its Effect on Denial 
In addition to the potential effect that regime type can have on the government’s 
strategic response to the conflict (the conflict frame), regime type also has an influence 
on an individual’s strategic response to PCJ. The opportunities available for an 
individual to deny a national justice process are a direct product of the level of political 
opportunity for that action within the state. The greater the political opportunity (i.e., an 
open regime) an individual has to deny PCJ the greater the chances for public forms of 
resistance such as refusing to participate in the justice process or the creation of parallel, 
non-state, justice processes to address unmet justice needs. Publically rejecting a process 
may be extremely dangerous in certain societies, but a legitimate form of resistance in 
others. ‘Every day acts of resistance’ such as foot dragging, failing to actively participate 
in a national justice process or private expressions of resentment will be more likely in 














 H1: Accept 
 H1: Accept 
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(i.e., in closed regimes). Here openly refusing to participate in a process may be too 
dangerous so individuals are forced to choose private (less public) methods of denial. 
The forms of denial available to an individual are a product of the level of 
“voice” within the state. Voice is the degree to which the government is “made 
accountable to those subject to its power” (Davenport 2007, 22). I argue that the ability 
of an individual to openly challenge PCJ, if they choose to do so, is a product of the 
political opportunity within the society for that action. Based on this argument I 
maintain that open forms of denial such as refusal to participate in PCJ or the creation of 
parallel processes will be more likely in societies with high levels of voice. In addition, I 
argue that more ‘everyday forms of resistance’ such as foot-dragging or reduced levels 
of participation in the existing process will be likely in societies with low levels of 
voice. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Individuals who choose to deny the PCJ effort in an 
open society will be more likely to use public forms of denial such as 
refusing to participate in the process or the creation of parallel processes. 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Individuals who choose to deny the PCJ effort in a 
closed society will be more likely to use private forms of denial such as 
reduced levels of participation in the existing process or private 
expressions of resentment. 
 
These hypotheses are tested in the case of individuals who choose to deny the 
justice efforts in Rwanda and in Northern Ireland (in Chapter 7). 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I developed a theory for participation in and exclusion from post-
conflict justice based on individual conflict experiences and the government selection of 
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the justice process. This theory generated two hypotheses about participation based on 
the potential disjuncture between an individual’s conflict experience and the justice 
institution created by the government and an additional two hypotheses on the effect of 
regime type on the type of denial an individual might choose when faced with this 
disjuncture. 
In the following chapters I test these hypotheses, beginning first with a 
discussion of individual conflict experiences and the government conflict frame for each 
of the two cases, Rwanda and Northern Ireland and then testing patterns of participation 
across both cases. Before moving to the Rwanda and Northern Ireland cases I begin with 
an overview of the research methodology used to both collect and analyze the data.  
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Chapter 4:  
Methodology and the Microfoundations of Post-Conflict Justice 
 
I have asserted in the introduction to this dissertation that investigating individual 
participation in and exclusion from post-conflict justice (PCJ) is essential for 
understanding the functioning of PCJ on the whole. In this chapter I suggest that 
measuring this participation and exclusion requires a disaggregated approach focusing 
on the microfoundational mechanisms that drive the process. Taking this methodological 
approach is necessary for moving beyond the existing, government-created, conflict 
frame and its subsequent justice process and for cataloging individual conflict 
experiences and the effect that those experiences have on individual interactions with the 
justice process. 
In this chapter I begin with the reasoning behind the use of microfoundations for 
this dissertation. I then present an overview of the methods used in my research. I 
organize this overview according to the two categories of data needed to address my 
research questions: (1) disaggregated conflict data; and (2) individual level data on PCJ 
participation. In this section I specifically address the use of microfoundational methods 
and justify my interview sample size. Next I turn to the research design for this 
dissertation. I present a justification for the case selection of both Rwanda and Northern 
Ireland, and also for the areas within each country where interviews were conducted. I 
discuss the interview methodology more specifically presenting the similarities and 




As Kalyvas writes "wars, and their violence, display enormous variation- both 
across and within countries and time” (Kalyvas 2006, 7). The microfoundational 
approach has emerged in conflict studies in order to address this variation and the 
possible affects that it may have on other theories related to and surrounding conflict, 
such as theories of post-conflict justice. Microfoundations look at individual and local-
level determinants of conflict and violence by disaggregating the mechanisms of conflict 
to the individual or community level. In moving beyond an emphasis on the aggregated, 
“national-level”, the mircofoundational movement has been able to gain leverage on 
issues such as the dynamics of violence (Kalyvas 2006), rebel movement violence and 
organization (Weinstein 2007), peasant mobilization and participation (Wood 2003; 
Straus 2006) and patterns of civilian targeting (Davenport and Stam 2009). Scholars who 
use this methodology argue that these individual dynamics matter and that they are 
essential for understanding the patterns of the conflict more generally.  
In addition to a different ideological presupposition, the microfoundational 
movement is rooted in a different methodological understanding than large-N, cross-
national research on conflict. The unit of analysis in this framework moves from the 
conflict on a whole to individual level variables (such as economic inequality, land 
scarcity, ethnic heterogeneity etc.). This research generally focuses on within case 
comparisons to gain leverage on these questions (i.e., the villages of Manesi and Gerbesi 
in Greece (Kalyvas 2006), Marínguè and Ribáuè in Mozambique (Weinstein 2007) and 
contested communities across the Usulután region of El Salvador (Wood 2003)). Within 
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case comparison allows scholars to develop comparable cases for testing hypothesis 
within a given conflict. 
Following on the existing work of microfoundational conflict scholars, I propose 
a more refined methodology for studying post-conflict justice that allows me to use 
detailed analysis of a limited number of cases (individual interviews) to understand 
individual experiences with the conflict and the government creation of the conflict 
frame. By taking this approach to the study of post-conflict justice, I move beyond the 
current understanding of the national process, which adheres to the government conflict 
frame, to a more nuanced understanding of how individual conflict experiences can 
affect individual interaction with and participation in national justice. By not assuming 
that the national justice process addresses all individual conflict experiences, we can 
begin to see the strategic decisions that go into constructing a government conflict frame 
and the subsequent justice solution.  
I choose to address the research questions in my dissertation with a 
disaggregated, microfoundational methodology for three main reasons. First, the existing 
work on the overall effects of post-conflict justice has been inconclusive (e.g. Brahms 
2005; Lie et al. 2007). I argue that this work is “digging in the wrong place” or rather by 
focusing on a national-level analysis we are not able to measure the effect of variation or 
patterns in individual implementation and participation which could condition these 
outcomes. By failing to address the possible effects of individual-level variation on the 
overall outcomes of post-conflict justice, the results of current investigations have been 
unable to find conclusive patterns of outcomes. It could be that PCJ is not related to the 
outcomes of interest. Alternatively, it could be that the negative effects of exclusion are 
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canceling out the positive effects of the process on included individuals leaving us with 
null results. By focusing on the micro-level of post-conflict justice, I move away from 
this limitation and theorize the variation in interaction and participation with PCJ on the 
individual level. 
The second reason I choose a micro-level methodology is to incorporate the 
opinions of individuals into a broader theory of PCJ participation and exclusion. The 
current transitional justice literature is increasingly moving towards a greater 
incorporation of victim’s experiences (or those who experienced violations), but this 
work has not been expanded to a broader theory of transitional justice implementation or 
participation (Kulkarni et al. 2009; Gibson 2004). As I will demonstrate in the empirical 
chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7), this has also caused the potential for strategic political 
exclusion from PCJ on the part of the government to be overlooked.  
Finally, I employ a disaggregated methodology to gain a greater understanding 
of the mechanisms that drive events in the post-conflict period. The existing conflict 
literature has been making great strides in expanding our understanding of the form and 
function of conflict through greater attention to individual and regional variation in 
patterns of conflict participation and diffusion. As a student of conflict studies it is my 
intention to spread this understanding to the post-conflict period particularly the 
implementation of post-conflict institutions. 
There are other ways to investigate these claims, notably: (1) relying purely on 
quantitative data regarding the conflicts in Rwanda and Northern Ireland as well as 
existing data sources on participation in the justice efforts in each country; or (2) 
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exclusively using interview or ethnographic work to substantiate my theory. In essence 
using exclusively large-N or small-N data. Both of these options have their limitations. 
Large-N, quantitative data on conflict experience and PCJ participation are 
generally collected by the government or from government sources. This type of data 
collection favors the government conflict frame and is usually not able to capture wide 
variations in experiences across space and time. Conducting an analysis based on large-
N data generates a superficial review of patterns of conflict for each case and would 
reveal only the dominant conflict frame. This level of analysis also fails to take 
individual experiences and subsequent strategic reactions into account. 
However, the opposite extreme, small-N data is equally problematic. Focusing 
exclusively on individual experiences or personal accounts of conflict does not situate 
those experiences within broader patterns of violence. Without a greater understanding 
of the universe of conflict experiences or the pattern of conflict across a given country it 
is not possible to predict how representative is a give sample of violations. In my 
dissertation disaggregated conflict data for the whole country is used to select areas of 
interest and to situate the interview data within the broader context of the conflict.  
Having made the case for the use of micro-level data for the study of post-
conflict justice, I turn now to an overview of the methods used in my dissertation 
 
Introducing the Research Methods 
This dissertation investigates two research questions of interest. First I examine 
the mechanisms that account for the (potential) disjuncture between an individual’s 
experience of conflict and the experiences address by the mandate of the national justice 
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process. Second, I investigate the affect that the disjuncture (if any) has on an 
individual’s participation in the PCJ and his/her views of justice in general. In order to 
examine these two questions I needed to collect: (1) disaggregated data on conflict 
experiences throughout the country of interest relying primarily on non-state sources; 
and (2) individual-level data on participation in and views towards the national justice 
process. The rationale for each of these sources of data is explored below. 
 
Disaggregated Data on Conflict Experience 
In order to assess the disjuncture between individual conflict experiences and the 
mandate of the national justice process, I must first have an understanding of an 
individual’s personal experience during the conflict as well as an understanding of the 
PCJ’s mandate in relation to that experience. As discussed in the introduction, the 
current literature on post-conflict justice generally investigates these institutions at an 
aggregated level (e.g. variation and effects are studied across process without attention 
being paid to potential variation within the process). This focus prevents us from 
observing the potential disjuncture between individual conflict experiences and the 
process mandate. If we do not account for variation across individual experiences with 
the conflict, then we are unable to identify this disjuncture.  
Paralleling the current trend in the conflict literature, my dissertation takes a 
mixed-methods approach using micro-level data on the two conflicts of interest (Rwanda 
and Northern Ireland) and combining that data with in-depth interviews from 
individuals. This methodology allows me to investigate the range of individual conflict 
experiences that occurred in each country outside of the government conflict frame. 
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Quantitative data is used for establishing the conflict frame as well as selecting the 
interview sites. For Rwanda, I use data from the GenoDynamics project by Christian 
Davenport and Allan Stam (2009). This project combines multiple data sources to create 
predictions for battle deaths and perpetrators across Rwanda from April 1994 through 
July 1994 (the duration of the Rwandan Genocide). For Northern Ireland, I rely on the 
disaggregated tabulation of people killed during the conflict from Sutton’s Index of 
Deaths.12 This tabulation relies on media sources to catalogue all people killed as a result 
of the conflict from 1968 through 1998 (the duration of the Troubles). 
In addition to disaggregated quantitative data on the conflict, I use individual 
interviews to establish the range of potential conflict experiences for individuals in the 
country. To accomplish this, I conducted 80 randomly selected interviews in both 
Rwanda and Northern Ireland. Individuals were asked about violations they had 
experienced. These interviews did not assume a particular type of conflict experience, 
but rather catalogued specific violations and perpetrators across individuals. When 
compared with the quantitative conflict data these interviews begin to develop a 
theoretical range of conflict experiences across the population.  
Unlike existing interview and survey work in this field, respondents were not 
sampled on conflict experience (i.e., perceived victim status) but rather by random 
sample across geographic location. This technique allowed me to come across a wider 
variety of experiences, including people who did not consider themselves “victims” and 
to gain a greater understanding of the possible range of experiences in each country. 
Participation in this research was not based on victim status, but rather on membership 
in the society. In this way I was able to develop an understanding of the range of conflict 
                                                
12 http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/ Accessed on December 18, 2010. 
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experiences across each country and outside of the conflict frame. Additional 
information on the collection of the interview data is provided below. 
 
Individual Level Data on Participation 
Once I established the range as well as an individual’s own experience with the 
conflict I could investigate the effect that this experience has on PCJ participation and 
views of justice in general. In addition to data on conflict experiences, I use the 
interview data collected in Rwanda and Northern Ireland to establish the relationship 
between conflict experience and PCJ participation. In Chapter 3, I theorize that an 
individual whose experience of conflict is excluded from the justice process will be less 
likely to accept and participate in the justice process, while an individual whose 
experience is included will be more likely to accept and participate. Individual level data 
on conflict experiences and PCJ participation is needed to test these two hypotheses. 
Therefore interview data was used for elaborating individual experiences outside 
of the conflict frame and determining individual interactions with the PCJ and the 
motivations behind that behavior. For this research I interviewed 80 people, 10 
respondents for each theoretical category. In Rwanda, I interviewed 10 people from each 
sector (two high-genocide sectors and two low-genocide sectors, one urban and one 
rural. See Table 1 below). In Northern Ireland, I interviewed 10 people from each 





Table 1: Interview Categories in Rwanda 














Table 2: Interview Categories in Northern 
Ireland 










The theoretical categories were selected in order to maximize potential variation 
on conflict experience. Remember that the goal is to categorize the range of possible 
experiences with the conflict across the population. In Rwanda, high- and low-genocide 
areas are a likely predictor of violence. In the same way, Catholic and Protestant 
communities in Northern Ireland experienced potentially different types of violations 
and different patterns of violence. Urban and rural locations were selected in both 
countries to increase potential variation. This divide between urban and rural 
experiences was more pronounced in Northern Ireland. In Rwanda, I choose not to 
conduct research in Kigali (the capital city) and therefore all of my research locations 
were comparatively rural.13 
 
                                                
13 Kigali was excluded from the sample for two reasons. First, as the country grows more urban, people in 
Kigali are general from all over the country and did not necessarily experience the conflict in that area. 
Many Kigali residents were actually raised outside the country and have returned to Rwanda with the 
support of the RPF government. People in Kigali also represent different demographics from the average 
Rwandan with higher levels of education, different language skills (people in Kigali are more likely to 
speak English) and higher incomes. Second, people in Kigali have a reputation for being less open and 
willing to participate in research than Rwandans outside of the city. While I did not empirically test this, 
elite level interviews cautioned against including Kigali in the sample.  
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Sample Size 
The decision of how many people to interview was a product of resources (time 
and money), the current literature on qualitative research methodology, and best 
practices within current micro-level research. As a graduate student on a limited research 
budget, 80 respondents represented a feasible amount of interviews both for time spent 
within each country and the resources needed to code (and in Rwanda also translate) the 
data. However this decision was also methodological. 
When doing large-N or survey work, the general consensus is the more 
observations the better. More observations reduce uncertainty in the estimates. This 
change in uncertainty is fairly dramatic when we are talking about small numbers of 
cases (i.e., adding 100 observations to 200 observations), but has diminishing marginal 
utility as the proportion between added and existing data increases (e.g. adding 100 
observations to 1,000).  
The conventions for qualitative research are less clear. Determining an 
appropriate formula for the sample size in qualitative research can be challenging 
because as Mugo (2010) states “the validity, meaningfulness, and insights generated 
from qualitative inquiry have more to do with the information-richness of the cases 
selected and the observational/analytical capabilities of the researcher than with sample 
size.” Here there is no definite rule to follow. The number of individuals needed is a 
product of the quality of the data received from each interview determined by the length 
of time of the interviews, the number of visits to each respondent, the level of specificity 
of the interview questions, etc. 
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Best practices within current qualitative research have generally suggested 
between 10 and 30 interviews per category of interest. While there is no official rule, 
this has been the convention. In Weinstein’s (2007) research on rebel organizations in 
Uganda, Mozambique and Peru, he interviewed between 3 and 29 people per category 
(See Table 3 below). Straus’s (2006) research on leaders and aggressive killers in the 
Rwandan Genocide relied, in part, on 19 non-random interviews within the Rwandan 
prisons. It is worth nothing that scholars often include additional data in their final 
manuscripts. Straus (2006), for example, relies on 210 randomly selected interviews in 
15 Rwandan prisons as well as micro-comparative data on the Genocide in five locations 
when conducting his final analysis. In other words, he used a mixed-methods approach. 
 
Table 3: Weinstein’s (2007) Distribution of Formal Interviews 




22 6 5 
Local Level Semuto Kiwanguzi Ribáuè Marínguè Huanta Tingo María 
Combatants 3 10 10 10 -- -- 
Civilians 29 11 19 14 21 16 
 
In my dissertation, I follow this convention. My interviews ranged between one 
and 3.5 hours long. These interviews took place in single sittings, though on some 
occasions, particularly in Northern Ireland individuals were introduced to the project on 
one day and I returned to conduct the interview on a subsequent day. This methodology 
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produced over 750 pages of analyzed texts directly on the research question of interest. 
Interview transcripts were coded and analyzed using TAMS Analyzer v.3.14  
Above, I demonstrated that both disaggregated conflict data and individual level 
data on conflict experience and participation in PCJ is needed in order to address 
questions of the potential disjuncture between an individual’s experience with conflict 
and the national justice process as well as the relationship between potential exclusion 
from the justice process and an individual’s participation in the process. Below I present 
the research design implemented to collect this data. 
 
Research Design 
  In order to address the hypotheses raised in Chapter 3, two types of data needed 
to be collected: (1) disaggregated data on the conflict (outside of the government conflict 
frame) including individual level data on conflict experiences; and (2) individual level 
data on participation and responses to the post-conflict justice effort. As introduced 
above, this was accomplished by using disaggregated data on both national conflicts (in 
Rwanda and Northern Ireland) and by conducting individual interviews in each country. 
In this section, I outline how both the country cases and the interview locations 
were chosen describing the conflict data used in this selection. I also explain the 
interview methodology used for each of these cases.  
 
                                                
14 TAMS Analyzer is freeware coding and text analysis software designed by Matthew Weinstein at Kent 
State University. For additional information on the software see: http://tamsys.sourceforge.net/gtams/ 
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Case Selection- The Countries 
Rwanda and Northern Ireland were selected as cases in this analysis for three 
reasons. First, in each country the conditions exist to create demand for a post-conflict 
justice process. Both Rwanda and Northern Ireland are post-conflict countries where 
people experienced human rights violations during the conflict period. In the post-
conflict period, there has been a shift in power (a new government in Rwanda and 
power-sharing in Northern Ireland) and justice has become a central issue. In both 
countries, justice issues are debated in the national media and among individuals. 
Because justice is salient it makes it possible to question individuals about their current 
interaction (if any) with the national process and views of justice in general.  
Second, across both countries there is a wide range of conflict experiences, 
allowing for variation on the most important theoretical variable of interest. The conflict 
was widespread enough to produce a range of experiences across the population in both 
Rwanda and Northern Ireland making it possible to test the effect of variation in conflict 
experience on participation in the national justice process.  
And finally, in both cases the justice efforts selected by the government are 
locally implemented, allowing me to measure variation in individual participation in 
each process. Individuals have an ability to directly participate in each justice process 
without additional barriers to entry (e.g. lack of information about the process or 
resources needed to participate in the process) that may confound my theory. For 
example, in Rwanda the Gacaca process operates in each individual village. Individuals 
don’t have to travel far in order to participate. If people choose not to participate in the 
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process it is most likely due to their desire not to participate, not because of outside 
impediments such as time, money or lack of information about Gacaca. 
Despite these similarities, Rwanda and Northern Ireland differ in two important 
ways. First, Rwanda and Northern Ireland represent different types as well as patterns of 
violence. The conflict in Rwanda is known for its extreme levels of violence in a ten-
year period (measured in both intensity and duration), while the conflict in Northern 
Ireland took place with relatively low intensity over a 30-year period (e.g. less than 
4,000 people killed). Investigating the effects of conflict experience across both 
extremes of violence (high and low) allows me to note potential influences that the 
actual intensity of the experience may have on patterns of PCJ participation. The 
conflicts in both Rwanda and Northern Ireland are described in Chapters 5 and 6 
respectively.  
Second, the two countries have different political systems. Investigating both a 
democracy (Northern Ireland) and a semi-autocracy (Rwanda) allows me to note ways in 
which the degree of veto and voice of a country’s political system can influence the 
relationship between the creation of a government conflict frame and the subsequent 
individual interaction with the national justice process. The predictions of these effects 
are discussed in Chapter 3. While a two case comparison does not allow me to 
conclusively determine causality, it does allow me to examine whether the outcomes in 
each country are consistent with what I predict based on the level of veto and voice. This 
difference allows me to investigate possible ways in which the conflict frame may 
emerge or be constructed differently across political system. In addition, comparing 
different political systems allows me to investigate the opportunities for denial that are 
 95 
available to individuals across different levels of political voice. While there are 
differences in conflict and political system, similar mechanisms are at work across each 
case. 
 
Case Selection- Within Rwanda 
In addition to conducting cross-case comparisons between Rwanda and Northern 
Ireland, the primary analysis is conducted within each country. The conflict experiences 
and PCJ interactions are compared across individuals within Rwanda and Northern 
Ireland respectively. Below I discuss how research locations were chosen in Rwanda and 
describe each of the four research sites. 
The interview data presented for Rwanda is the result of interviews conducted in 
four sectors15 across the country.16 Again, there is no convention for the number of 
research sites in qualitative research, however four sites allowed me to obtain regional 
variation (including urban and rural) and prevented me from relying on a single location 
for each level of violence (e.g. high-genocide and low-genocide). Sectors were selected 
based on the level of genocide violence experienced in each location as measured by 
duration of the violence (start and end date of genocide violence in that sector) and 
intensity of the violence (the number of people killed over the course of the Genocide 
[April through July 1994]). In addition, one urban and one rural sector were chosen from 
each category. 
                                                
15 For administrative purposes Rwanda is divided into providences, districts and sectors. There are 4 
providences, 30 districts and 416 sectors in the country. 
16 IRB approval was granted through the University of Maryland (Protocol # 09-0468). In addition to 
ethics approval, Rwandan government permission for research was received from the Minister in the 
President’s Office in Charge of Science and Technology (MINIST/003/2009). 
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This selection was designed to maximize the range of potential conflict 
experiences by the respondents. As the main dependent variable in the analysis is 
individual conflict experiences (as compared to the government conflict frame), it was 
necessary to maximize difference on this variable. Using existing conflict data on 
Rwanda, two sectors were selected which experienced comparatively high levels of 
genocide violence (Nyamagabe and Karongi) and two sectors were selected which 
experienced comparatively low levels of genocide violence (Musanze and Rulindo). 
High-genocide and low-genocide areas were selected based on existing data from 
the GenoDynamics project assembled by Christian Davenport and Allan Stam (2009). 
This project collects disaggregated data on political violence in Rwanda from April 
through July 1994 (the period of genocide violence).17 The GenoDynamics project does 
not identify high and low categories of genocide violence, however, using the measures 
for the total number of people killed as well as the start date and end date of the violence 
in each sector, I scaled the violence into high and low categories across the country. For 
this project, high-genocide areas are defined as areas with the highest number of deaths 
and longest duration of violence (in comparison to other sectors in the country during 
1994), and low-genocide areas are defined as sectors with a low number of deaths and a 
short duration of violence (in comparison to other areas in the country).  
Selecting research locations based on variation in the level of genocide violations 
is consistent with the Rwanda government conflict frame, as I will demonstrate in 
                                                
17 The data compilation and collection of GenoDynamics brings together a variety of sources of existing 
data in addition to other information gathering efforts: 1) interviews (both structured and unstructured 
throughout all provinces in Rwanda), 2) focus groups in Kigali and Butare, 3) one randomly-selected 
household survey in the prefecture/province of Butare regarding the violence and reconciliation effort 
(Gacaca), 4) information regarding the location of all military units before the conflict in April got 
underway, 5) information on the location and strength of all radio towers in Rwanda, 6) the collection of 
census information, agricultural zones, forced migration (internal displacement and refugees) as well as 7) 
international media coverage about Rwanda and the conflict (Davenport and Stam 2009).  
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Chapter 5. This selection allows me to demonstrate the validity (or lack thereof) of the 
government frame. This selection procedure is also the product of a limited amount of 
information on other periods of violence in Rwanda. Currently, the only non-
governmental sources of disaggregated information on the Rwandan conflict deal 
exclusively with the Genocide making it difficult for me to sample on other conflict 
criteria. 
 








                                                






In addition to a diversity of experiences with potential violence, the sectors 
selected were also in regionally diverse areas of the country (see Figure 13 above). 
Nyamagabe19 is located in central Rwanda. It is southwest of the capital city, Kigali, and 
north of the old colonial capital, Butare. It is a hilly area which houses major genocide 
massacre sites such as Murambi and is an urban center for the region. Karongi, a rural 
area, is located on the western border of Rwanda on Lake Kivu. This area experienced 
both extreme genocide violence and high levels of refugee flows during the Genocide as 
people moved through the area and into Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). 
Musanze is located in the foothills of the Virunga National Park. It is a colder and wetter 
part of the country, known for its long rainy season. This area experienced early ethnic 
violence in the 1960s through 1980s. Musanze contains the largest urban center in the 
North of the country. Finally, Rulindo is located just north of Kigali. It is a flatter area of 
the country, rural but only 30 minutes by bus from Kigali. Because of its proximity to 
the capital it was constantly on the frontlines of the Civil War fighting. 
 
Case Selection- Within Northern Ireland 
 In Northern Ireland, interviews were conducted in two locations: Ardoyne/Upper 
Ardoyne and South Armagh.20 These two areas were selected based on the diversity in 
conflict experiences, measured by type of violations and perpetrators of the violence, 
across communities in these areas. Both locations experienced high levels of violence, 
but had different experiences of the conflict (measured in types of violations and 
                                                
19 In 2004 Rwanda reorganized and renamed all of its geographic units. I refer to the contemporary names 
of each location. In 1994 geographic terms, Nyamagabe is proximate to Gikongoro. Musanze is located in 
ex-Ruhengeri. Rulindo is roughly encompassed by Kigali-Ngali. And Karongi is in ex-Kibuye.  
20 Research was conducted under University of Maryland, IRB Protocol 10-0198. 
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perpetrators). While the Ardoyne/Upper Ardoyne area is an urban center and was 
subjected to rioting and a high level of police and army surveillance, the South Armagh 
area is predominantly rural farm land and experienced violence which was more similar 
to a conventional guerilla war with substantial attacks between Republican paramilitary 
organizations and the British Army. 
 
Table 4: Geographic Locations of 
Deaths During the Troubles in 
Northern Ireland (Sutton 1994) 
Location Count 
Belfast West 624 
Belfast North 576 
County Armagh 478 
County Tyrone 340 
County Down 243 
Derry/Londonderry 227 
Belfast South 213 
County Antrim 207 
Belfast East 128 
Britain 125 
County Derry 123 
Republic of Ireland 114 




 These locations were selected using Sutton’s Index of Deaths (Sutton 1994). 
Information for this database was collected through newspaper archives, coroner reports, 
organizational pamphlets and additional supplemental material. This is a database 
cataloguing information about the total number of people killed over the course of the 
Troubles. As displayed in Table 4 above, both the Ardoyne area in North Belfast and 
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South Armagh area experienced some of the highest levels of deaths over the course of 
the conflict.21  
While violence in these areas was generally high, it is possible for individuals to 
have varying experiences with the conflict across each location. Unlike Rwanda, which 
had comparatively high levels of violence across the country, violence in Northern 
Ireland varied quite severely with some areas of the country experiencing very low or no 
violence. While in Rwanda the justice process both welcomes and requires the full 
participation of all members of the Rwandan community, in Northern Ireland existing 
PCJ is available only for people who have experienced violations. For this reason, the 
sampling in Northern Ireland required that I speak with people who experienced some 
violations or people who could potentially participate in the justice process. I focused 
my sampling on people who lived in high violence areas over the course of the conflict. 
In this way, the sample is not representative of the “average” experiences with conflict 
in Northern Ireland, but rather represents the range of experiences with violence across 
the country. 
 Ardoyne and Upper Ardoyne are adjacent areas in North Belfast.22 The larger of 
the two areas is Ardoyne traditionally a predominantly Catholic, Nationalist and strong 
Republican community. Ardoyne is composed of approximately 11,000 people. In part 
because of its Republican/paramilitary leanings, Ardoyne has one of the highest 
concentrations of people killed during the Troubles. The Ardoyne Commemoration 
project tabulated 99 people killed from the Ardoyne area out of 1,500 people total in all 
                                                
21 The highest number of deaths during the conflict was experienced in West Belfast. However, due to the 
highly politicized nature of the area it was difficult to find community organizations which were not 
mobilized around conflict and justice issues. For this reason I choose to work in North Belfast. 
22 This area is located up the Crumlin Road to the east of the Shankill and the west of Old Park Road. 
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of Belfast from 1968 through 1998 (Sutton 1994). 23  The majority of violence 
experienced in the Ardoyne area was the result of rioting, police and army raids and 
paramilitary attacks (Ardoyne Commemoration Project 2002). 
 
Figure 14. Map of Research Location in North Belfast (Ardoyne/Upper Ardoyne) 24 
 
 
1. Ardoyne/Upper Ardoyne 
 
                                                
23 It is worth noting here that the Ardoyne Commemoration Project was later faulted for its failure to 
include members of the Protestant community who were born in Ardoyne but later left (or were forced to 
leave) due to the changing political climate (Lundy 2006). As such the individuals included in the project 
are likely representative of Catholic deaths in this area during the conflict. 
24 Kelly, Conal 2007 http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/gboun07.htm 
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Upper Ardoyne is the area which boarders Ardoyne to the north separated by 
Alliance Avenue and a group of shops called the Ardoyne Shops. Upper Ardoyne is 
primarily a Protestant, Unionist area with Loyalist paramilitary leanings. The name, 
Upper Ardyone, itself is relatively new emerging in the post-1998 period as an attempt 
to refine the community identity of the area and to separate community redevelopment 
money between the Catholic and Protestant areas of Ardoyne. See Figure 14 above for 
the location of Ardoyne and Upper Ardoyne within Belfast. 
The second research site, South Armagh, is in the southeast of Northern Ireland 
spanning County Armagh and County Down, bordering the Republic of Ireland and 
about 60 miles outside of Belfast. The area of South Armagh is more of a cultural 
distinction than a geographic one. It includes such infamous conflict towns as 
Crossmaglen, Forkhill and Markethill.  
Over the course of the conflict, South Armagh developed a different, though no 
less noteworthy, reputation from Ardoyne. Known as “Bandit Country”, South Armagh 
was a highly militarized area of the conflict due mainly to the battles between the British 
Army and the South Armagh Brigade of the IRA (the main Republican paramilitary 
group during the conflict). Between 1969 and 1993, 106 British troops were killed in the 
South Armagh area (out of 502 over the course of the conflict (Sutton 1994)25). Today, 
in 2011, the area still has a high level of violent activity from dissident Republican 
groups who have not accepted the peace process (BBC 2010). Violence against civilians 
                                                
25 For the purpose of this dissertation I am relying solely on the tabulations of deaths from Sutton’s Index 
of Deaths. It is worth noting that these numbers are debated particularly in regards to the organization 
responsible for the killing and whether or not the circumstances surrounding the death was directly related 
to the conflict. 
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in the South Armagh area was primarily the result of paramilitary attacks on the security 
forces. See Figure 15 for the location of South Armagh within Northern Ireland. 
 




























2. South Armagh 
 
In addition to selecting areas in Northern Ireland with diversity in conflict 
experiences I also interviewed individuals within certain communities (e.g. Catholic and 
Protestant). It is generally assumed in the conflict literature on Northern Ireland that the 
experiences of Catholic and Protestant communities varied over the course of the 
                                                
26 CIA World Fact Book 
2. 
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Troubles (Lundy and McGovern 2007). In order to account for this potential variation, I 
was careful to sample evenly from both communities. 
 
Interview Methodology in Rwanda and Northern Ireland 
Once interview locations were selected for each country, interviews were 
conducted in each of the research sites. Interviews in Rwanda were conducted between 
October and December 2009. Interviews in Northern Ireland were conducted between 
April and July 2010. Respondents were questioned on their conflict experience, their 
knowledge and participation in existing justice institutions as well as their current views 
of justice in their country. Interview questions were divided into four sections: (1) 
General Survey and Demographic Questions; (2) Respondent’s Conflict Experience; (3) 
Respondent’s Experience with Post-Conflict Justice; and (4) Respondent’s Justice 
Issues. 
  The interview questionnaire relied on a combination of open answer and closed 
answer questions based in part on McCracken’s (1989) method from The Long 
Interview.27 The closed answer questions are those with a specific set of choices 
presented to the respondent (e.g. scaling questions such as ranking a topic between 
strongly disagree and strongly agree). Closed answer questions were used to derive 
easily comparable responses across categories. Open response questions where those in 
which the respondent was asked a broad or general question. Open response questions 
were designed with two goals in mind. First, open response questions allowed me to 
verify the information that was gained from the closed response questions. If a 
respondent was not satisfied with the choices in the closed answer question, he/she was 
                                                
27 For an illustration of the method see Adler et al. 2008. 
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free to add additional information in the open response portion. For this reason, open 
response questions generally followed the closed response section on the same topic. 
The second reason for including open response questions was to give respondents an 
opportunity to talk freely about their conflict experiences. From my experiences with 
previous research (Adler et al. 2008; Adler et al. 2009), open questions are essential for 
individuals who have had a traumatic experience, such as experiencing violations 
through conflict. Restricting a respondent’s desire to tell their story was 
counterproductive to my research and also nearly impossible. For example, when 
conducting an interview in Northern Ireland, one respondent interrupted in the middle of 
the closed answer questions and asked, “Can I tell my story yet?” (SAP-4).  
The interaction between open and closed response questions is most apparent in 
the collection of information on conflict experience. In order to determine the experience 
that a given individual had with the conflict he/she was first asked a series of yes or no 
questions about different types of violations (e.g. Were you physically assaulted? Was 
your property destroyed? etc.). Once this series of questions was completed, respondents 
were asked, “Are there any other ways that you suffered?” This open-ended question 
allowed respondents to add to the given list of violations or broaden their descriptions of 
those experiences. The total time of each interview ranged between one hour and 3.5 
hours with the average interview taking about two hours. Interviews took longer in 
Rwanda because of both translation time and a more elaborate oral tradition (e.g. 
Rwandans generally use more descriptive language than people from Northern Ireland 
do).  
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While the interview methodology was similar in both Rwanda and Northern 
Ireland, there are important differences across case, which is a necessary product of 
doing research in two very distinct social and political spaces. This was particularly true 
in regards to participant selection. For that reason I review the methodology separately 
for each country case and highlight the main differences below. 
 
Participant Selection and Interview Methodology in Rwanda 
In Rwanda I coordinated a three-person research team consisting of a research 
coordinator, a research assistant/translator and myself. Participants in Rwanda were 
recruited through direct contact. The research coordinator entered the village and houses 
were randomly selected on both the main market street and on individual farming plots. 
Potential respondents were first approached and asked if they would be willing to learn 
about the project. The research coordinator also verified that the respondent had been 
living in Rwanda in 1994 (a condition for participating in the research). After the project 
was explained, potential respondents were asked if they would be willing to 
participate.28 Once people agreed to participate all three members of the research team 
were present and the consent protocol was read and agreed upon. Participants received 
no monetary compensation for their participation.  
Interviews were primarily conducted on the respondent’s property, generally in 
his/her yard in public view yet out of earshot from passersby. When the respondent 
preferred (or if weather mandated), interviews were conducted inside his/her home. On 
                                                
28 Everyone approached agreed to listen to the project description. Upon hearing the description two 
people (one in Nyamagabe and one in Musanze) refused to participate. One respondent in Rulindo 
terminated the interview after 10 minutes. As per the IRB protocol, all of this individual’s information was 
removed from the sample. 
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four occasions, interviews were conducted in private rooms in local community 
buildings. 
Interviews were conducted in Kinyarwandan with simultaneous English 
translation (conducted by my research assistant). With permission from all respondents, 
interviews were digitally recorded (including the consent procedure) and later re-
translated and transcribed into English. The individual interview data was collected 
through 40 interviews (10 in each sector). Fifty percent of respondents were 18 or older 
in 1994 while the other 50 percent were under 18. This was a characteristic of the 
research design developed to gain a range of opinions across Rwandan society and not to 
sample solely from a particular group. This was a sampling technique, but it is not 
theorized to have any effect on the final analysis. Twenty-five (62.5 percent) of the 
respondents were male. Ninety percent of the interview respondents have attended 
primary school and have basic literacy, which is higher than the national estimate of 
approximately 70 percent of the population.29 Additional descriptive information for the 
respondents is presented in Table 5 below. 
Respondents in the Rwanda sample were questioned on their experience of 
conflict in general. Throughout the interview I was careful not to indicate that I was 
interested in one particular type of violence (i.e., violence from the Genocide). This was 
mostly accomplished through using the words in Kinyarwandan for “the Troubles”, 
meaning the broader period of violence in Rwanda not specifically the Genocide. On 
many occasions I had to clarify for respondents that I was interested in their experiences 
from all perpetrator types not just genocide violence. 
                                                
29 Descriptive information was taken from the CIA World Fact book 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html. Accessed on December 14, 
2010. 
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Nyamagabe 5 Men 5 Women 4-50 16 
1 No Formal Education 
4 Primary School/Basic 
Literacy 
4 Secondary School 
1 Some University or Higher 
6 (60%) 6 (60%) 
Karongi 8 Men 2 Women 6-36 17 
1 No Formal Education 
5 Primary School/Basic 
Literacy 
4 Secondary School 
0 Some University or Higher 
1 (10%) 2 (20%) 
Musanze 5 Men 5 Women 3-37 16 
0 No Formal Education 
6 Primary School/Basic 
Literacy 
3 Secondary School 
1 Some University or Higher 
3 (30%) 2 (30%) 
Rulindo 7 Men 3 Women 8-31 16.5 
2 No Formal Education 
6 Primary School/Basic 
Literacy 
2 Secondary School 
0 Some University or Higher 
4 (40%) 1 (10%) 
 
Survivors of violence in a semi-authoritarian country can be a problematic group 
to interview. It can be hard to gain trust and comfort as well as to receive answers off of 
the “scripted” national narrative. For example, some questions from my questionnaire 
were answered almost exactly the same, word for word, by each respondent.30 But 
surprisingly, even to me, I received forthright information on many of the most difficult 
questions, including questions regarding sexual violence,31 and opinions, which, in a 
round about way, directly countered existing government policies. I attribute this entré 
primarily to the “student” status of the group. The research team was composed of three 
                                                
30 This was particularly true of the question “What is unity and reconciliation?” In addition, every single 
respondent said that he/she believed that “good government” had come to Rwanda and that the new 
leaders could be trusted. 
31 Three women in our survey admitted to having been raped, something that I did not expect within the 
confines of the research design. 
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people, myself (a Ph.D. candidate at the time), my research coordinator who was 
currently working on his Masters degree in Genocide Studies at the National University 
and my research assistant who was an undergraduate at a small private university in the 
capital city. Participants were generally very receptive to the idea of helping students 
and often shared stories of their family members who had recently been accepted to 
university or other levels of study. Far from being overwhelming, the size of the 
research group (three researchers and the respondent) added a degree of discussion that 
was distinct from a one-on-one interview format. 
In addition to the “student” status of the group, the gender, age and ethnic 
composition were carefully selected. Both the research coordinator and research 
assistant were men, which lent a certain degree of authority to the procedure. While 
there is leeway in Rwandan society given to “Western” women, it could have been 
perceived as inappropriate for me (I am a woman) to be interviewing men in their homes 
alone or traveling with a single man alone. Having a woman present in the interviews 
(myself) however allowed female respondents a different degree of comfort that may not 
have been present with an all-male interview team. The gender dynamic was noticeable 
over the course of the interviews as respondents would turn and face different members 
of the group at different times. Having a younger student on the team (the research 
assistant) as well as a more established Rwandan researcher (the research coordinator) 
contributed to this dynamic. Both Rwandan members of the research team were of 
mixed ethnicity though one demonstrated physical characteristics traditionally 
associated with Hutu ethnicity and the other demonstrated stereotypic Tutsi traits. 
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These dynamics were different in Northern Ireland where I conducted research 
alone. This methodology is described below. 
 
Participant Selection and Interview Methodology in Northern Ireland 
The process of interview selection differed slightly in Northern Ireland based on 
the social and economic structure in Northern Ireland. Once research areas were 
selected, I interviewed members from both communities (Catholic and Protestant, 10 
respondents per research site). Respondents were not selected based on their religion or 
political affiliations, but rather respondents were approached through community 
centers, one in a predominantly Catholic neighborhood and one in a predominantly 
Protestant neighborhood. An important point of departure of this research from existing 
work, particularly existing survey work in Northern Ireland, is that the respondents were 
not selected based on “victim status”. In fact, a huge effort was made to interview 
“ordinary” people from the two research areas. Respondents were approached through 
local community centers and other community groups that were not “victim”-focused, 
such as women’s groups and youth organizations. In this way I moved away from the 
“usual” suspects who are frequently interviewed about their conflict experience in order 
to interview people who had not previously mobilized around justice issues.32 By 
moving away from victims’ organizations I believe that the respondents I interviewed 
were less likely to be re-articulating a group’s issue platform and instead answering 
questions based on their own justice views.  
Community centers were a useful way to locate respondents for this research. 
The Northern Ireland government funds community centers in Northern Ireland, but 
                                                
32 Of the 40 respondents, 16 (40%) had been interviewed for any type of conflict-related research before. 
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local community members staff these centers. Most medium size towns in Northern 
Ireland have their own community centers as so do most areas within Belfast. The 
selection of the individual community centers was not random; there is only one 
community center per research location. However, the selection of respondents from the 
center was based on individuals who were at the center on the particular day that I 
conducted interviews. 
Working through community centers was especially important in Northern 
Ireland. Because I had no “local” team members as I did in Rwanda, I relied on local 
community workers to make first contact with potential respondents as per my IRB 
protocol. In addition, one of the legacies of the conflict in Northern Ireland is a strong 
distrust for outsiders, or unidentified individuals. Contacts with community workers 
were able to overcome this skepticism. 
Respondents in Northern Ireland were introduced to the project through 
community leaders at four local community centers. These leaders would schedule the 
interview and get general consent from the participants before the potential respondent 
met with me.33 Once the interviews were scheduled, I would meet privately with the 
respondents. Interviews generally took place at the community center. Other research 
locations included a respondent’s place of business, a local library and two local pubs. In 
all cases these locations were semi-private and generally visible, but out of earshot. 
Before the interview began respondents were asked to read and sign the consent 
document. Respondents received no monetary compensation for their participation. All 
interviews were conducted in English. I conducted the interviews personally both taking 
                                                
33 Because potential respondents were first approached by community leaders, I have no way of knowing 
how many people the leader approached before gaining consent for the respondents who participated in 
the interview. 
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notes and digitally recording the interviews with the respondent’s written permission. 
Interview transcripts were transcribed and coded using TAMS Analyzer v.3. 
Forty-two percent of the respondents were male. The median age of the sample 
was 52.7 years. This is higher than the national median, but is intentionally skewed to 
include a greater number of respondents who experienced the conflict in during the 
1970s and 1980s. The education level of the respondents varied widely across research 
site. Respondents from Ardoyne had mostly received university or post-graduate 
degrees. On the opposite extreme, the majority of Protestant respondents from South 
Armagh had completed only primary or secondary school. Additional descriptive 
information for the respondents is presented in Table 6. 
 








Education (# of 
Respondents) 





5 Women 21-57 42.5 
2 Secondary School 




0 Part Time 






7 Women 20-56 51 
1 Primary School 
5 Secondary School 
3 Trade School 
1 University 
5 Unemployed/Benefits 
1 Part Time 






6 Women 27-77 54.5 
3 Secondary School 




0 Part Time 






5 Women 38-83 64.5 
4 Primary School 
4 Secondary School 
1 Trade School 
1 Post-Graduate 
4 Unemployed/Benefits 
0 Part Time 




An important point of distinction between the Rwanda and Northern Ireland 
cases was in the wording of the questionnaire. In Northern Ireland the word “justice” 
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was replaced by “legacy”. For example, in the introduction to the Northern Ireland 
questionnaire I stated that I would be talking about legacy issues instead of justice 
issues. This was done because of the strong connection between the word justice and the 
Republican/Catholic community. After a series of preliminary elite interviews (not 
included in the analysis), it became obvious that the concept of justice was associated 
purely with the Republican call for justice and human rights and not broader concerns 
about accountability and the rule-of-law in Northern Ireland. In order to address this 




In this chapter I have demonstrated the necessity of using disaggregated, micro-
level data in order to investigate the processes of participation in and exclusion from 
post-conflict justice. The aggregated level at which current data on post-conflict justice 
has been collected prevents us from observing variation within the process as well as 
individual interactions with the process. 
To overcome this limitation I collected disaggregated data on the conflicts in 
Rwanda and Northern Ireland and used this data to select research locations within each 
country. I conduced 80 interviews in both Rwanda and Northern Ireland to investigate 
the relationship between an individual’s conflict experience, the potential disjuncture 
between that experience and the national justice process and the individual’s subsequent 
acceptance or denial of the justice process. The results of that analysis are presented in 
the concluding chapters.  
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Chapter 5: 
 Framing the Conflict in Rwanda 
 
As introduced in the preceding chapters, individual conflict experiences can vary 
widely across the population. The case of Rwanda is no exception. When analyzed with 
individual level data, the variation in type of violations and perpetrators of those 
violations can be seen. This variation is both spatial and temporal and is the essence of 
how an individual personally experienced the conflict. As outlined above, I argue that an 
individual’s experience with a given conflict is directly linked to his/her overall 
interaction with the national justice process. Before I begin to investigate this interaction 
it is first necessary to understand the conflict experience itself. 
Rwanda is a small country in East Africa that has suffered much violence. It is 
bordered by Uganda to the North, Tanzania to the East, Burundi to the South, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the West. It is a small landlocked country, 
roughly the size of the American state of Maryland. As of 2010, there were 
approximately 11 million people living in the country, making Rwanda the most densely 
populated country in Africa. Rwanda is composed of three main ethnic groups and 
according to the CIA Worldfact book, approximately 84% of the population is Hutu, 
15% is Tutsi and 1% is Twa.34  The country is poor, with 90% of the population engaged 
in subsistence agriculture. Rwanda is a former Belgian colony, first belonging to 
Germany and then switching hands to the Belgians following World War I. In 1962, the 
country gained independence and it now functions under a presidential multi-party 
system. The official languages are Kinyarwanda, French and English. 
                                                
34 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html#top Accessed on October 20, 
2010. 
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In this chapter I present an overview of individual conflict experiences in 
Rwanda, as well as the government framing of the conflict and the subsequent justice 
process, which was implemented in the post-conflict period. I begin with a general 
(aggregated) history of the conflict and then move to a disaggregated analysis of 
individual violations to develop the theoretical range of conflict experiences in the 
country. In order to theorize the range of possible conflict experiences, I rely on 40 
randomly selected interviews from four sectors in Rwanda. In these interviews I survey 
individuals about their experiences (if any) with violence in Rwanda. In the following 
section of the chapter, I describe the creation of the government conflict frame in 
Rwanda highlighting the core “truths” which make up the frame and the strategic way in 
which the frame has been constructed by the current government to emphasize the 
government’s own attributes and to weaken the position of the domestic opposition. 
Most important for this project, the conflict frame leads to the selection and 
implementation of the Gacaca process, a system of community level courts designed to 
address crimes committed during the Genocide of 1994. I turn to the case below. 
 
The Conflict in Rwanda 
The contemporary conflict in Rwanda began in October 1990 with the onset of a 
civil war.35 The Civil War was initiated by a group of Rwandan refugees living on the 
border in Uganda. This army, calling itself the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), had the 
military goal of winning political participation and legitimacy for Tutsi refugees who 
had fled Rwanda during early pogroms against Tutsis in the 1960s and 70s. Far from 
                                                
35 In addition to this period of violence, there was violent civilian targeting in the 1960s and 1980s 
(Prunier 1995). 
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being a rag-tag army, this group contained experienced military men and women, some 
of whom had fought in the Ugandan Bush War which brought Yoweri Museveni, the 
current president of Uganda, to power in 1986 (Prunier 1995).  
The first few weeks of the Civil War progressed slowly. As the RPF moved 
down from the North, RPF commander Fred Rwigema was shot and killed (allegedly by 
friendly-fire though this point is debated). Upon hearing of his death, Paul Kagame, who 
was in the United States at the time, returned to Rwanda to take command.36 General 
Kagame reorganized the army and launched a new guerilla offensive from the Virunga 
Mountains in the north of the country bordering Uganda. Under Kagame’s leadership the 
army advanced quickly and decisively; the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armées 
Rwandaises [FAR]) lost ground (Prunier 1995). Violence during this period consisted 
primarily of battle line confrontations with medium artillery and low-level guerilla 
warfare. An estimated 9,000 soldiers and civilians were killed as a direct result of the 
Civil War (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005).  
In 1992, the United Nations brokered a peace agreement between the two sides. 
The peace agreement ended the conflict and resulted in the deployment of a UN 
peacekeeping mission, UNAMIR, which would monitor the ceasefire and the 
implementation of a transitional government. The transitional government was selected 
and tasked with negotiating the repatriation of the Tutsi refugees still outside the country 
(mostly in Uganda). The Protocol of Agreement on the Repatriation of Rwandese 
Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons entered into force in June 1993.37 
                                                
36 Paul Kagame was attending a course at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas. 
37 See the full text of the agreement at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b50318.html (Accessed 
December 3, 2010) 
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This agreement stated that the Rwanda government would make land available for these 
refugees and that returning refugees had the right to repossess their property. 
Tensions mounted through 1993, as Hutu hardliners in the transition government 
were unwilling to support a Tutsi return and to accept the negotiated peace. On April 6, 
1994, President Habyarimana, the president of the transitional government and 
Rwanda’s president for the past 20 years, was killed in a plane crash over Kigali 
International Airport. While culpability has never been determined, there is much 
evidence to suggest that the plane was deliberately targeted by heavily armed individuals 
(or troops).38  
The death of President Habyarimana became the inciting event for the beginning 
of the 1994 Genocide (Adler et al. 2008). From the way in which the Genocide was 
executed, it has been argued that months, and possibly years, of planning went into 
arming, motivating and organizing the participants (Straus 2006). The first acts of 
violence were primarily the targeting of Tutsi and Hutu political opposition in Kigali, 
the capital city. These killings were conducted in large part by the Rwandan army, loyal 
to Colonel Bagosora, the Cabinet Minister at the Ministry of Defense. These killings 
were followed by attacks on Tutsis throughout the country as the radio and local 
authorities blamed this group for collaborating with the RPF’s advance and the death of 
the President (Mamdani 2002). In addition to members of the military, acts of violence 
were carried out by militarized gangs and small local militias known as Interahamwe 
(Straus 2006). 
                                                
38 Evidence from the current Rwanda government suggests that Hutu extremists shot down the plane, 
possibly from the Rwanda army (Mutsinzi Report 2010). The RPF itself was implicated in the shooting by 
French Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière’s 2006 report on a judicial inquiry into the crash. For a critique of 
both these reports, see Reyntjens (2010). 
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From the early weeks of April genocide violence spread. Participation in the 
violence has been linked to fear (Adler et al. 2008), group pressure (Fujii 2009), the 
ongoing war (Adler et al. 2009; Straus 2006), the nature of Rwandan state institutions 
and, predictably, ethnicity. Violence was rampant and included one-on-one killing using 
machetes, farm instruments and blunt objects. In addition to personalized killings, there 
were more systematic attempts of extermination such as the deliberate military targeting 
of civilian areas including churches and schools (African Rights 1995; Human Rights 
Watch 1999). Over the course of 100 days, approximately 800,000 people were killed.39 
Shortly after the downing of the President’s plane, the RPF moved out of its UN-
assigned safe zones. Fighting resumed in both the North of Rwanda and in Kigali 
between the RPF and the FAR. This was not genocide violence. This violence is best 
described as a continuation of the 1990 Civil War. The RPF troops in the Northwest 
moved swiftly towards Kigali in order to provide relief for the 600 troops stationed there 
as part of the peace process (Prunier 1995). This march south was deliberate and 
decisive. For most of its advance the RPF held strict battle lines (Davenport and Stam 
2009).  
The Civil War and Genocide ended in July of 1994 when the RPF, still led by 
General Paul Kagame, took control of the capital city. Interahamwe militia members and 
FAR soldiers stopped fighting and many fled along with a large number of civilians to 
neighboring Zaire (later the Democratic Republic of Congo [herewith, Congo]). What 
                                                
39 Both the total number of people killed and the ethnic composition of that number are currently debated 
in the literature. Early estimates of deaths emerged from Human Rights Watch and African Rights of 
around 500,000 people killed, however later it was admitted that this was a conservative number. At one 
point, IBUKA, the Rwandan survivor organization placed the number around 1.2 million. The quoted 
figure of 800,000 people represents a median consensus in the literature. Original sources believe this 
number to be made up almost entirely of Tutsi victims, however recent work has suggested that a large 
part of this figure, over 50% could have been Hutu deaths (see Davenport and Stam 2009). Due to the 
nature of the data, this work is still inconclusive. 
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followed was one of the largest refugee movements in UNHCR history. Prunier (1995) 
estimated that there were 2 million, mostly Hutu, refugees. Close to a million of these 
refugees fled into Congo.40 At one time UNHCR had as many as 37 refugee camps in 
operation in Easter Congo with another 7 in Burundi and 5 in Tanzania.41 
International media and human rights organizations have accused the RPF of 
reprisal killings following the end of violence in 1994 including attacks on civilian 
refugee camps in Rwanda (e.g. the Kibeho massacre [HRW 1999]). These killings 
appear to be linked to RPF soldiers and Tutsi refugees returning to their homes to find 
loved ones killed and perpetrators still living in their villages, sometimes in the homes of 
those who were murdered. The level of direct RPF involvement in these reprisal killings 
has never been determined, but human rights sources have consistently substantiated 
these claims of violence (African Rights 1995; Human Rights Watch 1999).  
Although July 1994 is commonly identified as the termination point of the 
conflict, this was not the end of the violence in Rwanda. The Interahamwe and soldiers 
(ex-FAR) who fled the country were able to re-arm and re-group. From the 
internationally-run refugee camps in Tanzania and Congo, 42  and the neighboring 
countryside, these groups were able to recruit troops and launch attacks into the 
Northwestern area of Rwanda, through the Volcano National Park and southwest in the 
Bukavu area. 43 Now the RPF was in power, and the former Army became the rebels. 
                                                
40 In addition to the refugees in Congo there were approximately 270,000 in Burundi, 577,000 in Tanzania 
and 10,000 in Uganda (Prunier 1995). 
41 These numbers changed over time as camps were combined and new camps were created. See the 
UNHCR camp population map from 1994 http://www.reliefweb.int/mapc/afr_east/gl_reg/gl_ref94.html 
(Accessed on December 3, 2010). 
42 The refugee camps were a huge point of contention for foreign aid groups who were aware that they 
were funding rebels and supporting the military hierarchy within the camps. But these groups, particularly 
the UN, proved unable to separate and secure the camps without ceasing aid. 
43 See Reyntjens’s (2009) work on why Congo was the ideal environment to ferment this type of rebellion.  
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Known as the Abacengezi, or ‘those who come without giving notice’, this new rebel 
group terrorized civilians demanding money, goods and recruiting (often forcibly) new 
troops.  
In addition to causing civilian terror, the Abacengezi coordinated attacks on local 
military barracks, police stations and officials in the transition government. The new 
Rwandan army (Rwandan Defense Force [RDF]) fought back against this insurgent 
force, using counter-insurgency tactics that often targeted civilians suspected of assisting 
in the rebel efforts (Prunier 1995). Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) estimate that between 
1997 and 2002 approximately 13,800 soldiers and civilians were killed as a direct result 
of this period of conflict. 
The actual make-up of the new rebel group (post-1994) has been difficult to 
ascertain based largely on their disorganized roots. Originally organized as the Rwandan 
Liberation Army (ALiR), the group was approximately 20,000 members strong and 
consisted mostly of military personnel from the former Rwandan Army (ex-FAR). This 
group fought from approximately 1994 through 1998, when it was militarily defeated by 
the Rwandan Army (International Crisis Group 2003). This defeat led to a period of 
conflict between disparate rebel groups throughout East Africa with different capacity 
and organization levels and different grievances against the Rwanda government (some 
decidedly genocidal in nature others more political).  
In 2000, these separate groups united to form the Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The FDLR was/is comprised of three main groups: (1) 
ex-FAR and Interahamwe members who participated in the Genocide; (2) ex-FAR 
members who did not participate in the Genocide; and (3) post-genocide recruits who 
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arguably make up the bulk of the current fighting forces (ICG 2003).44 The FDLR 
represents both a military and political opposition to the new Rwandan government (lead 
by the RPF). The group argues that the majority of Hutu people do not have an equal 
representation in the Rwandan government and after the national elections in 2003 the 
FDLR refused to recognize Paul Kagame (the former RPF commander) as the legitimate 
president. The FDLR continued to launch attacks into Rwanda and was a serious threat 
to the country through 2001 when the RPF was able to diminish the strength of the 
organization and successfully drive most of the rebels deep into Congo.45 In addition to 
military force, there has been a number of demobilization programs aimed at returning 
former FDLR soldiers to their communities (UN 2009).  
In Table 7 I present a summary of the periods of violence in Rwanda. 
Table 7: Periods of Violence in Rwanda  
 Time Period Description Combatants Death Totals 
Civil War 1990-1992 
RPF invasion from Uganda 
began civil war, ended by 
UN negotiated ceasefire 
and peace agreement 
Rwandan Government 
Army (FAR) vs. 










Government extremist from 
Hutu parties perpetrated 
genocide against Tutsi 














RPF broke cease-fire and 
returned to civil war after 
genocidal violence began, 

















Former Rwandan army 
soldiers and Interahamwe 
fled to Congo and 




Army (RDF) vs. Forces 
Democratiques de 





                                                
44 From 1994 through 1996 there was a period of heavy recruitment within the refugee camps, particularly 
in Congo and Tanzania (ICG 2003). 
45 The FDLR and its armed wing, the Force Combattantes Abacunguzi (FOCA), are still active today and 
participate in attacks mostly in Eastern Congo (ICG 2003). 
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Above I have presented an overview of the aggregated conflict in Rwanda. But 
how was this long history of violence experienced by individuals throughout the 
country? I turn to an investigation of individual experiences of the conflict below. 
 
Variations in Violence Across Rwanda 
Conflict across a country is rarely, if ever, a uniform experience for the 
population. This statement holds true for the conflict in Rwanda. The violence that 
people experienced across the country varied according to geographic location, a 
person’s perceived ethnicity, political affiliation and demographic characteristics such as 
income and education. However, as I have argued above, in the post-conflict period 
there has been a strong focus on individuals who experienced genocide violations with 
comparatively little attention to individuals who experienced other types of violence. In 
many ways, people’s experiences have been dichotomously aggregated such that you are 
a genocide survivor or you are not. You were targeted during the Genocide or you were 
not.46 This focus is a product of the government conflict frame, as I will discuss further 
below.  
In the following section I move away from this simplification to catalogue the 
range of possible individual conflict experiences through 40 individual interviews. These 
interviews allow me to diversify the current understanding of the violence people 
experienced both by type of violation and by perpetrator.47 I begin with a discussion of 
the patterns of conflict experience and perpetrators of violence that were present across 
                                                
46 This category also matches along ethnic lines with, Tutsis being understood as the only victims of the 
Genocide and Hutus being seen as the perpetrators of those crimes. 
47 In Chapter 3 I also presented duration and intensity of violations as characteristics of individual conflict 
experiences. However, for the purpose of this analysis I focus exclusively on type of violation and 
perpetrator. 
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interview respondents. These results are neither designed to present the totality of 
conflict experiences in Rwanda nor to represent proportions of experiences generalizable 
to the whole population. These interviews were conducted to problematize the existing 
aggregated understanding of the violence in Rwanda and to present a range of conflict 
experiences, which will be used to generate theoretical conclusions about subsequent 
participation in the national justice process in later chapters. 
 
Types of Violations and Conflict Experience 
In order to capture conflict experiences across the country, four research sites 
were selected in both ‘high’ and ‘low’ genocide areas (based on aggregate levels of 
violence in those areas).48 As discussed above, the current focus in Rwanda has been on 
genocide violations. If genocide violations were the most prominent violence in the 
country then we would expect to find the majority of violations across the population 
occurring in high-genocide areas. But this is not what I find. Rather I observe that 
violations are spread throughout the country with only slightly higher reporting of 
violence in high-genocide areas. Instead of a discrepancy across types of violations (e.g. 
property, physical integrity and intangible), I find that the greatest variation is across the 
perpetrators of the violence that individuals experienced. Within my sample, I find that 
people experienced high numbers of violations in both high- and low- genocide areas, 
however people in high-genocide areas experienced these violations as a result of the 
Genocide while people in low-genocide areas experienced similar types and numbers of 
violations but as a result of the Civil War and Abacengezi period. I turn to an analysis of 
three patterns below. 
                                                
48 In Chapter 4 I describe the selection protocol for the research locations. 
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The first objective of the interviews was to determine the ways that each 
individual experienced the conflict, including the types of violations he/she experienced 
as well as the perpetrators of those violations. Respondents were questioned on their 
experience of conflict in general. Throughout the interview the research team and I were 
careful not to indicate that we were interested in only one particular type of violence 
(i.e., violence from the Genocide). In order to move away from the existing focus on 
genocide violations and to uncover the possible range in types of violations that people 
in Rwanda experienced across different perpetrators, I asked participants to respond to 
an eight-question variable of conflict experience. Respondents were asked to answer yes 
or no to having experienced: (1) property loss or damage; (2) physical threat; (3) forced 
eviction; (4) witness a killing; (5) personal assault; (6) attempted killing; (7) killing49; 
and (8) rape. In addition to answering these questions for his/her own experience, each 
respondent was asked to answer the questions for family members (defined as a relative 
living in the same house). 50  
This eight-part variable allowed for a comparable understanding of what people 
experienced personally and within their family. Table 8 presents the total number of 
each violation reported (for self and family) across respondents in the sample for each of 
the eight violations. What is most noticeable from this table is the sheer number of 
violations that people experienced in Rwanda over the course of the conflict. Rather than 
only a small section of the population being exposed to the violence of the conflict (or 
the violence of the Genocide) there were high levels of violations experienced by all 
                                                
49 Death could obviously not have happen to the respondent him/herself so in this case the respondent 
could only answer for family members. 
50 I would like to thank David Backer and the West Africa Transitional Justice (WATJ) Project for 
assistance with the design of the interview questionnaire. 
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respondents that I interviewed. The average respondent in the data listed having 
experienced 7 violations, of these 3 violations were personal (out of 7 possible 
categories) and 4 were family violations (out of 8 possible categories).  
 
Table 8:  
Types of Violations Experienced in Rwanda By 
Respondent and Family Members 
 Self Family Member 
Property Loss or Damage 25 (62.5%) 29 (72.5%) 
Physical Threat 27 (67.5%) 22 (55%) 
Forced Eviction 19 (47.5%) 18 (45%) 
Witnessed Killing 22 (55%) 16 (40%) 
Assault 16 (40%) 25 (62.5%) 
Attempted Killing 14 (35%) 21 (52.5%) 
Killing X 32 (80%) 
Rape 2 (5%) 5 (12.5%) 
Total 125 168 
 
 
Despite the division of research locations between high-genocide and low- 
genocide sectors, respondents described a similar experience of conflict across the 
country (as measured by the types of violations they experienced). As one respondent 
put it: “Of course, during a war you can not not have something happen to you.” (MU-1) 
The conventional understanding of the conflict would lead us to believe that violations 
would be prevalent in high-genocide areas, and less common in low-genocide areas. 
This is not what we find. Indeed, as demonstrated in Figure 16 and 17, the total number 
of violations and type of violations were high across all regions. For example, at least 
50% of respondents in all research locations lost a member of their family. As the 
aggregated narrative of the conflict would predict, people in Nyamagabe and Karongi 
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(the high genocide-locations) experienced the highest level of physical violations for 
both respondents and their families. People from Rulindo (a low-genocide location) 
experienced less physical and property violations but these types of violations were still 
present across the respondents. 
 
Figure 16. Types of Violations Experienced in Rwanda by Research Location, Self 
 
 






















































While the patterns of high and low genocide areas loosely hold there are some 
noticeable exceptions to these predictions. People from Musanze and Rulindo (low-
genocide areas), for example, reported the killing of a family member more than people 
from either Nyamagabe or Karongi (high-genocide areas). People from these four 
communities reported having experienced almost equal levels of personal assault and 
attempted killing. If these violations in Musanze and Rulindo were not related to the 
Genocide, than what can account for this conflict experience? 
 
Perpetrators of Violations and Conflict Experience 
While the types of violations experienced by people were similar across region, 
the perpetrators of that violence varied. People experienced violence from the Genocide, 
the Civil War, and the Abacengezi period.  
Determining the perpetrators of the violations that respondents experienced was 
more difficult than determining the violation type. While respondents were asked 
directly about the types of violations they experienced, it was not prudent (or 
permissible in Rwanda) to directly ask about the perpetrator(s) of the violence. Asking 
the perpetrator question directly ran the risk that respondents would admit to being 
victimized by the Kagame/RPF government. This was a potentially hazardous finding 
for the research team, the respondent and myself because the culpability of the 
government in civilian violence is publically denied. In order to circumvent this hazard, 
I relied on a temporal coding which allowed me to impute the perpetrator of the 
violation.  
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In two-thirds of the interviews respondents attributed the perpetrator of the 
violence themselves without being directly asked, either in questions about the identity 
of their perpetrators or in other questions regarding the nature of the violence. When 
respondents did not self-attribute, the perpetrator of the violations was determined by 
temporal cues. For the purpose of this project, crimes of genocide are defined as 
anything that happened during the year 1994, as ‘1994’ is now a common euphemism 
for genocide violence in Kinyarwanda. Civil war violence is defined as any violence 
happening before 1994, this accounts of the violence from the RPF invasion as well as 
infighting between the RPF and the then Rwandan Army. Abacengezi violence is 
defined as anything happening after 1994.51  
When there were not temporal indicators, the perpetrator of the violence was not 
attributed and the respondent was removed from this part of the analysis.52 It is 
important to note that these categories do not attribute the actual perpetrator to a given 
violation. As mentioned above, the measure of perpetrator is imprecise. The data can 
only attribute violations to a given period of conflict, not a particular side that was active 
during this period.53  
Of the two-thirds of respondents who did attribute the violence, people who 
suffered genocide crimes were more likely to assign the violence to the Genocide 
directly. For example, when answering a question in regards to property violations, a 
respondent would answer “Yes, that happened to me during the Genocide.” People who 
experienced Civil War and Abacengezi violence were more likely to gauge their 
                                                
51 The Abacengezi violence in the Karongi area was particularly concentrated in 1997. As such, many 
respondents referred to this violence as the “Conflict of 1997” or simply “1997”. 
52 This coding rule affected one respondent from Nyamagabe and one respondent from Rulindo. 
53 Of note, no single respondent attributed any of their violations to the current Rwandan government. 
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violence by the temporal point of the Genocide, such as “that happened to me before the 
Genocide reached here” to refer to violence related to the Civil War, or “that was after 
the Genocide was over” referring to the period of the Abacengezi violence. The 
temporal measure biases the perpetrator variable towards an over-reporting of genocide 
violence, as it is likely that people experienced Civil War in 1994 as well. The reader 
should keep in mind that this coding method leads to an over-reporting of genocide 
violations, however this biases my findings towards an over-reporting of genocide 
violence which will strengthen my argument if results are found for Civil War and 
Abacengezi violence (the excluded experience as per my hypothesis). 
The aggregated understanding of the conflict would predict that most if not all of 
the violence experienced in Rwanda was a result of the Genocide, but this is not the 
case. From the interview data I find that less than half of the violence experienced by 
respondents is attributable solely to the Genocide. The distribution of perpetrators across 
the sample is as follows: 18 respondents (47.5%) experience genocide violence; 4 
respondents (10%) experienced civil war violence; and 11 respondents (27.5%) 
experienced violence from the Abacengezi period. Seven respondents were recorded as 
experiencing multiple sources of violence. This means that over 50% of the respondents 
experienced something other than only genocide violence. This finding certainly 
challenges the current understanding of the Rwandan conflict. Table 9 summarizes the 






Perpetrators of Violations in Rwanda Experienced 
Across Respondent 
Genocide Violence only 18 (45%) 
Civil War Violence only 4 (10%) 
Abacengezi Violence only 11 (27.5%) 
Genocide & Civil War Violence 2 (5%) 
Civil War & Abacengezi Violence 4 (10%) 
All Three Types 1 (2.5%) 
Total 40 
 
Unlike the types of violations that people experienced, the perpetrators of 
violations reported by respondents vary significantly across region. In Nyamagabe, a 
high-genocide sector, all respondents reported only genocide violence, except for one 
woman who fled to Congo in early 1994. In Karongi, the other location with high levels 
of genocide violence, six respondents reported only genocide violence while three 
reported only Abacengezi violence and one reported violence from the Civil War. In 
Musanze, a low-genocide sector, all respondents reported Abacengezi violence except 
for one person who was not living in the area at the time. Here there was only one case 
of genocide violence. Finally, in Rulindo, the other location of low-genocide violence, 
experiences by perpetrator were mixed. There were four cases of genocide violence, five 
civil war cases and three cases of Abacengezi violence. Note that three of the 
respondents in this location experienced violence from multiple perpetrators. This 
location also includes the respondent who experienced violations from all three 
perpetrators. The breakdown of perpetrators by research location is presented in 








While the perpetrators of the violence differed, the actual violations themselves 
were very similar. Respondents with violations from all three perpetrator types reported 
the death of family members, physical assault, threats, property destruction and forced 
relocation. While victims of Abacengezi violence report higher counts of property crime, 
there is no type of violence that is unique to a particular perpetrator of violence. 
Personally experiencing sexual violence is a notable exception, as this was reported 
solely by women who reported crimes of genocide. It is unclear whether this is a 
systematic pattern in the type of violation or a result of the public support given to 
genocide survivors who were raped over other victims of sexual violence making it more 
likely for this category of women to share their story.  
From the sample we see that violence in Rwanda was not confined to acts of 











































Abacengezi. However, this is not what is included in the government-created conflict 
frame. As described in Chapter 3, a conflict frame is the government interpretation of 
conflict events strategically selected to strengthen the government’s political power in 
the post-conflict period. In Rwanda, this frame focuses solely on the Genocide. I turn to 
an analysis of the selection and development of the frame below. 
 
The Government Conflict Frame in Rwanda 
Following the transition from the Civil War in 1992, the government in Rwanda 
has grown more repressive (Freedom House 2007). While there are regular elections, 
both choice and information is limited, leading Freedom House to declare that Rwanda 
is both “not an electoral democracy” and “not free”. Since the military victory in 1994, 
the RPF is said to maintain careful control over political life. It is in this political context 
that the conflict frame has emerged. 
Above, I demonstrated that there was a wide range of individual experiences 
with violence in Rwanda across the 10-year period that includes multiple perpetrator 
groups. The government conflict frame, however, only recognizes the violence from the 
Genocide perpetrated by the then Rwandan Army (FAR), the Interahamwe militia 
groups, and vigilante individuals. In this way the conflict frame only acknowledges 
violence in which the RPF government cannot be implicated. I argue that the 
government has systematically ignored all other violence in Rwanda in an attempt to 
strategically consolidate political power and place blame. 
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Why Construct the Frame? 
The national conflict frame in Rwanda is an example of a meticulously 
constructed narrative for international and domestic consumption. The conflict frame is 
used both by Rwandan society, and those outside of the country who seek to understand 
the course of the violence in the country in a unified way. When faced with the 
complexity and extreme variation of conflict events, individuals, governments and the 
international community seek a simplified version of events. This desire for aggregation 
is exaggerated in the presence of extreme violence – such as genocide – which is 
universally difficult to comprehend. What did people experience? Who is right and who 
is wrong? Who should be punished? These questions become overstated in times of 
extreme moral upheaval and support the emergence of a unifying frame. 
The conflict frame in Rwanda was strategically constructed to support the RPF 
government (the current majority party in Rwanda54), and to present a version of the 
violence that highlights the RPF victory in the Civil War. It both challenges and 
excludes political opposition to the government. Instead of recognizing all violence 
experienced over the course of the conflict, the RPF strategically restricts the dialogue. 
Political opposition is classified as genocidal and therefore the legitimacy of this 
opposition is undermined. 
 
                                                
54 In the 2010 presidential election, the RPF candidate (Paul Kagame) received 93.08% of the vote. The 
next highest candidates were from the Social Democratic Party (PSD) receiving 5.15% and the Liberal 
Party (PL) receiving 1.37%. See African Elections database 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/rw.html#2010_Presidential_Election Accessed February 23, 2011. 
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What is the Conflict Frame? 
The current conflict frame in Rwanda exists as three main “truths”. First and 
foremost, there is the Genocide against the Tutsi. This violence is recognized for its 
deliberate, targeted destruction of the Tutsi ethnic group. This period of conflict is called 
“the Genocide Against the Tutsi” by the Rwanda government to further highlight the 
targeting of the Tutsi ethnic group over Hutu political moderates who were also killed at 
that time.55 The violence of the Genocide and the targeting of the Tutsi is elevated in 
importance above all other periods of violence that were experienced during the conflict. 
Here the current government uses the violence from the Genocide to create what 
Reyntjens (2004) calls a “genocide credit”. This piece of the frame serves to remind 
people of the horrible and disruptive violence that took place in 1994 and the “bad 
leadership” that brought the country to that place. Strategically, the focus on the 
Genocide is able to justify a demand for new leadership that will not take the country in 
such a disruptive direction. This disruption refers to the genocide violence, but also the 
property destruction, economic collapse and refugee movements associated with that 
violence. While the Genocide was by many accounts the most violent and disruptive 
period of the conflict, violence against the Tutsi is also the only type of violence in 
which the RPF government can in no way be implicated.  
The second “truth” of the conflict frame highlights the RPF victory over the 
Rwandan Army (ex-FAR) during the second phase of the Civil War. In this component 
of the frame, the RPF is championed for having saved the Tutsi population (and 
                                                
55 In 2009 there was a shift in the national name of the conflict from “The 1994 Genocide” to the 
“Genocide Against the Tutsi”. There is speculation that this change was made to exclude Hutu political 
moderates from the national narrative. This change was received in Rwanda with mixed response 
(Author’s Interviews, 2009). 
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Rwandan population in general) as well as having won a military victory over a 
repressive government. This “truth” is manifested in national holidays such as Heroes’ 
Day and Liberation Day. Heroes’ Day is a holiday that recognizes the achievements of 
all types of heroism in Rwanda, though in recent years awards have focused on RPF 
officers and military accomplishments (Kimenyi 2007). Liberation Day is more 
specifically meant to remember the role of the RPF in the liberation of the country. If the 
first truth’s focus on the Genocide frames the call for new leadership, the second truth’s 
focus on the RPF as liberators answers the question of who those new leaders should be. 
By leveraging the military success of the RPF and by championing this group as those 
who stopped the Genocide, the RPF is able to frame itself as Rwanda’s rightful moral 
and military leader.  
Finally, the conflict frame includes the threat of attack from the Abacengezi 
rebels in the Northwest (particularly in Congo). Having established that new leadership 
is needed, and that the RPF is the best option for that new leadership, the convergence 
on a domestic threat justifies a restrictive, semi-authoritarian form of rule. Here, the 
Abacengezi rebels enter into the conflict frame in a very specific and strategic way. Far 
from being seen as having legitimate political goals, the FDLR is classified as a group of 
ex-genocidaires continuing the fight for the elimination of the Tutsi. While this was true 
in part, particularly in early 1995, the FDLR currently represents a political opposition to 
the RPF government. By focusing on the genocide links of the organization, however, 
the RPF is able to dismiss the FDLR as illegitimate but still threatening and bring the 
conflict frame full circle. By maintaining the presence of an active military threat against 
the country, the RPF is able to defend the political consolidation needed to maintain 
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domestic political power. Here the government is again able to leverage the “genocide 
credit” against accusations of strong-armed politics and state repression. As Reyntjens 
describes it: 
Of course the genocide is a massive reality with a lasting impact, 
but it has also become a source of legitimacy astutely exploited to 
escape condemnation, not unlike the way in which the Holocaust is 
used to deflect criticism of Israel’s policies and actions towards the 
Palestinians. … [T]he 1994 genocide has become an ideological 
weapon allowing the RPF to acquire and maintain victim status 
and, as a perceived form of compensation, to enjoy complete 
immunity (Reyntjens 2004, 199). 
 
While the conflict frame highlights violence from both the Civil War and the 
Genocide, it does not include an analysis of the violence from the Abacengezi period. 
Through the individual interviews conducted in Musanze and Rulindo, we can see that 
insurgent violence from the Abacengezi period was a significant conflict experience for 
some individuals in Rwanda, however this experience is not included in the existing 
conflict frame. The narrow focus of the government conflict frame excludes the 
experiences of people who were violated during the Abacengezi period and further 
denies their participation in the national justice process as discussed below. 
 
Opposition to the Government Conflict Frame in Rwanda 
Conflict frames are often essential for the reconstruction of a post-conflict 
country. By distilling down the complications and various grey areas that are an 
inevitable part of violence, a nation is able to move forward with an uncontested history. 
The purpose of analyzing the conflict frame in Rwanda is not to challenge the reason for 
its existence, but rather to reveal the strategic role that the frame takes on in the 
contemporary political functioning of the country. Everything from political 
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campaigning to international funding requests circle around the Genocide violence of 
1994.  
Yet despite this exclusion there has been minimal domestic opposition to the 
government conflict frame. Victims of Abacengezi violence are not organized or 
mobilized in any politically meaningful way. There are no victim groups or civil society 
organizations. Abacengezi victims lack a cohesive consciousness of their experiences. 
Challenges to the RPF government itself have also been minimal. As hypothesized in 
Chapter 3, this is due in large part to the restriction of veto within Rwandan society. 
While Rwanda is a democracy in theory, in practice there have been major restrictions 
on civic participation and political opposition to the RPF party has been limited. 
Freedom House characterizes the Rwanda elections as being “marred by bias and 
intimidation which precluded any genuine challenge to the RPF” (Freedom House 
2007).  
Attempts to launch rival political parties have been met with intimidation and, in 
some instances, violence. For example, in the 2010 presidential election three opposition 
candidates were excluded from the ballot: Victoire Ingabire, leader of the Union of 
Democratic Forces Party remains under extended house arrest, Bernard Ntaganda is in 
prison under attempted murder charges and Frank Habineza’s deputy was murdered a 
month before the election in a currently unsolved case. The restriction of viable political 
alternatives to the RPF party has limited the power of individual citizens to veto the 
government and thus enforce a more inclusionary conflict frame. Most of the opposition 
to the conflict frame has come through international actors, mainly human rights 
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organizations and international academics who have no power to domestically sanction 
or veto the RPF government. 
Post-conflict justice in Rwanda, particularly the Gacaca courts (or Inkiko Gacaca 
in Kinyarwanda), has been designed to address grievances that arise from the RPF 
conflict frame, and not the conflict more broadly. Below, I explore the history of post-
conflict justice in Rwanda focusing on the origins and implementation of Gacaca as well 
as the ways in which the Gacaca courts have emerged from the existing conflict frame. 
 
Selecting Post-Conflict Justice in Rwanda 
As I theorize in Chapter 3, the purpose of a conflict frame is to support political 
consolidation in the post-conflict period not to address individual grievances. Post-
conflict justice (PCJ) is a product of this strategic conflict frame and as a result all 
individual experiences of conflict are rarely if ever realized in the creation of a national 
justice process. First, it may not be possible for a single justice process to address all 
individual experiences in a given political context. This limitation could be the function 
of domestic resources or the feasibility of addressing a wide variety of claims. But 
second, and more likely, the political choice to construct and implement a given justice 
process is a strategic selection by the government of which individuals to favor and 
which to exclude. It is precisely this strategic political exclusion that can have lasting 
effects on individual participation in a given process and the views towards justice in the 
country on a whole. In this way political exclusion can threaten the success of the justice 
process for all individuals including the included group. Rather than base a national 
justice process on a disaggregated experience of the conflict itself, post-conflict justice is 
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more often constructed based on a government conflict frame which is the product of the 
strategic political decision on the part of the state to shape the understanding of the 
conflict in a particular way. This is the process we see in Rwanda. 
After the military victory of the RPF in July 1994, justice (i.e., the accountability 
and prosecution of those responsible for crimes during the conflict) was a major priority. 
The transition government stated that “(t)here can be no reconciliation without 
justice”.56 The particular path toward this end was unique. With extensive consultation 
from international actors, the Rwandan government engaged in three different justice 
efforts: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), national-level domestic 
courts and the Gacaca courts. While the Gacaca courts are the main focus of this 
analysis, I outline each process briefly below. 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Created by the UN Security 
Council in 1994 immediately following the end of mass violence, the ICTR was 
sponsored and supported by the international community. The Tribunal was intended to 
handle the “prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda between 
1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (United Nations 1994).” Accordingly, the goals 
of the ICTR are to “contribute to the process of national reconciliation in Rwanda and to 
the maintenance of peace in the region” by punishing those accountable for violent 
activity (United Nations 1994). As structured, the ICTR was created in order to address 
a number of problems that the Security Council believed the Rwandan government was 
not able to tackle without international legal support. These problems included the 
                                                
56 Government of Rwanda 2009. 
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history of cyclical conflict within post-independence Rwanda, the necessity of 
international assistance in engaging in high profile, contentious arrests throughout the 
world and a legitimacy crisis for the transitional Rwandan government both at home as 
well as abroad. 
Although well intentioned, the ICTR had some limitations. As conceived, it was 
not structured to deal with nor is it capable of trying all the persons believed to be 
involved with the violence. The ICTR was only expected to deal with the persons 
“responsible for genocide” taken to mean the leaders and organizers of the violence not 
lower level participants. As the ICTR’s mandate draws to a close, only 50 cases have 
been completed with 25 cases in progress and 2 individuals awaiting trial.57 Seemingly 
in an effort to fill this void, new legislation and procedures were established in 
Rwanda.58  
 
National-Level Courts. Immediately following the conflict, the Rwandan transitional 
government initiated a massive legal plan of arrests and prosecutions for suspected 
perpetrators living in the country (USIP 1995).59 The establishment of courts and 
relevant proceedings (trials) relied on both new and pre-existing Rwandan criminal law, 
functioning in accordance with the new Rwandan judiciary. Unlike the ICTR, 
individuals in the national court system are charged and tried according to Rwandan 
criminal law and not international law. The post-conflict effort was extensive. By early 
                                                
57 http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx Accessed on March 25, 2010 
58 In 2010 uncompleted ICTR cases were scheduled to be transferred to the Rwanda National Courts for 
trial however as of the writing of this dissertation the process has yet to begin. 
59 Rwandan Organic Law 40/2000. 
 141 
1995, more than 6,500 suspected genocide perpetrators were being held in Rwandan 
prisons. By 2005, that number was close to 72,000 (USIP 1995).60  
While effort was extended, the infrastructure in Rwanda was not at the level 
necessary to support the number of individuals being brought into the legal system. The 
lack of infrastructure did not prevent the arrest of suspected perpetrators but rather it led 
to a backlog in the national courts and an overflow in the Rwanda prison system, which 
required the development of yet another institution, Gacaca.  
 
Gacaca Courts. Created in part to address issues of reduced judicial capacity61 and the 
overwhelming number of prisoners62 following the conflict the Rwandan government 
introduced a justice system called Gacaca in 2002. 63  Gacaca (Inkiko Gacaca in 
Kinyarwanda, literally translated to mean “justice on the grass”) was designed as an 
extensive series of local courts to try genocide suspects in their own communities. These 
courts were created to address the backlog in the national court system as well as to 
bring the responsibility for the prosecution of genocide perpetrators to the community 
level. Unlike the international court system with its adherence to international law and 
focus on accountability and punishment, and the national court system with its emphasis 
on civil and customary law, Gacaca encourages the public confession of crimes, truth 
                                                
60 See also: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4726969.stm. Accessed on December 30, 2010. 
61 At the end of the Genocide and Civil War, there were only 40 lawyers remaining in Rwanda from over 
800 in 1992 the others having been killed or fled the country (USIP 1995). The Rwandan government 
states that these numbers were slightly higher. The National Service of Gacaca Jurisdiction reports that 
before 1994 there were 758 judges and 70 prosecutors in Rwanda and in November of 1994 there were 
244 judges and only 12 prosecutors (http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/Generaties.htm accessed March 
25, 2010). Government buildings and supplies were also destroyed and looted. 
62 The United States Institute of Peace estimates that in 1995 there were over 6,500 people in Rwanda’s 
prisons (USIP 1995), by 2005 that number was close to 72,000. The prison conditions were equally 
problematic. As a post-conflict country, Rwanda lacked the material resources to accommodate all of the 
prisoners. International attention was drawn to the poor living conditions that the prisoners suffered 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4726969.stm)  
63 Established by Rwandan Organic Law nº 16/2004 of 19/06/2004. 
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telling and community service in exchange for reduced punishments (Neuffer 2003). 
Gacaca is a direct product of the RPF conflict frame focusing exclusively on crimes 
committed during the Genocide. 
The Gacaca courts function like a local community meeting. Elected judges, 
trained by the Rwanda government, preside over the meeting. The accused in Gacaca 
manage their own defense, while members of the community volunteer information and 
their own experiences about a particular crime. All members of the community are asked 
by the government to attend.64 Because of the structure of the Gacaca courts, the success 
of the process is highly contingent on local-level, individual participation. In order for 
the process to be most effective, individuals must put forward cases, testify and supply 
evidence for those cases. Although operating on the local level, the Gacaca courts were 
designed and implemented from the top down. 
While the national courts in Rwanda are still responsible for prosecuting higher-
level genocide crimes such as murder, rape and the organization as well as leadership of 
violence, the Gacaca courts have allowed less severe crimes to be tried in a less formal, 
quasi-legal manner at the community level. Crimes tried in Gacaca courts include 
property crimes, assault and joining with and assisting killers in finding the location of 
targeted individuals. When the Gacaca process got underway there was an estimated 
800,000 to one million people accused of crimes of genocide (“Rwanda Abolishes” 
2007). Though Gacaca was scheduled to be completed in December 2009, it is still 
ongoing in areas with extremely high levels of genocide violence. In these areas, 
completing the caseload of all alleged perpetrators was not possible in the time allotted. 
                                                
64 http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/Generaties.htm 
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The large number of genocide perpetrators in Rwanda is due in part to the way 
that the government has chosen to define crimes of genocide. In Rwanda, crimes of 
genocide range on a scale from organization of the violence at the high extreme to low-
level participation on the other extreme where participation can include property crimes 
and “showing” or divulging the location of someone in hiding. In some cases, these low-
level crimes were motivated by genocidal ideology, but it is also possible that people 
participated in looting and more superficial acts of violence against Tutsis because of the 
social and political breakdown at the time (Davenport and Stam 2009). While these 
crimes are classified as crimes of genocide, it is extremely difficult to prove actual 
genocidal intent or ethnic targeting through the Gacaca courts (Morrill 2004; Karbo and 
Mutisi 2008). 
In line with the existing conflict frame in Rwanda, Gacaca was designed and 
implemented solely to address crimes of genocide. The effect of the limited focus of the 
justice process is to provide elevated status for survivors and victims of the Genocide in 
Rwanda. Genocide survivors receive special compensation for school fees, property and 
other allotments through national Genocide survivor funds such as FARG (Fonds 
National pour l'Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide/National Fund for the Assistance 
of Survivors of Genocide). While these dispensations can in no way compensate for 
their experiences during the Genocide and those who were lost, a strong effort is made 
to assist survivors in their current living conditions. In addition, Genocide survivors 
receive the less tangible benefits of post-conflict justice through the Gacaca courts. 
Where possible Genocide survivors are provided with additional information about 
violations that they experienced including information about the death of a family 
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member. Genocide survivors are also given an opportunity to participate in the 
potentially cathartic experience of testifying against their aggressor(s).65 
The focus on survivors of the Genocide and, most important for my argument, a 
singular focus on crimes of genocide prevent other areas of violence from being 
examined in the current justice effort. The Freedom House (2007) country report on 
Rwanda, for example, describes Gacaca as one-sided and argues that the failure to 
prosecute RPF war crimes from 1990 through 1995 or violence in the Congo from 1996 
through 2000 opens up the critique that the Gacaca process is simply victor’s justice. 
Some quick and decisive war crimes trials took place immediately following the Civil 
War, but in most cases, members of the ex-Rwandan army and other suspected political 
officials were rounded up, briefly tried and summarily executed (USIP 1995). Following 
that brief period of “justice”66 there has been virtually no systematic attention paid to 
crimes that took place during the Civil War or Abacengezi period. One possible 
explanation for this justice focus is the problem of limited resources, which already 
taxes the country. While struggling to prosecute crimes of genocide, it is necessary for 
the government to focus on a single, dominant justice issue. Another possible, and more 
cynical, explanation for the focus of the current justice process is that crimes of genocide 
are the only crimes in which the current RPF government can in no way be implicated.67 
While there are three justice efforts in Rwanda, for the purpose of this 
dissertation I focus the analysis of participation exclusively on the Gacaca process. The 
                                                
65 The psychology and transitional justice literature is in an active debate about the benefits of public 
testimony (Stover and Weinstein 2004). 
66 International human rights sources have questioned the impartiality and legality of these trials 
(USIP 1995). 
67 A concept known as the ‘double genocide’ hypothesis has emerged in recent literature on Rwanda 
suggesting that there were two genocides, one committed by the Hutu against the Tutsi and another 
committed by Tutsi (specifically the advancing RPF) against the Hutu. For a detailed explanation, see 
Verwimp (2003). 
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Gacaca courts are central to this analysis for three reasons. First, Gacaca is a domestic 
process. It was selected and implemented by the Rwandan government. While there was 
significant consultation with international funding agencies, the process itself is largely 
understood to have originated in Rwanda. 68  While the international community 
influenced the mandate of the ICTR, according to my theory the Gacaca courts will be 
most closely matched to the Rwandan government’s conflict frame. Second, Gacaca is a 
post-conflict justice process. Unlike the national courts, which are part of the judicial 
system in Rwanda, the Gacaca courts were created simply to investigate crimes 
committed during the conflict and the Gacaca courts will be disbanded once these crimes 
have been addressed. Finally, the Gacaca courts are a locally implemented process. The 
local implementation of the process is essential for testing the hypotheses raised in 
Chapter 3. The local nature of the process is needed to measure individual participation 
in the process as the barrier to entry for individuals is minimal. For example, a PCJ with 
hearings held only in the capital city would require individuals to be informed about the 
process and to travel to the capital city in order to participate. Because Gacaca is held on 
the village level, individuals have very little reason not to participate if they are willing 
to do so. 
 
Conclusion 
In the above chapter I demonstrate that genocide violence was not the only 
source of violence experienced by Rwandans over the course of the conflict. To the 
contrary, through a series of interviews with individuals in Rwanda I found that more 
than 50% of these individuals experienced something other than only genocide 
                                                
68 For an overview of the international community’s role in the construction of Gacaca see Oomen (2005). 
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violations. While the types (e.g. assault, property destruction, etc.) of violations that 
people experienced were the same, the perpetrators of those violations were different. 
Indifferent to this empirical reality, the conflict frame in Rwanda focuses solely 
on the violence of the Genocide. In this chapter I argue that that focus is a deliberate 
strategic choice on the part of the current RPF government to highlight the successes of 
their political party and deny their own culpability while challenging political opposition 
and legitimating state repression. This focus on crimes of genocide within the conflict 
frame has lead to the creation of a post-conflict justice process, Gacaca, which focuses 
exclusively on one type of violence while excluding others. As presented in Chapter 3, I 
argue that this focus will have a negative effect on participation in the Gacaca process as 
well as views of justice in Rwanda on the whole. 
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Chapter 6:  
Framing the Conflict in Northern Ireland 
 
In the preceding chapter, I summarized the conflict in Rwanda. I presented 
original data on individual conflict experiences in the country across both different types 
of violations and different perpetrators. This information was then compared to the 
government conflict frame and the mandate of the post-conflict justice (PCJ) process in 
Rwanda. In this chapter I look at the contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland (from 
1968-1998) and discuss the similar mechanisms of conflict frame creation and PCJ 
selection at work in this case. 
The experience in Northern Ireland69 is similar to that in Rwanda in many ways. 
First, the violence in Northern Ireland was experienced differently across the population 
(measured by both different types of violations and different perpetrators of those 
violations).70 These differences created a range of conflict experiences across individuals 
and across the country similar to the range of experiences in Rwanda. Second, at the 
termination of the conflict, the British government in Northern Ireland had an incentive 
to frame the events of the conflict in a strategic way. And third, the resulting justice 
efforts in Northern Ireland are a result of this strategic framing on the part of the 
government.  
                                                
69 As with many things in Northern Ireland history, the name of the area itself is a contentious issue. 
Individuals sympathetic to the Unionist cause tend to prefer the term Northern Ireland or Ulster. Those 
sympathetic to the Nationalist cause tend to refer to the area as the North of Ireland or the Six Counties. 
For the purposes of this dissertation I will refer to the area as Northern Ireland as this is the political term 
for the area used by both the United Nations and the European Union. 
70 As discussed in Chapter 3 conflict experience is also measured as the duration and intensity of the 
violations. However, for the purpose of this analysis I focus exclusively on the types of violations 
experienced as well as the perpetrator of those violations. 
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While similar in many ways, the mechanisms at work in Northern Ireland differ 
from Rwanda in an important way. I argue that the existence of a (weak) democracy in 
Northern Ireland is essential for understanding the creation of the conflict frame and the 
ways in which excluded individuals have interacted with that conflict frame. In Rwanda, 
the military victory on the part of the RPF allowed for a consolidated conflict frame to 
emerge with little domestic resistance. While in Rwanda I observed little resistance to 
the RPF frame, but in Northern Ireland I observed a dynamic set of groups and 
individuals working to advance counter-narratives that challenged and subverted the 
British conflict frame. This discrepancy is due in large part to the differences in political 
structure across both countries, as I will argue in the subsequent chapter. 
Northern Ireland consists of the six counties on the northeast quarter of the island 
of Ireland and is bordered by the Republic of Ireland to the south and west and the Irish 
Sea to the North and East. In 1921 after a war of independence with England, a political 
settlement was reached and the island of Ireland was partitioned. The six northern 
counties that make up Northern Ireland today remained part of the United Kingdom 
(UK) while the rest of the island was granted independence. With the Good Friday 
Agreement of 1998 ending the conflict, Northern Ireland currently has a devolved 
government within the United Kingdom, meaning that power from the UK government 
is granted to Northern Ireland for its own governance. As of the 2001 Northern Ireland 
census, there are approximately 1.7 million people living in Northern Ireland. The area 
consists of roughly 2.9% of the UK’s total population. According to the same census, an 
estimated 40% of the population of Northern Ireland identifies as Catholic, with 
approximately 46% identifying as Protestant (including Presbyterian, Church of Ireland 
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and Methodist) and the remaining 14% of the population identifying with no religious 
tradition or answering ‘other’ (to include Jewish, Muslim and Hindu).71 
In this chapter I present an overview of individual conflict experiences in 
Northern Ireland over the period of the conflict (1968-1998) as well as the British 
government framing of the conflict and the subsequent justice processes which have 
been implemented in the post-conflict period. I begin with a general (aggregated) history 
of the modern conflict in Northern Ireland (beginning with the Civil Rights Movement 
in 1968) and then move to a disaggregated analysis of individual violations to develop 
the theoretical range of conflict experiences in the country. In order to theorize the range 
of possible conflict experiences, I rely on 40 interviews from two locations in Northern 
Ireland (across two communities, for a total of four research sites). In these interviews I 
question individuals about their experiences (if any) with violence in Northern Ireland. 
In the following section of the chapter, I describe the creation of the British government 
conflict frame in Northern Ireland highlighting the core “truths” which are included in 
the frame. I also discuss the way in which the frame has been constructed by the British 
government to strengthen the government’s position in Northern Ireland and to protect 
the British government’s strategic interests pertaining to the conflict. Most important for 
this project, the British conflict frame leads to the selection and implementation of a 
variety of ad hoc justice processes put in place in Northern Ireland. I turn to this case 
below. 
 
                                                
71 See http://www.nisranew.nisra.gov.uk/Census/Census2001Output/KeyStatistics/keystats.html. Accessed 
December 27, 2010. 
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The Conflict in Northern Ireland 
The contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland is one of competing identities and 
competing political goals. Essentially it is a clash over the question of who should 
govern the six counties in the North of Ireland: the United Kingdom or the Republic of 
Ireland (or in some cases, the people of Northern Ireland themselves). Different groups 
place emphasis on different components of this debate. Protestants are historically more 
likely to be concerned about maintaining the union with Britain and as a minority group 
on the island would see a united Ireland as a major threat to their own security. 
Historically a minority group within Northern Ireland, Catholics have focused on 
abolishing the discriminatory practices of Protestant rule in Northern Ireland and many 
argue for the uniting of the island of Ireland and complete British withdraw from the six 
counties (Darby 1997). This is not a war of ethnic or religious hatred, though this divide 
has certainly played a major role in the conflict. Rather this is a conflict between two 
opposing political views: Unionists- those favoring the union with the UK and 
Nationalists- those favoring a united Ireland. Each of these views is reinforced by 
proponents who support the use of force in achieving these two aims: Loyalists for the 
cause of unionism and Republicans for nationalism (McGarry and O’Leary 1995; Darby 
1997). The main actors to the conflict are further elaborated in Table 10. 
For many, the contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland begins with partition, or 
at least, the major dispute over how Northern Ireland should be governed can be linked 
to that partition. However, Darby (1997) contends that the source of the conflict can be 
argued to being in “1170, 1641, 1690, 1798, 1912, 1916, 1921 or 1969” (19). This is not 
an exaggeration. Strident Nationalists may trace the origins of the conflict back to the 
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invasion of the island of Ireland by England in the Twelfth Century. Unionists may cite 
the rise of IRA violence in the early 1970s. Others would argue that Bloody Sunday (a 
civil rights march turned violent which resulted in the British army killing 14 protest 
participants) and the advent of Internment in 1971 mark the escalation of the conflict 
and a new and distinct chapter of violence.  
 
Table 10: Political Groups in Northern Ireland 
Group Political View Representative Organizations 
Unionist Maintain union with Britain Orange Order 
Loyalist Advocates violence if necessary in maintaining the union with Britain 
Ulster Volunteer 




Return to a union with the 
Republic of Ireland, opposition to 
British rule 
Sinn Féin (political 
party) 
Republican 
Advocates violence if necessary to 
return to a union with the Republic 
of Ireland and to expel British 





British Government Historically supportive of Unionist rights 
British Army, SAS 
(British Special 
Forces) 
Republic of Ireland 
Government 
Historically supportive of 
Nationalist rights Irish Police 
 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I place the starting point of the modern 
period of conflict in Northern Ireland in 1968 with the rise of the Civil Rights 
Movement. At this time the Protestant majority dominated Northern Ireland politics. 
There was growing inequality between Protestants and Catholics in education, 
employment and public housing. Though there had been low-level violence and 
contestation going back for decades, the rise and eventual fall of the Civil Rights 
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Movement in Northern Ireland marked a new period of sustained violence that would 
last through 1998. 
The Civil Rights Movement gained force in Northern Ireland around 1967 with 
the founding of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), an umbrella 
organization which organized various political and civil groups around a central call for 
human rights. The demands of the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland focused 
on discrimination against Catholics and centered around five issues: voting rights, 
housing, unemployment, education and human rights and the administration of justice 
(Darby 1997). Modeled off the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, NICRA used protest 
marches, sit-ins, house-squatting and other forms of civil disobedience that attracted 
national as well as international attention (McKittrick and McVea 2000). 
The Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland had a number of early successes, 
however, in 1969 the political situation began to deteriorate. Civil rights demonstrations 
grew increasingly contentious. Confrontations between protesters and the police broke 
out during protest marches. Riots and civil disobedience became increasingly violent, 
involving petrol bombs, bricks and barricades that injured police, participants and 
bystanders. At this time British troops began to replace Northern Ireland police on the 
streets in attempts to quell the violence. This period also marked the rise of the 
provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), a paramilitary group supporting violence in 
defense of Nationalist beliefs and the Catholic community.  
In 1970, amid rising violence and in an attempt to suppress the IRA, the British 
government implemented the Falls Road Curfew in which over 20,000 people in the 
West Belfast area were ordered not to leave their homes for a period of several days 
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while the Army conducted door-to-door searches. The curfew was a major turning point 
in the relations between the British government and the Catholic community. Catholics 
felt directly targeted and systematically violated by the policy. One civil servant 
recalled: “It is hard to remember any other incident that so clearly began the 
politicization and alienation of a community” (qtd. in McKittrick and McVea 2000, 62). 
One hundred and seventy one people were killed in 1970 and IRA violence against the 
Army gained momentum through this period (Sutton 1994). 
In an effort to weaken the rise of the IRA, a policy of internment was 
implemented in August 1971. Internment was a plan of large-scale arrests and detention, 
which eventually led to allegations of torture and prison abuse against the British Army 
(Murray 1998). Due in part to poorly maintained police files, the process of internment 
was inefficient, highly disruptive and discriminatory against the Catholic community. 
McKittrick and McVea (2000) argue that this period of indiscriminate justice was partly 
responsible for the surge in IRA violence which followed: 
To the outside world internment might be seen as a response to IRA 
violence, but many Catholics in areas such as west Belfast regarded IRA 
activity as a response to violence from the authorities (69). 
 
The most violent year of the conflict came in 1972 when 480 people were killed 
(Sutton 1994). It was in this same year that the Northern Ireland government was 
dissolved and the British Parliament resumed direct rule, a policy by which the 
responsibility for governing Northern Ireland was transferred to the newly created 
Northern Ireland Office (NIO) in London and away from Northern Ireland itself. In 1973 
a power-sharing government (between Protestants and Catholics) was put in place, but 
lasted only three months (Darby 1997). While other forms are political agreements were 
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attempted, violence continued in Northern Ireland and the political situation did not 
stabilize. 
During the 1980s violence increased again across Northern Ireland. The British 
army presence increased from 2,280 personnel in 1969 to 19,170 personnel in 1980.72 At 
the same time, there was a sharp increase in violence from Loyalist groups. These 
paramilitary groups, such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defense 
Association (UDA), claimed to protect and defend Protestant interests during the 
conflict through carrying out targeted assassinations as well as random civilian violence 
against Catholic neighborhoods. In recent years there has been evidence of British army 
and intelligence collusion with Loyalist groups. The role of collusion is gaining greater 
attention as new information becomes available regarding the use of British intelligence 
by Loyalist groups in prominent assassinations such as the murder of Catholic lawyer, 
Pat Finucane as well as cross-border (into Ireland) sectarian killings (Cassel et al. 2006). 
The contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland ended in 1998 with the signing of 
the Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement. The agreement focused on ending the most 
recent phase of violence in Northern Ireland (post-1969). It was signed by all but one 
major political party in Northern Ireland73, the British government and the government 
of the Irish Republic (Bell 2002). The agreement was a commitment to peace and the 
democratic process and included provisions for majority vote and power sharing within 
the Northern Ireland Executive. With the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the 
British government agreed to an Assembly and Executive within Northern Ireland for 
                                                
72 See http://www.dasa.mod.uk/modintranet/UKDS/UKDS2008/c7/table704.html Accessed on Janunary 1, 
2011. 
73 The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) opposed the agreement. 
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the maintenance of internal affairs, as well as a British-Irish council to promote relations 
between the UK and the Republic of Ireland.  
Over 3,700 people died during the course of the Troubles, an additional 40,000 
were injured,74 tens of thousands were arrested and home searches and roadblocks were 
an almost daily occurrence for people across the country. These violations occurred 
across community and throughout the country, though some areas had a larger 
concentration of violations than others. The scope and duration of the conflict had 
affects on the economy, social services, education and psychological health of the entire 
population. The full legacy of these experiences has yet to be determined (Muldoon et 
al. 2004).  
Below I move away from the aggregated understanding of conflict experiences in 
Northern Ireland and explore the range of violations that people experienced during the 
conflict. 
 
Variation in Violence Across Northern Ireland 
As presented in Chapter 5 on Rwanda, violence during a conflict is rarely a 
uniform experience across a population. Different individuals and communities 
experience the conflict differently, often with different violations and from different 
perpetrators. This was particularly true for the conflict in Northern Ireland. Despite the 
variation in violence that was experienced across the population, only very specific 
violations from specific perpetrators have been considered “crimes” as a part of the 
conflict frame. For example, there has been a strong focus on people who were killed 
                                                
74 See http://www.psni.police.uk/updates_fy_security_situation_and_public_order_statistics Accessed on 
Aug. 25, 2010. 
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during the conflict (e.g. Sutton 1994 and McKittrick et al. 1999) as well as crimes 
committed by paramilitary groups (particularly the IRA). Yet, as I will demonstrate 
below, people in Northern Ireland experienced a wide range of violation across different 
types of perpetrators. The range of violations included home raids, arrests, assault and 
other physical abuse as well as attempted killings and the deaths of family members. In 
addition to deaths by paramilitary organizations, people experienced violence from the 
police (RUC), local military (UDR) and the British Army. Despite this variation the 
frame of the conflict has remained narrow. 
In the following section I catalog the range of possible individual conflict 
experiences over the thirty-year period of violence. I use the 40 interviews collected in 
Northern Ireland to diversify the current understanding of violence that people 
experienced by both the type of violation and the perpetrator of that violation. To do this 
I discuss the patterns of conflict experiences presented across the interview respondents. 
As with the interviews in Rwanda, these results are neither designed to present the 
totality of conflict experiences across Northern Ireland, nor to represent proportions of 
those experiences that are generalizable to the whole population. Rather, these 
interviews were conducted to problematize the existing aggregated understanding of 
violence in Northern Ireland and to present a range of conflict experiences, which will 
be used to generate theoretical conclusions about subsequent participation in the national 
justice processes in the next chapter. 
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Types of Violations and Conflict Experiences 
In order to capture the variation in violence across Northern Ireland two research 
sites were selected (one urban and one rural) and interviews were conducted across both 
the Catholic and Protestant communities in each area. Ardoyne/Upper Ardoyne and 
South Armagh were selected because of the severity of violence in these areas as well as 
the diversity of experiences with the conflict across both locations. The selection process 
and the individual research areas are described in detail in Chapter 4, which describes 
the research methodology of this dissertation. The individual interview data from 
Northern Ireland was collected through 40 semi-structured interviews (10 from each 
community in each of the two locations).  
An important point of departure from existing research on Northern Ireland is 
that in the sampling of these respondents I tried to avoid selecting individuals with close 
ties to organized victim groups. Many victim groups in Northern Ireland have particular 
political platforms on violations or justice issues and for this reason respondents from 
these organizations could be biased in their responses in favor of the group’s program. 
To avoid this I relied on sampling from community groups organized around different 
goals (e.g. women’s groups or neighborhood redevelopment groups). 
One of the difficulties that I encountered using this selection technique was 
finding members of the Protestant community in South Armagh who had not previously 
been involved in or with the security forces in the area, namely the RUC75. For both 
political and social reasons, Protestants in South Armagh were very supportive of the 
local police and army. This affiliation led to a high number of people from that 
community volunteering for active service in the security forces. For this reason, I found 
                                                
75 The Royal Ulster Constabulary or police force in Northern Ireland. 
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that Protestants in the South Armagh area experienced high levels of violations both 
individually and within their families. These violations were often experienced on active 
duty or as the result of the individual being targeted because of his/her affiliation with 
the security forces. This group rarely experienced random violence. While these patterns 
do not invalidate the findings from this group, it is worth noting the reason for the high 
number of violation in the sample of the South Armagh Protestant community. 
As mentioned above, there has been a strong focus within Northern Ireland on 
people who have been killed or have lost a member of their family through the conflict. 
While no doubt an extreme violation, the focus on people who were killed during the 
conflict has led us to ignore or overlook other violations that took place during the same 
period. In many ways, these daily violations, such as road blocks, property damage and 
physically assault, were the hallmarks of the violence for many people in Northern 
Ireland and occurred with more frequency than deaths during the conflict (e.g. 3,700 
deaths compared with 40,000 injuries). Emphasizing the experience of people who were 
killed leads us to assume that this type of violation was either the only or certainly the 
most prevalent violation that people experienced. This is not the case. 
In order to evaluate the range of violations that people experienced in Northern 
Ireland I asked a series of questions regarding conflict experience. A list of experiences 
was read and respondents were asked to answer yes or no if they had experienced the 
violation or not. These experiences included: (1) property damage; (2) being forced from 
his/her home; (3) stopped at a road block; (4) threatened with violence; (5) witnessed 
someone being physically assaulted; (6) witnessed someone being killed; (7) physically 
assaulted; (8) arrested; and (9) attempted killing. In addition to asking these questions 
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for each person individually, respondents were also asked the questions for his/her 
family members (i.e. did a member of the respondent’s family experience these 
violations?). Family members were defined as a member of the respondent’s immediate 
family (not necessarily living in the same house). In addition to the nine violations listed 
above, respondents were asked if a family member was killed during the conflict. The 
breakdown of these violations is as follows. 
There were 187 individual violations experienced by respondents across the 
sample and 252 family violations. The average person received 5 violations (4.68) and 
had family members experience 6 violations (6.3). Across research location and 
community, people from Belfast had a higher rate for violations both individually and 
for their family then respondents from South Armagh. Members of the Catholic 
community reported only a slightly higher rate of violations to Protestant respondents 
(4.85 violations on average as compared with 4.5). People from Ardoyne experienced 
the highest number of violations, followed by Upper Ardoyne and Protestant members 
of South Armagh. Family violations followed the same pattern. The total number of 
violations experienced by research location is presented in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Number of Violations in Northern Ireland by Location 
Location Individual Violations Family Violations  Total Median Total Median Total 
Ardoyne (Catholic) 62 7 81 8 143 
Upper Ardoyne (Protestant) 50 5.5 64 6.5 
114 
South Armagh (Catholic) 35 3 49 4 
84 
South Armagh (Protestant) 40 3.5 58 6.5 
98 
Total 187 -- 252 -- 439 
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In addition to variations in the total number of violations that people 
experienced, there was variation in the types of violations that people experienced (e.g. 
property damage, assault, etc.). The most common violation for both individuals and 
their immediate family was being stopped at a roadblock, which happened to 92.5% of 
individuals and 97.5% of family members. While twenty-one people acknowledged 
experiencing the death of a family member, this experience fell below the median of 
violations across the sample. More people experienced property damage, being stopped 
at a roadblock, threats on their lives and witnessing physical violence than experienced a 
death in their family. The number of people who experienced a death in their family is 
also high, in part, because of the presence of a number of former security personnel from 
South Armagh in the sample. In addition, while the question regarding deaths was 
worded to ask specifically about immediate family members, some respondents 
mentioned the deaths of cousins and grandparents that are included in this total. While 
these results suggest that a number of people were affected by the death of a family 
member, the rest of the sample was affected by other types of violence. Figures 19 and 
20 present the types of violations experienced by individuals and their families across 
research location.  
In Figure 19 and 20 we can see the differences in the types of violations 
experienced in urban and rural locations. For example, people from Belfast, both 
Ardoyne and Upper Ardoyne witnessed more physical violence and were more likely to 
have been physically threatened than respondents from South Armagh. The Belfast 
respondents were also more likely to have witnessed a killing or to have been personally 
assaulted. Home raids were most common among respondents from Ardoyne as was the 
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destruction of property. Respondents from the Protestant community in South Armagh 
reported higher levels of attempts on their own lives as well as the lives of family 
members than the Catholic community in South Armagh, but this finding is due, again, 
to the high level of security personnel included in the sample, as explained above. 
Variations in the types of violations experienced by individuals suggests that in urban 
areas people experienced higher numbers of physical violations and were therefore more 
likely to be exposed to violence that people in rural areas (even high violence rural areas 
such as South Armagh). 
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The interviews I conducted in Northern Ireland reveal the range of violations that 
people experienced during the conflict. These patterns suggest that the focus on people 
killed during the conflict may obscure the variety and sheer numbers of violations that 
people experienced over thirty years of violence. No one in the sample was left 
untouched by the conflict. Below I turn to the perpetrators of these violations to see if 
the focus on paramilitary violence is warranted. 
 
Perpetrators of Violations and Conflict Experience 
In addition to the types of violations people experienced, I asked questions about 
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perpetrated by paramilitary groups, this was not the only source of violence people 
experienced. Respondents in the sample attributed their violations to paramilitary groups 
as well as the army and police. The inclusion of security personnel as perpetrators of 
violence will be particularly important in the following sections when I review the 
British conflict frame.  
In order to determine the perpetrator of an individual’s violations, respondents 
were asked, “Who was responsible for this violence?” This was an open-ended question 
and respondents could choose any answer to this question. It is important to note here 
that in many cases the perpetrator of an individual’s violations is a matter of perspective. 
The individual him/herself may not have actual evidence to substantiate this claim. This 
method differed from the technique employed in Rwanda. In Northern Ireland I judged it 
safe for the respondent, my data and myself to ask the perpetrator question directly. 
However, I did not ask people to identify individuals or perpetrators with specific 
violations (e.g. who was responsible for the death of your brother?). This could have 
been potentially more risky particularly with the presence of active Loyalist 
paramilitaries in the Upper Ardoyne area as well as possibly interfere with ongoing 
criminal investigations. 
When asked who was responsible for the violence committed against him/her, 
respondents’ answers included police, army, Republican and/or Loyalist paramilitary 
organizations, Catholics and/or Protestants as well as other answers such as politicians 
or the British imperial system. The most common perpetrator of violence was listed as 
Republicans (39%), followed by Loyalists (30%). The police and army together 
accounted for 30% of the perpetrators in the sample. Additional combinations of 
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violence include police and paramilitaries or army and paramilitaries. These 
combinations suggest that individuals could be victims of violence from both the State 
and non-state actors. In Table 12, I list the number of times that each group was listed as 
a perpetrator. Note, some respondents listed multiple perpetrators so this number is 
higher than the number of interviews. In Figure 21, I present the percentage of violations 
attributed to each group. 
 
Table 12: Perpetrators of Violations Experience 
in Northern Ireland, by Respondent 
Perpetrator Total 
Republican Paramilitary 26 
Loyalist Paramilitary 23 
Police 12 

















While types of violations varied across research location, patterns regarding the 
perpetrator of violations were linked more closely to individual communities. The 
Protestant communities in Upper Ardoyne and South Armagh reported the majority of 
their violations coming from Paramilitaries. In South Armagh this violence was 
primarily the responsibility of Republican paramilitaries namely the IRA. In Upper 
Ardoyne, however, respondents listed both Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries as the 
primary perpetrators of violations. The Catholic communities in Ardoyne and South 
Armagh experienced a wider range of perpetrators. These communities listed Loyalist 
paramilitaries, Army and Police as well as many combinations of these groups. 
Respondents from South Armagh even discussed the targeting of the Catholic 
community by Republican paramilitaries (particularly the IRA). The wide range of 
perpetrators suggests that paramilitaries were responsible for some – but definitely not 
all – of the violations people experienced. The patterns of perpetrators across these 
communities are presented in Figure 22. 
Despite the narrow focus of our current understanding of the conflict, interviews 
with individuals in Northern Ireland demonstrate a broad range of violations and 
perpetrators across the population. While there is a range of experiences across both 
types of violations and types of perpetrators, the British conflict frame focuses only on 
specific violations from specific perpetrators. Below I explore the creation of the British 
conflict frame for Northern Ireland and discuss the subsequent justice policy to emerge 
from this frame. 
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The British Conflict Frame in Northern Ireland 
Before outlining the conflict frame in Northern Ireland, I want to begin with a 
discussion of the current role of the British government in the region. As discussed 
briefly above, the British government has been involved in the island of Ireland since the 
Twelfth century when Henry II invaded, yet the relationship between Britain and 
Northern Ireland, or Ulster, has changed over time. Today a Nationalist discourse would 
argue that the British government still views Northern Ireland as a colonial holding or at 
least lesser than mainland Britain in some way. There is some evidence to suggest that 
this is true, for example, the unwillingness of UK political parties (e.g. the Liberal 
Democratic and Labour Parties) to organize in Northern Ireland. The lack of political 
integration between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK means that British influence 
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Britain contributes to the day-to-day functioning of Northern Ireland society with little 
democratic accountability to the people of Northern Ireland. This division is heightened 
by the failure of MPs elected from the Sinn Féin (Nationalist) party to take their seats in 
Westminster.76 
Following the Good Friday Agreement, today Northern Ireland has a devolved 
government consisting of the Assembly and the Executive. The Northern Ireland 
Assembly is responsible for passing laws on “transferred matters” or those issues such as 
health, education, agriculture and rural development, policing and justice which are 
transferred to the Northern Ireland government from the UK Parliament as part of 
devolution.77 Some issues remain with the UK government, for example foreign affairs, 
and ultimately the decision to transfer issues to the Northern Ireland Assembly is under 
the purview of the UK Parliament. The Northern Ireland Executive branch is made up of 
a First Minister and deputy First Minister who also have power over transferred issues. 
In addition to the Assembly and Executive, Northern Ireland representatives are elected 
to seats in the UK Parliament and in the European Parliament. Northern Ireland holds 18 
out of 646 seats in the UK House of Commons. Because of this structure the British 
government still retains control over much of the Northern Ireland political agenda. 
Through this structure the British government has maintained the political power 
needed to select and implement post-conflict justice. British influence on PCJ issues is 
relevant for two reasons. First, prior to the Good Friday Agreement the British 
government maintained primary responsibility for justice issues in Northern Ireland. As 
I will elaborate further below, in practice this meant that from 1968 through 1998 the 
                                                
76 This political protest is based on the belief that British rule of Northern Ireland is illegitimate. 
77 See http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/ Accessed on January 6, 2011. 
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British government heavily influenced commissions of inquiry, inquests and domestic 
court proceedings. Second, the effective functioning of any justice process in Northern 
Ireland has been and remains contingent on British cooperation. Because of the active 
role that the British government and Army played in the conflict, information from the 
British government is essential for broad-based justice and accountability. I focus on the 
British government in order to understand the framing of the conflict, subsequent justice 
efforts and the potential for political exclusion in Northern Ireland today. 
Below I discuss why the British government chose to construct a conflict frame 
in the first place as well as the components of the frame that was created. I then turn to 
an analysis of the current opposition to the British conflict frame in Northern Ireland. 
 
Why Construct the Frame? 
Even after the conflict in Northern Ireland has ended, the British government 
retains political control over Northern Ireland. While the Good Friday Agreement 
included devolved rule for Northern Ireland, the area remains part of the United 
Kingdom. As such issues of justice are still, in part, under the direct control of the UK 
parliament. The British government therefore has two main motivations in constructing 
the conflict frame: political control and public opinion.  
First, like the RPF government in Rwanda, the British government has an 
incentive to maintain control in the area. This is done through strengthening its own 
political position and discrediting opposition. In regards to the conflict frame, this is 
accomplished through delegitimizing claims against British rule. Through legitimating 
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British rule in Northern Ireland, the government is able to effectively maintain its 
political control and influence in the area and discredit challengers. 
Second, because of the involvement of British security forces (mostly the British 
Army) in the conflict, the British government has an incentive to maintain positive 
public opinion and “save face” in light of the growing opposition to British involvement 
in the area. It has been and remains important for the British government to have public 
support for its actions in Northern Ireland from both domestic and international 
audiences. As a democracy and world leader, reputation on issues of human rights, 
particularly state abuses matter for Britain. The democratic system also increases the risk 
that leaders will be sanctioned for their actions and removed from office. The British 
government therefore has a strong incentive to frame the events of the conflict in a way 
that supports these political goals. 
 
What is the Conflict Frame?  
In many ways, the British conflict frame is more complex than the frame in 
Rwanda. The duration of the conflict in Northern Ireland as well as the international 
attention and sophisticated media coverage of events have made it difficult for the 
British government to construct and maintain a rigid frame over time. The decisive 
victory of the RPF in Rwanda in 1994 allowed for the creation of a strong conflict frame 
which has been maintained and strengthened, however the lack of clear victory in 
Northern Ireland as well as the presence of well-organized political opposition weakens 
the British frame. Yet over time the British conflict frame has maintained three main 
“truths”: (1) the British Army as “peacekeepers” during an ethnic conflict; (2) 
 170 
Republican paramilitaries as criminals during the conflict; and (3) deaths by paramilitary 
violence as the main violation of the conflict. Each of these points is elaborated below. 
To begin with, the role of the British Army in the conflict has always been 
debated. At the two extremes, Republicans argue that the British Army is an occupying 
force, while the British government has argued that the presence of the Army is a 
peacekeeping necessity in light of the ethnic conflict between Catholics and Protestants. 
The British conflict frame emphasizes the role of the British army as a pacifying force in 
the conflict, not an instigating one. In this way, the British conflict frame denies the 
culpability of British security personnel in the violence or that there is any motivation 
for British military involvement in the conflict. 
This “truth” is further strengthened by the occasional denial of an actual conflict. 
At times British civil servants and politicians denied the very presence of a conflict in 
Northern Ireland and British involvement in that conflict. For example, when asked 
about the British contribution to the conflict in 1992, Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland, Sir Patrick Mayhew said:  
First of all, what’s the conflict? There’s not a conflict between 
constitutional parties in Northern Ireland. The only ‘conflict’ is the 
conflict that is waged by paramilitary forces, whether orange or green, 
against the forces of law and order, and in practice, against the ordinary 
people of Northern Ireland… So I don’t look at this in terms of conflict. I 
do look at it in terms of what you might call a mismatch (qtd. in McGarry 
and O’Leary 1995). 
 
This component of the conflict frame is essential for strengthening the British 
position towards the current governance of Northern Ireland. The British conflict frame 
emphasizes the altruistic intentions of British involvement. No concessions need to be 
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made if the British government had no real influence or effect on the conflict in the first 
place. 
The second “truth” of the British conflict frame portrays Republican 
paramilitaries, particularly the IRA, as criminals. Note that I did not say as perpetrators. 
One of the main characteristics of the British conflict frame has been the refusal of the 
British government to identify Republican paramilitaries as a legitimate fighting force 
thereby legitimizing their political cause. This point is consistent with historical British 
denial of an actual conflict or legitimate political grievances in the area. By relegating 
the IRA to the status of common criminals, the British government is able to legitimize 
its role as peacekeeper or external security force, and further undermine what the IRA 
portrays as the legitimate use of violence towards a political end. 
At no point in the conflict was this point more apparent than during the Hunger 
Strikes of the early 1980s. During this period, Northern Ireland prison facilities 
resembled World War II prisoner-of-war camps where regulations were weak and 
paramilitary prisoners maintained command structure taking orders from their 
commanding officers rather than prison officials (McKittrick and McVea 2000). In part 
to address this, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher changed the status of paramilitary 
prisoners (particularly IRA members) from political to criminal. This seemingly 
semantic difference resulted in a deliberate change of prison regulations. For example, 
prisoners classified under a criminal status were required to wear prison uniforms, while 
political prisoners were allowed to wear civilian clothing. In addition to attempting 
greater prison control, the policy was also a strategic attempt to devalue the use of 
violence and delegitimize the IRA by reducing them to common criminals. Again this 
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component of the conflict frame legitimates British actions in the conflict, justifies the 
strong tactics (including torture) used against the “criminals” while at the same time 
delegitimizing political opposition to British rule. 
The final component of the British conflict frame highlights the violence, 
particularly killings, committed by the paramilitary organizations. As I demonstrated 
above, there was a wide range of violations experienced across the population, however 
the conflict frame has focused primarily on support and acknowledgement for people 
who were killed during the conflict. In addition to the variation in types of violations, the 
British conflict frame ignores the role of security personnel, particularly the British 
army, in the violations that individuals experienced. While paramilitary organizations 
were responsible for the majority of deaths during the conflict, 363 deaths are attributed 
to British security forces.78 The focus on paramilitary violence strategically directs 
attention away from Army and police violations and focuses the attention on the 
indiscriminate seemingly immoral violence of paramilitary organizations. As a result the 
frame downplays potential illegitimate uses of force by the British State including prison 
abuse, torture, accidental violence against civilians and collusion with Loyalist 
paramilitary groups. 
As in Rwanda, the British conflict frame is constructed through media, political 
speeches, education and memorialization campaigns and post-conflict justice. The three 
components of the conflict frame focus on individuals who experienced a single type of 
violation from a single perpetrator, and exclude the experiences of those who faced low-
level or systematic patterns of violence such as property destruction and home raids. The 
frame also ignores those violations committed by the British army or police. As in the 
                                                
78 See http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Organisation_Summary.html Accessed January 6, 2011 
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case of Rwanda, I argue that this political exclusion will be particularly relevant when I 
examine participation in and views towards post-conflict justice in subsequent chapters. 
While the British conflict frame has been dominant in the post-conflict period there has 
been opposition to it. I turn to this below. 
 
Opposition to the Government Conflict Frame in Northern Ireland 
Despite the strength of the British government presence in Northern Ireland, 
there has been substantial opposition to the conflict frame. The presence of this 
opposition is due in large part to the high level of “veto” within Northern Ireland 
society. As outlined in the theory in Chapter 3, veto is the degree to which an individual 
is able to sanction their government for unpopular policies (Davenport 2007). 
Democratic elections as well as high levels of access to information across the 
population in Northern Ireland help to hold the British government accountable for their 
actions both during the conflict and within the creation of the conflict frame. Individuals 
in Northern Ireland have the ability to make informed decisions about the range of 
conflict experiences and therefore are less likely to be convinced by the British 
government’s exclusive conflict frame. Accountability to public opinion has weakened 
the ability of the British government to create a strong, exclusionary frame. 
Opposition to the conflict frame in Northern Ireland has frequently taken the 
form of alternative frames. Counter narratives from Unionist and Republican groups 
(both political and civil) have been essential for providing sustained opposition to the 
British frame. During the conflict, opposition took the form of public protest, the 
organization of victim groups, international campaigns, etc. Through these forms of 
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opposition, individuals were able to undermine the British government’s ability to 
consolidate political power and delegitimize their experiences through the creation of an 
exclusionary frame. 
Despite this opposition, the British government has still been able to effectively 
use its conflict frame for selecting and implementing post-conflict justice. I turn to this 
below. 
 
Selecting Post-Conflict Justice in Northern Ireland 
In Rwanda, a strong and coherent government conflict frame led directly to a 
unified strategy for post-conflict justice. In Northern Ireland contention surrounding the 
conflict frame is evidenced in the ad hoc way in which post-conflict justice has been 
implemented. For one, varying forms of justice have been ongoing through the conflict 
challenging the definition of “post” in post-conflict justice. Second, there has been no 
unified attempt to address justice issues resulting from the conflict, but rather a series of 
institutions implemented with varying degrees of success overtime. And finally, none of 
these justice solutions have been unique attempts to address systematic violations during 
the conflict. Instead, post-conflict justice in Northern Ireland has consisted of using 
existing legal or political institutions to address specific events or violations. 
Below I provide an overview of past justice processes that have been 




Overview of Past Justice Processes in Northern Ireland 
The implementation of justice in Northern Ireland has been ad hoc at best (Bell 
2002). During the conflict justice issues were addressed through existing legal 
institutions such as the national courts and the UK system of public inquiries. In addition 
to these forms of redress there have been three major events that have focused the post-
1998 justice debate both politically and socially. While these were not post-conflict 
justice efforts in Northern Ireland, all three events are attempts to address the past, thus 
shaping the current justice context in Northern Ireland. 
The first event was the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. The agreement 
includes two main justice components. First, it granted early prison release, or amnesty, 
for political prisoners on both sides of the conflict. Following the signing of the 
Agreement approximately 453 people were released from prison for crimes ranging from 
possession of an unauthorized firearm to murder. 79  Second, the agreement 
acknowledged the suffering of victims and a commitment was made to address and 
remember those concerns. While the Good Friday Agreement contained a strong human 
rights component, there was no specific mechanism outlined for dealing with past abuses 
or truth telling (Bell 2002). In many ways, the issue of truth was noticeably lacking in 
the final agreement and signaled the deliberate attempt to sidestep the topic of justice by 
all parties involved.  
The second major justice event was the establishment of the Bloody Sunday 
Inquiry80 in January 1998. The inquiry was created under the Tribunal of Inquiry 
(Evidence) 1921 Act as an inquiry into the deaths of 14 people killed by the British 
                                                
79 http://www.niprisonservice.gov.uk/index.cfm/area/information/page/earlyrelease Accessed on Aug. 25, 
2010. 
80 Also called the Saville Inquiry after the head of the inquiry, Lord Saville of Newdigate. 
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Army at a political protest in Derry/Londonderry on January 30, 1972.81 The inquiry was 
a reinvestigation of the events following the public outcry that accompanied the release 
of the first report of Inquiry, the Widgery Inquiry, in April 1972. The Widgery Report 
found no substantial fault from the Army in regards to their conduct and found that 
while none “of the dead or wounded is proved to have been shot whilst handling a 
firearm or bomb… there is a strong suspicion that some… had been firing weapons or 
handling bombs… and that yet others had been closely supporting them” (qtd. in 
Hegarty 2002). Evidence seemed to be lacking in Widgery and its findings ran counter 
to the testimony of many witnesses. The public release of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry on 
June 15, 2010 reversed many of these findings and was accompanied by a formal 
apology by British Prime Minister James Cameron. The apology on the part of the 
British government marked a major turning point for justice efforts, particularly from the 
Republican community, aimed at greater information from the British government (Pat 
Finucane Center 2010). 
 The third justice event in Northern Ireland was the convening of the Consultative 
Group on the Past (or Eames-Bradley Commission). This commission was created in 
2007 as a conclusive attempt to advise on justice issues resulting from events of the 
conflict. The commission spent over a year consulting with victim groups, church 
groups and community organization to determine the justice and legacy needs of 
individual communities. The result was a final report designed to summarize and 
synthesize competing justice claims. The final report put forward recommendations for a 
                                                
81 For many, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry is as an example of how justice can be costly and arguably a 
waste of money. For example, one interview respondent from Ardoyne complained, “[Justice] is all just a 
money making machine, like Saville… £198 million for giving answers that we all know… Jesus, a 5,000-
page document. Who is going to read it?” (A-1).  
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Legacy Commission (similar in structure to a truth commission); support for an 
international day of remembrance; and suggestions regarding storytelling and memorial 
projects. Unfortunately, the report is best known for one of its lesser 
recommendations—the suggested payment of £12,000 for all victims killed during the 
conflict regardless of the perpetrator of his/her violation. This recommendation created 
public outcry, with some arguing that the payment was blood money and others arguing 
that there was a moral difference between service men killed on active duty and IRA 
members who were killed committing a terrorist attack. These arguments were never 
resolved and in the end most hope for the recommendations of the group has vanished. 
 While each of these three events have advanced debates surrounding justice 
issues in Northern Ireland they have failed to produce a coherent policy towards post-
conflict justice. Some scholars have argued that this piecemeal approach to justice is 
both pragmatic and a necessary way to continue compromise and strengthen the peace 
process (Bell 2002). But the fact still remains that Northern Ireland has not had a unique 
policy or institution for dealing with the past. Below I turn to the existing opportunities 
for justice in Northern Ireland today.  
 
Post-Conflict Justice in Northern Ireland Today 
 The lack of a coherent policy of justice in Northern Ireland is the result of the 
contested and exclusionary British conflict frame. This frame has resulted in the ad hoc 
policies listed above and two contemporary forms of post-conflict justice. Today the two 
main sources of post-conflict justice available to people who experienced violations 
during the conflict are: (1) public inquiries; and (2) the Historical Enquires Team (HET). 
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Both of these mechanisms address violations from the conflict however neither are a 
unique justice institution, rather, public inquiries and the HET use existing legal and 
bureaucratic structures to address violations. These two mechanisms are a product of the 
British conflict frame, focusing on people who were killed and failing to address the 
systematic involvement of the British state in the conflict. By addressing justice issues 
through the existing legal system and by failing to create an independent justice process 
the British government is further reinforcing the idea that the activities in Northern 
Ireland were criminal and that no substantial or unique event took place. Below I 
describe each justice mechanism individually and explore how the mechanisms are a 
direct product of the British conflict frame. 
 Public inquiries are a system of judicial redress within the UK legal system. 
They are a legal mechanism designed to examine one particular event or occurrence. 
Inquiries can be held for any one of three reasons: (1) when the facts of an event require 
public investigation; (2) when the facts are unknown and there is a reason for public 
concern; or (3) when the facts are known, but when the facts have been denied or 
contested in the past (Hegarty 2002). Public inquiries are generally driven by a public 
demand for an accounting of certain events. In the UK public inquiries have been sought 
from a wide range of people including victims of a rail crash and families of patients 
who were murdered by their doctor (Hegarty 2002). In Northern Ireland public inquiries 
have been convened to address specific and egregious violations of human rights. 
 There have been nine public inquiries regarding the conflict in Northern Ireland. 
The nine inquiries include: (1) the Cameron Inquiry into the civil disturbances 
surrounding the Civil Rights Movement in 1968; (2) the Compton Inquiry regarding 
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State brutality during Internment; (3) the Parker Inquiry to investigate interrogation 
procedures of terrorist suspects; (4) the Widgery Inquiry into Bloody Sunday as 
discussed above; (5) the Scarman Inquiry into the civil disturbances in 1969; (6) the 
Bloody Sunday Inquiry also discussed above (Hegarty 2002); and inquiries into the 
deaths of (7) Rosemary Nelson, (8) Robert Hamill and (9) Billy Wright.82 
  It is generally understood that the British government agrees to public inquiries 
because of public pressure. Instead of a legitimate concern for truth and accountability, 
the British government has often enacted inquiries to deflect domestic and international 
criticism (Hegarty 2002). Here the implementation of public inquiries is consistent with 
the British conflict frame. All nine of the inquiries were set up to investigate allegations 
of human rights abuse on the part of the British State as if to suggest that these were the 
only nine incidents of abuse which took place. Inquiries are limited to the particular 
event in question so the system of public inquiry prevents an examination of systematic 
patterns of abuse over time. In addition, the proceedings and final report of public 
inquires are not always made public. At the Widgery Inquiry, for example, testimony 
from British soldiers was kept confidential. 
 While I have listed public inquiries as a form of post-conflict justice, it is 
debatable as to whether that is actually the case. Public inquiries are not unique 
institutions designed to examine past abuses, but rather a creative way of adapting an 
existing institution to address violations in the absence of a PCJ process. In addition, 
five of the nine public inquiries listed were implemented during the conflict, not after it 
challenging the notion of post-conflict justice. One of the main reasons for addressing 
                                                
82 There have also been calls for a public inquiry into the murder of Pat Finucane, but as of this writing it 
has not been convened. 
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justice issues in the post-conflict period is to give the time and political space needed to 
adequately address violations. Here this is not the case. And finally, public inquiries are 
only available to individuals who experienced egregious violations in particularly 
noteworthy cases. This is not a form of redress open to the general public. 
 The second post-conflict justice process in Northern Ireland is the Historical 
Enquiries Team (HET). The HET is a unit within the Police Service of Northern Ireland 
(PSNI) tasked with reinvestigating all deaths related to the conflict (occurring between 
1969 and 1998). Established in September 2005, the HET reviews existing evidence and 
seeks new information which is then turned over to the family of the victims by way of a 
final report. Where necessary the HET has the authority to present information to the 
PSNI for new charges or arrests to be made in regards to these cases. PSNI calculates 
that there are 3,268 deaths attributable to the conflict arising from 2,546 separate 
incidents. Cases are taken in chronological order except when there is reason to address 
“humanitarian concerns” or linked cases. Work on cases began in January 2006. As of 
this writing approximately 1800 cases have been completed. 
 The HET was created to address the lack of information which many families 
had surrounding the death of loved ones. Often this information was either not revealed 
to the families during the original investigation or not collected by the police at the time 
the person was killed. According to their own mandate, the HET has two main 
objectives: first, to provide families with a report on the death of their loved one and 
where possible, to address their specific questions and concerns, and second, to conduct 
a professional reinvestigation of cases at “the current level of analysis and 
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professionalism”.83 The HET operates independently from PSNI and reports directly to 
the Chief Constable. The HET is funded, in large part, through the Northern Ireland 
Office (NIO). Thirty-four million pounds sterling (approximately $54.4 million) was 
made available to fund the project. The HET has received mixed reviews. Some hope 
that reinvestigations are a viable means towards the prosecution of perpetrators 
previously unidentified or not held accountable. Critics of the HET, however, have 
refused to participate in the process arguing that it is not possible to have the police 
themselves investigate potential police misdeeds.  
 Like the system of public inquiry, the HET is a direct product of the British 
conflict frame. Here violations are addressed through the existing police service and are 
treated as criminal offences. Situating the HET within the PSNI also suggests that the 
police themselves are not responsible for any of the deaths they are re-investigating. And 
finally, the HET focuses very specifically on people who were killed during the conflict 
excluding both individuals who experienced other types of violations as well as the 
broader historical questions surrounding the conflict.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have demonstrated the variety of violations that people 
experienced in Northern Ireland and the variation in perpetrators involved in that 
violence. The British conflict frame, however, ignores this variation. The British conflict 
frame emphasizes the lack of British army involvement in the violence of the conflict, 
the criminal nature of paramilitary activity and focuses specifically on people who were 
killed during the violence. This framing of events is manifested in the creation and 
                                                
83 See http://www.psni.police.uk/historical-enquiries-team/het-our-role.htm Accessed on January 4, 2010. 
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implementation of post-conflict justice in Northern Ireland today. First, justice in the 
area has been ad hoc. The lack of a unified justice framework is indicative of the failure 
of the British government to address the root causes and subsequent legacies of the 
conflict. Second, current justice issues in Northern Ireland have been addressed through 
existing legal structures such as the public inquiries system and the police service. The 
failure to create a new and unique legal institution to address justice and legacy issues 
arising from the conflict is further evidence of the British government’s denial of its 
involvement in and the historical roots of the violence.  
 The limited framing by the British government excludes those individuals who 
experienced systematic violations over time which were not a product of massive state 
abuse (to be included in a public inquiry) or which resulted in death (to be examined by 
the HET). Existing post-conflict justice in Northern Ireland is also biased against those 
individuals who do not feel comfortable seeking redress from the British government 
(i.e. those who were victims of British state violence). As I will examine in the 
following chapter, I argue that the exclusion of certain experiences from the government 
conflict frame will affect the degree to which people participate in national justice 
proceedings as well as the views that these individuals have towards justice in general. 
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Chapter 7:  
Political Exclusion and Post-Conflict Justice: Participation in Rwanda 
and Northern Ireland 
 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I explored the conflicts in Rwanda and Northern Ireland. In 
each of these chapters I developed the current understanding of the violence and how the 
RPF and British governments respectively have created a frame for each conflict. In 
addition to presenting the government constructed conflict frame, I also presented the 
range of possible conflict experiences within each society. In this way we are able to 
identify the experiences excluded from the government conflict frame, and subsequently 
the disjuncture between these experiences and the mandate of the post-conflict justice 
(PCJ) process.  
Now I return to the question of the affect that this disjuncture between an 
individual’s conflict experience and the mandate of the justice process will have on that 
individual’s participation in the process and his/her views towards justice in general. In 
Chapter 3, I theorized that (H1) individuals whose experience is included in a national 
justice process will be more likely to accept the process and (H2) individuals whose 
experience is excluded will more likely to deny the process. Returning to the interview 
data collected in both Rwanda and Northern Ireland I test the plausibility of these 
hypothesis. 
Before turning to an analysis of the individual level data by research location, I 
begin with a brief description of the data on the main variables of interest. While I will 
discuss this relationship further below, by conducting a basic cross tabulation on conflict 
experiences and justice participation I find that the relationship between the two is 
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statistically significant at p=.04 for a one-tailed test.84  In order to conduct this analysis I 
coded each respondent in both Rwanda and Northern Ireland as having either an 
included conflict experience (as defined by the government conflict frame) or an 
excluded experience. Once the respondents were grouped into these categories I coded a 
dichotomous variable for justice participation (which is defined by country later in this 
chapter). I have reservations about the usefulness of these frequencies because of the 
sample size and because I have combined respondents across research location, however 
I report the tabulation in Appendix 1. 
In this chapter I look at participation in post-conflict justice in both Rwanda and 
Northern Ireland and analyze patterns of participation across the Gacaca process and 
post-conflict justice in Northern Ireland. I begin by outlining the excluded group created 
by the government conflict frame in each country. Then I turn to individual participation 
in post-conflict justice and views towards justice in each country and examine these 
patterns across both included and excluded groups. I close this chapter with a discussion 
of denial of post-conflict justice by excluded groups looking at the way in which levels 
of “voice” in each country effects the choices available for individuals who wish to deny 
or subvert the process in some way. 
 
Participation in Gacaca 
Following the Genocide and military victory by the RPF in 1994, Rwanda has 
maintained a strong emphasis on the necessity for justice in the post-conflict period. Its 
application, however, has been almost entirely in support of the RPF conflict frame. 
Justice has focused on victims of genocide violence while systematically overlooking 
                                                
84 Pearson Chi2(1)= 3.0626, p= .080 
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individuals who experienced violations from other periods of violence namely the Civil 
War and post-1995 Abacengezi period. In this section I analysis the effects of this 
exclusion. I begin by defining the excluded group in Rwanda, created as a product of the 
RPF conflict frame, and then turn to an examination of participation in Gacaca and 
views of justice more generally.  
 
Identifying the Excluded Group in Rwanda 
As described in Chapter 5, the RPF government in Rwanda has constructed an 
exclusionary conflict frame that focuses solely on individuals who experienced 
violations as part of the 1994 Genocide. As elaborated in this same chapter, while the 
1994 Genocide was a significant source of violations for individuals in Rwanda at the 
time, it was not the only source of violence. From my interviews in Rwanda I find that 
less than 50% of respondents received violations solely as a result of the Genocide. In 
addition to genocide violence people experienced violations as a result of civil war and 
Abacengezi violence, however, these experiences are not included in the RPF conflict 
frame. 
The result of the government conflict frame is to create a group of individuals 
who experienced violence during the conflict but whose experiences have been 
systematically excluded from the broader narrative of the conflict and from subsequent 
justice processes designed to address the legacy of the conflict. While victims of civil 
war and Abacengezi violence are not included in the conflict frame, they experienced 
similar types and levels of violations to those individuals who experienced genocide 
violence. Despite experiencing high numbers of violations and similar types of 
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violations (e.g. assault and property destruction) to those individuals who were victims 
of genocide violence, this group is excluded from post-conflict justice in Rwanda. In 
Rwanda, the excluded group is explicitly made up of people who experienced violations 
as a result of the Civil War and/or violations from the Abacengezi violence. But what 
are the long-term effects of exclusion on this group? I turn to this below. 
 
Variations in Participation in Gacaca 
My theory of political exclusion from post-conflict justice, as presented in 
Chapter 3, led me to hypothesize that excluded groups (i.e., those whose experience of 
the conflict is not addressed by the justice process) would be less likely to participate in 
the relevant justice process. In the case of Rwanda, I examine participation in the 
Gacaca process. According to the predictions in Chapter 3, I would expect individuals 
who experienced genocide violations to be more likely to accept Gacaca and therefore 
more likely to participate in the process. Conversely, I would predict individuals who 
experienced civil war and Abacengezi violations to be more likely to deny the process 
Gacaca and therefore less likely to participate in it.  
In order to test the relationship between people who experienced violence from 
different perpetrators and his/her resulting participation in the Gacaca process I first 
define participation. For the purpose of this dissertation, participation in Gacaca is 
defined behaviorally as attendance at Gacaca, testifying in a case and/or brining a case 
before the Gacaca courts. Attendance involves merely showing up for the process. 
Gacaca is a public proceeding and all community members are asked to attend. 
Testifying includes publicly providing information for a case that one experienced, 
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participated in, or witnessed. Here an individual either volunteers information or is 
called to present information before the courts. Bringing a case could either be 
presenting one’s own case to the court or presenting a case of genocide violence 
witnessed or participated in by the respondent.  
Remember that an individual need not have experienced genocide violations him 
or herself in order to participate in Gacaca. In fact, the functioning of Gacaca requires 
the cooperation of anyone who has information related to these crimes. Gacaca has weak 
investigative power, and therefore relies on community information for accurate 
judgments. Because of the widespread nature of the genocide violence, it is unlikely that 
anyone in the sample did not have some information to bring forward; what varies is 
people’s willingness to do so.85 
In order to determine participation in Gacaca, respondents were asked to answer 
yes or no for each activity (e.g. Did you attend Gacaca? Did you testify before Gacaca? 
etc.). Following the closed response questions, individuals were asked an open-ended 
question about why they chose to participate. I turn to an analysis of these responses 
below. 
To begin with I conducted a basic test of my hypothesis that conflict experience 
in Rwanda (particularly experience with the Genocide) was related to Gacaca 
participation. While I have a relatively small number of observations (respondents) I 
found that the relationship between experiencing violence from the Genocide and 
                                                
85 Because of the sensitive nature of this question, respondents were not directly asked if they were 
deliberately withholding information from Gacaca. Failure to provide information in a criminal 
investigation is a serious offense. For this reason I doubt that even if the question was asked individuals 
would have responded truthfully. 
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participating in Gacaca was statistically significant with p=.052 for a one-tailed test.86  
While due to the size of my sample I have reservations about the usefulness of the 
represented frequencies, I report the tabulation in Appendix 1. Next, I proceed with an 
in-depth, text-based analysis of the interviews.   
When looking at individual acts of participation, there is virtually no variation in 
Gacaca attendance across the sample; almost every responded attended Gacaca. Only 
two people in the sample admitted to not attending Gacaca proceedings: one woman 
from Nyamagabe had only recently returned from Congo and another respondent was at 
school away from his village and did not have the (financial) means to return home for 
Gacaca proceedings. Upon reflection, this is hardly surprising as attendance at Gacaca is 
a requested community activity in a country with a history of active participation in 
community programs (Straus 2006).87 While Gacaca is not officially mandatory, the 
request for attendance by the President arguably carries the weight of law.  
While there was little variation in Gacaca attendance, the reasons for attending 
and other types of participation varied largely in line with my hypothesis regarding the 
perpetrators of the violence. Before turning to the two other measures for participation 
(testifying and bringing a case), I explore the reasons that people gave for attending 
Gacaca. 
The reasons respondents gave for attending Gacaca suggest that the majority of 
individuals were self-motivated, concerned about their own goals and not the broader 
benefits of their participation for Rwandan society more generally. People participate in 
                                                
86 Pearson Chi2(1)= 2. 6374, p= .104 
87 In addition to Gacaca, Rwandans are required to participate in umuganda, or national community 
service. Straus (2006) cites the history of umuganda as one of the common tenants of the ‘Rwandans as 
followers’ hypothesis suggesting that Rwandans are adherent to authority by nature. 
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Gacaca for four main reasons: (1) individuals felt required to participate; (2) individuals 
wanted to support the process through their participation; (3) individuals wanted to 
gather general information about the Genocide; and (4) individuals wanted to learn 
personally relevant information in regards to the crimes that they experienced. 
The majority of respondents began by saying that attendance at Gacaca was 
required and that is why they chose to participate. One group of respondents made clear 
that they were attending the proceedings solely on the bequest of the state. This group 
consisted of nine respondents, four who had experienced genocide violations and five 
who had not.88 Even when pressed as to their personal motivations, this group appeared 
to be participating in Gacaca only because it was required. For example:  
 
MU- 7: “We were told to come and listen to what happened.” 
 
KA-9: “Because it was said ‘today is for Gacaca, no other movement, no 
other work’.” 
 
Despite the perceived requirement to attend being the first response for most 
individuals, the majority of respondents had additional reasons for attending. The second 
category of responses suggested that individuals attended Gacaca as a way to support the 
process and reconciliation in the post-conflict period more generally. This group saw 
Gacaca as a tool for reconciliation and as part of the country’s progress towards peace. 
This group was represented equally across people who experienced violations from the 
Genocide versus those who experienced violations from other perpetrators. Of the eight 
respondents who reported this motivation, four had experienced violations during the 
                                                
88 In this analysis, people who experienced Civil War and Abacengezi violations are included together in a 
category for “non-Genocide violations”. 
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Genocide and four had experienced violations during other periods of violence. Two 
examples of this response are: 
 
NY -1: “I thought it was one of the ways to reconcile the Rwandan people 
and I wanted to know how this reconciliation would happen.” 
 
MU-10: “We were going to listen to the cases, to see the criminals and 




The third category of responses was those respondents who attended Gacaca to 
use the process as an information-gathering tool. The largest number of respondents 
referenced this category (27 respondents); 11 of these respondents were victims of 
genocide violence while 16 were victims of non-genocide violations. 89  These 
respondents were using Gacaca to learn about an event they deemed to be important for 
Rwandan political history namely the Genocide or in some instances to satisfy a sense of 
morbid curiosity. The two respondents below best summarize this reasoning. 
 
MU- 4: “I wanted to know what happened because I was young. I was 
curious to see a person who killed another one and to see how problems 
are being solved.”  
 
MU-6:  “I was going to listen to what happened, and to see those people 
who killed others.”  
 
 
Finally, there were those who attended Gacaca in order to gain personally 
relevant information. This group is almost exclusively made up of those who personally 
experienced crimes of genocide. In addition, this group is overly representative of those 
who experienced severe crimes such as the death of a parent or who were personally 
                                                
89 Of note, the respondents who were genocide victims tended to be younger than the average respondent 
suggesting that these individuals were using Gacaca to help fill in events or experiences which they might 
have been too young to remember. 
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targeted. This group represented the smallest number of responses. Only five individuals 
cited gaining personal information as their reason for attending Gacaca. Three examples 
of this type of response are listed below. 
 
NY-8: “[I participated] because it was the only institution I could address 
concerning what happened to me in 1994. And I was sure that they were 
the ones to solve my problems.” 
 
MU-5: “Those people who died at Mburabuturo, I wanted to know who 
killed them. Imagine, there was a baby of 6 months among the dead 
bodies!” (The respondent’s father was also killed at Mburabuturo.) 
 
KA-5: “The reason why I decided to participate is because of what 
happened during the Genocide. Gacaca was established to solve all those 
problems and I was among all those people who had such problems.” 
 
 
The variation in reasons for participation demonstrates a division in rationale 
between people who experienced crimes of genocide and those who did not. Individuals 
who experienced genocide violations were more likely to use the Gacaca process to gain 
personally relevant information while non-genocide victims were slightly more likely to 
attend Gacaca to gain general information or because it was required. While there is 
little variation across actual Gacaca attendance the motivations for this attendance help 
us to understand the rationale behind this behavior. For the purpose of this dissertation, 
however, it is worth noting that only eight out of 40 respondents attended Gacaca to 
support the process or to further justice. The majority of this participation, particularly 
by non-genocide victims was for information gathering (i.e. personal goals). The 
motivations for participation are presented across respondents who experienced 
genocide versus non-genocide violations in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23. Reasons for Gacaca Attendance, by Perpetrator Type 
 
 
In addition to physically attending Gacaca there are two other methods of 
participation that I included in my questionnaire. Respondents were questioned about 
whether or not they testified or were called to testify at Gacaca and whether or not they 
brought a case before Gacaca. Of the sample, only 14 (34%) individuals testified before 
Gacaca and only 8 (20%) individuals brought a case. Nine of the individuals who 
testified before Gacaca were victims of genocide violations while the remaining five 
were not. When questioned about their participation, of these five non-genocide victims 
three said that they testified after being called to do so but they did not voluntarily 
testify. The remaining two non-genocide victims who testified did so in a case that they 
had personally brought forward.  
Rwandans who bring a case to Gacaca are required to testify in that case. Of the 
total number of people who testified (14 respondents), eight respondents testified in a 
case they brought forward themselves. This means that there were only six respondents 





























genocide victims. This suggests that people who experienced genocide violations were 
more likely to testify than people who experienced violations from other perpetrators. 
This pattern holds for bringing a case before Gacaca as well. Those respondents 
who brought cases before Gacaca were disproportionately victims of crimes of genocide. 
Six of those respondents who brought a case before Gacaca were victims of genocide 
crimes while the other two respondents were victims of non-genocide violence. 
Figure 24 presents the total number of respondents who participated in Gacaca separated 
by perpetrator type. Figure 25 presents the same information with the total percentages 
of each type of participation by perpetrator type. 
 



































As predicted in Chapter 3, individuals who did not experience crimes of 
genocide had lower levels of participation in Gacaca than individuals who experienced 
genocide violations. Respondents who experienced non-genocide violations were less 
likely to accept and subsequently participate in Gacaca in general. These respondents 
expressed that they had nothing to say and that they were aware that Gacaca courts were 
not a place to discuss their violations. The respondent quoted below was a victim of 
violations from the Civil War and knew that Gacaca was not the place to address his 
grievances. 
 
RU-6: “[I did not put my case before Gacaca because] I consider [what 
happened to me to be] the violence of the general conflict, but it is not 
related to Genocide and Gacaca is trying the Genocide cases. Let’s say, for 
example, your brother has been killed at Jali (a hill close to the capital 
city), you can even see his body, but it was just in the general conflict like 
that. Who do you have to accuse? Except if you accuse maybe the state 
[respondent laughs].”  
 
 
One woman from Nyamagabe who did not experience crimes of genocide 






























NY-5: “Do you think that we can talk about this! No! There are people 
who suffered a lot more than me. So there is no reason that I should talk 
about [my experiences]. Take for example, those who got HIV from the 
Genocide, they are suffering a lot. So you see that for me, I should not talk 
about my suffering in front of those people.” 
 
Both of these respondents expressed knowledge of their exclusion from the 
Gacaca process based on the types of conflict experiences that they had. 
Above, I identified different patterns of participation in Gacaca based on 
variation in the perpetrator of violations that people experienced. From the responses for 
participation and non-participation we can see that individuals who experienced 
genocide violations were more likely to attend Gacaca and participate in the process to 
address those grievances. Individuals who did not experience genocide violence were 
more likely to attend Gacaca as an information gathering tool or because they were 
required to and expressed a knowledge of exclusion from the Gacaca process. This 
group was also less likely to testify or bring a case to Gacaca. 
The findings from these interviews generally support the hypothesis that people 
whose conflict experience is excluded from the national justice process are less likely to 
participate in the justice process in general. In addition to the individual effects of 
exclusion, limited participation by non-genocide victims threatens to compromise the 
ability of Gacaca to successful identify and prosecute all cases of genocide violence as 
well as contribute to social reconciliation. While these findings are not conclusive, they 
suggest that there are measurable behavioral differences between those individuals 
whose conflict experience is included in the justice process (i.e. those who experienced 
genocide violations) and those individuals whose experience is excluded (i.e. those who 
experienced non-genocide violations).  
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Below, I explore the views of justice in general to emerge from each group in 
order to explore the potential long-term effects that this exclusion might have. 
 
Views of Justice in Rwanda 
People’s views of justice in Rwanda vary by conflict experience. Here 
individuals were asked: “Given what has happened in Rwanda, what do you feel justice 
would be?”. This was an open-ended question that allowed individuals to speak on the 
current justice situation in Rwanda as well as the individual’s views on justice and 
whether or not he/she believed justice could be done or was being done in Rwanda 
(presumably through Gacaca). Even more so than questions of Gacaca participation 
these responses broke down by conflict experience (specifically perpetrator type). The 
responses to this question lend additional support to my hypothesis. Those respondents 
who experienced genocide violence were more likely to believe that justice in Rwanda 
was possible and that it was being achieved through Gacaca and the Rwandan justice 
system. Like the respondents quoted below, this group had clear strategies for achieving 
justice and its desired objectives. They believed that the Rwandan government was 
capable of achieving justice through existing legal mechanisms. For example, the two 
respondents below discuss achieving justice through the Gacaca courts: 
 
NY-1: “If all cases are tried and finished with transparency, without 
corruption and likes (preferential treatment), I think justice can achieve its 
objective.” 
 
NY-6: “What I think should be done for justice is to follow all the cases 




Respondents who experienced civil war violence tended to suggest that a 
separate justice institution should be created to deal with their specific crimes (RU-6). 
This group of respondents acknowledged that their violations were not currently being 
addressed through Gacaca, but believed that justice could be possible through any 
alternative post-conflict justice mechanism. Like the respondent quoted below, this 
group acknowledged that they had not suffered crimes that could be tried in Gacaca, but 
also did not express lasting resentment towards their exclusion or towards the RPF 
government. Here it is important to note that this group was often unable to identify their 
perpetrators and suggested that the types of violations they experienced were the order 
of the day in times of war making these respondents less likely to benefit directly from 
information potentially revealed in a justice process: 
 
RU-5 “If it doesn’t pass through Gacaca, you just have to let it go like that. 
Because you don’t know who killed your family member, so what would 
you say in front of the judges.”  
 
Those respondents who had experienced violations as a result of the Abacengezi 
violence, however, had a more severe reaction to their exclusion. While this group also 
tended to suggest that an additional institution should be created to investigate violations 
experienced during non-genocide periods of violence, there was a greater understanding 
of the unwillingness of the government to address their particular violations. Individuals 
who experienced Abacengezi violence expressed open resentment for being excluded 
from the Gacaca process and acknowledged that while their violations were similar to 
those who experienced genocide violence, their experiences were being ignored. Three 
examples of this perspective are: 
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MU-9: “There should be justice for both sides, 1994 (referring to the 
Genocide) and even those who died after (referring to the Abacengezi 
period). To know how people have been killed, even at the beginning of 
the war, and show how things happened. It should go like that, from that 
time (meaning the beginning of the Civil War, 1990).” 
 
KA-2: “According to me the justice should try to compare [cases of 
violence after the Genocide] to the Genocide cases to see if there is any 
relationship, if there is a link they should try them in Gacaca, if there is 
not a link then the justice should also follow the cases (in another 
institution) because all human beings have red blood.” 
 
KA-3: “[The violence of] 1997! No one is giving it value. They say it is 
because we didn’t listen.” 
 
While everyone experienced the violence in Rwanda differently, definite patterns 
emerge when people are questioned about their participation in the Gacaca process and 
their thoughts about justice in Rwanda. Of particular interest are respondents who did 
not suffer genocide violence, but rather suffered violations during the Civil War or 
during the Abacengezi period. While interested in pursuing justice for their personal 
cases, those who suffered violence during the Civil War were more likely to see that 
violence as part of the broader conflict and not necessarily attributable to any one person 
therefore not specifically in need of justice. People who suffered violence during the 
Abacengezi period, however, often knew the identity of their perpetrator or saw this 
violence as outside of the “normal” course of conflict. This group of people argued that 
the government was ignoring their particular justice needs and felt excluded from 
existing justice processes. This group was subsequently less likely to participate in 
Gacaca giving support to the hypothesis that people who are excluded from the national 
justice process are less likely to accept the process. 
As hypothesized, the interviews conducted in Rwanda suggest that people who 
experienced genocide violence participated in Gacaca through testifying and bringing 
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cases more than people who did not experience this type of crime. Victims of other 
sources of violence, particularly violence during the Abacengezi period, are more likely 
to express feelings of exclusion from the Gacaca process and doubt about justice in 
Rwanda more generally. These findings give support to the hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter 3. 
Below, I turn to the case of Northern Ireland to further explore these patterns. 
 
Participation in Post-Conflict Justice in Northern Ireland 
As described in Chapter 6, post-conflict justice in Northern Ireland has been a 
disjointed process. Following the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, the British 
government has implemented a number of public inquiries into major events during the 
conflict as well as created the Historical Enquiries Team within the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland to address criminal issues arising from individual deaths. As outline in 
the preceding chapter, however, these mechanisms for justice are directly linked to the 
British conflict frame. The focus of both public inquiries and the HET prevents a 
broader discussion about low-level violations and historical injustice in Northern Ireland 
as well as relegating the violence of the conflict to preexisting legal institutions. 
Below, I contrast the British conflict frame with the range of possible violations 
in Northern Ireland to outline the groups that are excluded from post-conflict justice. 
Then I turn to an analysis of the variation in participation in post-conflict justice in 
Northern Ireland by conflict experience, and between included and excluded groups. I 
close this section with an evaluation of views of justice contrasted by conflict experience 
as well as inclusion in and exclusion from the conflict frame.  
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Identifying the Excluded Group in Northern Ireland 
To briefly review, the British conflict frame focuses exclusively on people who 
were killed during the conflict, particularly those killed by paramilitary organizations. 
This frame supports the role that the British army and security forces played during the 
conflict and relegates the activities of the paramilitaries, particularly the IRA to the 
realm of criminal activity. Through this focus the frame strategically ignores a 
discussion of British and security force culpability in violations during the conflict. 
From the conflict frame, the British government has created a strategic and 
exclusive mandate for post-conflict justice. Because of the narrow concentration of the 
British conflict frame, the excluded group is quite large. Unlike in Rwanda where all 
conflict experiences are included in the frame (i.e., all types of violations), in Northern 
Ireland post-conflict justice is limited to a focus on those individuals who were killed as 
a result of the conflict. This emphasis excludes individuals who suffered lower level 
violations such as assault, property violations or economic discrimination. Post-conflict 
justice in Northern Ireland also focuses on paramilitary activity over security force 
violations. While we know from human rights organizations as well as my own 
interview data that individuals experienced violations from the army and police, the 
British conflict frame ignores these experiences or considers them to be extraordinary 
when they do occur. 
When security force violations are investigated, they are investigated as 
examples of extreme circumstances, generally through public inquiries and as a result of 
public demand and international pressure. This handling suggests that security forces 
committed violations only in extreme circumstances. Post-conflict justice in Northern 
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Ireland assumes this relationship; it is not empirically examined. Therefore in Northern 
Ireland the excluded group consists of any individual who experienced a violation that 
was not related to a death (e.g. home search, property violation or physically assault) or 
any one who was a victim of or targeted by the security forces. 
Below, I examine the ways in which this exclusion affects participation in post-
conflict justice in Northern Ireland as well as views of justice more generally. 
 
Variations in Participation in Northern Ireland 
Testing participation in post-conflict justice in Northern Ireland is made difficult 
by the lack of justice options available for aggrieved individuals. While in Rwanda all 
individuals are asked to participate in the Gacaca process, in Northern Ireland the 
opportunities for people to participate in post-conflict justice are limited to the included 
group. As discussed in Chapter 6, the limited number of justice options available to 
people in Northern Ireland is a direct product of the British conflict frame. For this 
reason, discussions of justice participation are already biased towards the included 
experiences since members of the excluded group do not have the opportunity to bring 
their own cases forward. 
Today existing post-conflict justice options in Northern Ireland, namely the 
system of public inquiries and the Historical Enquiries Team, are available for 
individuals who experienced egregious violations or for those who suffered the death of 
a member of their family. Public inquiries focus exclusively on extraordinary public 
events while the HET is investigating people who were killed. People who did not 
experience these types of violations have no current redress or justice options under the 
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existing PCJ system in Northern Ireland. The current system precludes a justice process 
for individuals who experienced lower-level violations. The system also makes it much 
more likely that individuals who were violated by the state will receive no justice at all. 
If an individual did not address their violation at the time that it occurred through the 
police or national court system they are ineligible for redress following the conflict. 90 
As mentioned above, the limitations of existing post-conflict justice in Northern 
Ireland makes it difficult to measure participation (i.e., if excluded individuals are not 
permitted to participate in the first place, then measuring participation is no longer an 
active measure of their acceptance or denial of the process). For this reason, I evaluate 
participation differently in Northern Ireland than I do in Rwanda. First I look at patterns 
of participation in three types of justice: (1) the HET; (2) Public Inquiries; and (3) the 
National Courts. This analysis is used to demonstrate the exclusive nature of post-
conflict justice in Northern Ireland. 
I include participation in the national courts to determine if people are using non-
PCJ mechanisms of justice as a substitute for PCJ. Unlike Rwanda, there was a semi-
functioning legal system at work in Northern Ireland throughout the conflict. People 
who experienced a violation had the opportunity to address their grievances at the time 
that the violation occurred. However, it was much more likely for individuals who 
experienced either a death or a violation by the paramilitaries to report these violations- 
reinforcing the British conflict frame. Individuals who experienced a death in their 
family were more likely to report that violation because of the extreme nature of the 
                                                
90 People who were violated by the State had other, non-state options for addressing these violations. For 
example the Associates for Legal Justice, a west Belfast-based human rights organization, collected over 
7,000 statements of low-level, mostly state violations over the course of the conflict. These statements 
were used in book writing projects as well as international human rights appeals (Davenport et al. 2010). 
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crime. In addition, individuals who experienced violations which were not related 
directly to state violence (i.e., were related to paramilitary violence) would also have 
been more likely to report that violence to the state. It stands to reason that individuals 
who experienced low-level violations and violations from the British state would have 
been less likely to use existing justice mechanisms during the conflict. 
As in Rwanda, I begin by defining participation behaviorally. In Northern Ireland 
participation could include testifying or presenting information before a public inquiry 
or testifying or presenting information before the HET. I also asked a question about 
providing information to the Consultative Group on the Past and participation 
(testifying) in a national court case. In order to determine patterns of participation I ask 
individuals a closed answer yes or no question (e.g. did you participate in the HET?). As 
I expected, participation in both public inquiries and the HET was limited because of the 
restricted nature of post-conflict justice in Northern Ireland. 
Similarly to the analysis in Rwanda, I begin with a test of my hypothesis that 
experiencing conflict events included in the British conflict frame (namely paramilitary 
violence and/or the death of a family member) is related to participation in justice in 
Northern Ireland. Due to the small number of observations, I find the relationship to be 
slightly significant with p=.08 for a one-tailed test.91 I report the tabulation in Appendix 
1. Next, I turn to a more in-depth analysis of the data. 
From the 40 respondents interviewed, five individuals participated in the HET 
and four individuals participated in a public inquiry. In addition to these post-conflict 
justice options, twelve respondents participated in a national court proceeding during the 
                                                
91 Pearson Chi2(1)= 1.9730, p= .160 
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conflict. Individuals who participated in these processes have conflict experiences 
similar to those predicted above. I discuss the patterns of this participation further below. 
First, the relationship between the number of violations individuals experienced 
and their participation in a justice process is relatively inconclusive. As demonstrated in 
Figure 26, people who experienced a larger quantity of violations were more likely to 
participate in national court proceedings, but this does not apply for post-conflict justice 
(e.g. public inquiries and the HET). These relationships are difficult to determine 
because of the small number of respondents who participated in post-conflict justice. 
Participation in PCJ is roughly evenly distributed across the total number of violations 
for each individual. This suggests that the number of violations an individual 
experienced is not a significant predictor of their involvement in post-conflict justice. 
 




This pattern changes, however, when we look at the characteristics of individual 
conflict experiences included in the British conflict frame, namely the death of a family 
member and perpetrator type. Four of the five people who participated in the HET 

























participated in a pubic inquiry. This suggests that post-conflict justice is more widely 
available to and more utilized by individuals whose conflict experiences are included in 
the British conflict frame. This pattern is less applicable for participation in the national 
courts where roughly equal numbers of people participated who had and had not lost a 
member of their family. Patterns of national court participation seem to be more closely 
linked to the number of violations that people experienced, but also the perpetrator of 
those violations as I discuss further below. In Figure 27, we can see that individuals who 
had a conflict experience that is included in the conflict frame make up a greater 
proportion of those who participate in post-conflict justice than those who have excluded 
experiences. 
 





In addition to behavior based on the types of violations (e.g. death of a family 
member), patterns of participation based on perpetrator type firmly illustrate the affects 
of the British conflict frame on justice in Northern Ireland. Participation in justice 
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paramilitary organizations. Only one person who experienced violations by security 
forces participated in a justice process and this respondent participated in a national 
court proceeding, not a post-conflict justice process. Some individuals who experienced 
violations from both types of perpetrators participated in a public inquiry and national 
court proceedings as shown in Figure 28. In this graph, I have also included information 
on participation in the Consultative Group on the Past to further illustrate the point that 
post-conflict justice is focusing exclusively on certain conflict experiences. 
 





While the limited focus of post-conflict justice in Northern Ireland makes it 
difficult to use participation as a measure of acceptance or denial of the process, patterns 
of participation across conflict experience demonstrate the effectiveness of exclusion 
from justice in Northern Ireland. While there is no significant difference between the 
number of individual violations people received and justice participation, the majority of 



























family member and who were violated by a paramilitary organization, as dictated by the 
British conflict frame.  
Below, I turn to an overview of the views of justice across both included and 
excluded groups. 
 
Views of Justice in Northern Ireland 
In light of the failure of a dynamic post-conflict justice process in Northern 
Ireland, I turn to the question of how people view justice in the area more broadly. 
Because participation in post-conflict justice in Northern Ireland is generally limited to 
individuals who experienced the death of a family member, individual views on justice 
become increasingly important for understanding the differences between included and 
excluded groups and their interaction with the justice process. While patterns of 
participation in existing post-conflict justice processes in Northern Ireland suggest a 
sharp contrast between people whose conflict experiences are included in the conflict 
frame and those whose experiences are not, views of justice suggest that many people, 
across conflict experience are still deeply dissatisfied with the justice options available 
today. Based on the predictions in Chapter 3, I would expect people who have included 
experiences (i.e., death of a family member and violations by paramilitary organizations) 
to be more likely to accept state-controlled justice processes such as the national courts 
and the existing legal system. I would predict people whose conflict experience is 
excluded from post-conflict justice to be more likely to support non-state forms of 
justice such as information gathering campaigns. 
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As in Rwanda, in order to determine views of justice respondents in Northern 
Ireland were asked the open-ended question: “Given what happened in Northern Ireland, 
what do you feel justice would be?” This was an open-ended question, so respondents 
were not given any prompts as to the type of justice that I was interested in. Most 
interestingly for this project, no one across the entire sample, regardless of conflict 
experience said that they believed that justice had been achieved in Northern Ireland 
instead individuals presented a range of areas where justice could be applied and current 
programs could be strengthened.  
Individual responses to the question of justice in Northern Ireland can be 
grouped into five categories: (1) the need for acknowledgement and truth; (2) justice as 
punishment (generally through the rule-of-law); (3) greater respect for human rights and 
rule-of-law in general; (4) alternative political solutions; or (5) justice as unattainable 
given the current political climate. I discuss each of these five responses below and look 
at the way that inclusion and exclusion from the British conflict frame influences these 
attitudes. 
First, some respondents argued that justice in Northern Ireland required 
acknowledgement and truth. This group argued that people should take responsibility for 
their actions or “own up” to the crimes that they committed. Individuals expressed this 
view in regards to paramilitary members, the British government or perpetrators in 
general. This was the most popular response and occurred across all victim categories 
regardless of types of violations or perpetrators. Some examples of this view of justice 
are listed below. 
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A-1: “I think justice for me… would just be people admitting their past 
and their roles and that would be it. … It would just be a matter of ‘yeah it 
was me’.” 
 
A-9: “The truth has to be [there] for us all to move on and we can’t do it 
without it.”  
 
SAC- 10: “To me, justice is probably the facts, truth.” 
 
A-10: “There will be justice when [the British] give inquiries to the 
Hamills and the Finucanes and when they come clean on shoot to kill. You 
can talk about justice then!” 
 
The second response concerned punishment. This group of respondents argued 
that justice could be achieved in Northern Ireland through harsher and more consistent 
punishment of perpetrators. This request was framed through a stronger reliance on the 
rule-of-law and generally called for harsher prison sentences. In some cases respondents 
even called for the death penalty (SAP-10). People who discussed punishment generally 
discussed the early prison release for people who got out of jail as part of the Good 
Friday Agreement and gave this release as a reason why justice had not been 
accomplished. This response is best exemplified by the quotes below: 
 
UA-1: “I feel that justice would be getting the perpetrators that committed 
the crimes behind bars, and giving them good hefty sentences… you know 
the way you hear in American that someone got 100 years and all. Well, I 
wish they would bring that here.” 
 
SAP-5: “People who perpetrated these atrocities should be brought to 
account.”  
 
SAP- 7: “For me personally, it would be [for] the man or men who 
murdered my father [to] serve a jail term. A life for a life.”  
 
The third category of responses called for a greater respect for human rights and 
the rule-of-law in general. Here, respondents frequently cited justice as equality or the 
lack of discrimination in society. Some respondents said that justice would be achieved 
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through education, social services and equal access to health care or by creating systems 
to ensure that the violence does not resume. The following are three respondents who 
typify this response: 
 
A-2: “I suppose that [if] everyone is treated with respect regardless of their 
religion… and there is no discrimination and it is equal jobs, equal 
housing, education.”  
 
A-5: “Justice would be for everyone to be equal.” 
 
UA-7: “Justice would be lets get our act together, stop the cutbacks around 
hospitals, around schools and education, around housing… at the end of 
the day people here have suffered so much, they deserve a break.” 
 
The next category of responses is individuals who offered alternative political 
solutions as a means for obtaining justice in Northern Ireland. This group tended to 
suggest radical political solutions such as returning to a united Ireland or having people 
who did not want to live under British rule “move house” to the Republic of Ireland. 
This was the smallest group of responses including only three individuals. Two of the 
responses are listed below:  
 
SAC-8: “British rule out of Ireland.” 
 
SAP-6: “Justice would be plain and simple. We are a small island… those 
who do not want to live under British rule should simply move house.” 
 
The final group of responses was those individuals who felt that there was no 
possibility for justice in Northern Ireland give the current political situation. This group 
was likely to cite the failures of the Good Friday Agreement, particularly the power 
sharing provisions as a reason why justice would not be possible. This group either 
thought that achieving justice would upset the peace agreement or that the Good Friday 
Agreement had made unjust compromises that could not be remedied. Ten respondents 
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thought that there was no possibility of justice in Northern Ireland, the same number of 
respondents who called for accountability. Examples of this response are:  
 
UA-4: “I don’t think you can have justice when you have a government 
that is half filled with perpetrators of the violence.” 
 
UA-6: “There is no trust in courts or police, so there wasn’t, on both 
sides… I don’t think there is any justice in Northern Ireland, I don’t think 
there ever will get.” 
 
SAC-9: “I don’t think the Irish nation could extract enough out of Britain 
to be adequately compensated.” 
 
In order to understand the effect that exclusion from the conflict frame has on 
views of justice, I look at the difference across justice responses between individuals 
who lost a family member and those who did not and individuals who experienced 
violations by the security forces and those who did not. 
The largest difference between those who experienced the death of a family 
member (the included experience) and those who did not (the excluded experience) was 
the difference between those who saw justice as human rights and those who favored 
stronger punishment. Consistent with the tenants of the British conflict frame, people 
who experienced the death of a family member saw this as a criminal act which should 
be punished and therefore saw a stronger need for punishment as a means of achieving 
justice. People who did not experience the death of a family member were more likely to 
suggest stronger human rights and equality as a means of achieving justice. As 
predicted, individuals whose conflict experience was included in the British conflict 
frame were more likely to support rule-of-law (albeit much harsher laws) than those 
whose experience was excluded. Individuals with an excluded experience favored rule-
of-law, but only when combined with a call for greater respect for human rights and 
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equality. Interestingly, accountability was supported equally by those who experienced 
the death of a family member and those who did not suggesting that the need for 
information and acknowledgement is the same across all groups. Figure 29 displays 
views of justice presented by conflict experience. 
 
Figure 29. Views of Justice in Northern Ireland, by Conflict Experience 
 
 
In addition to people who lost a member of their family during the conflict, I 
separated the justice responses across individuals who were violated by paramilitary 
organizations (the include experience) compared with those who received violations 
from the security forces (the excluded experience) or both the paramilitaries and security 
forces. Here the views of justice appear to be roughly equal across perpetrator type. The 
perpetrator of an individual’s violations does not appear to be an adequate predictor of 
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In this section I have demonstrated the differences in patterns of participation in 
post-conflict justice between individuals whose conflict experience is included in the 
mandate of the justice process and those whose experience is excluded. The findings in 
Northern Ireland suggest that the British conflict frame is successfully able to restrict 
excluded experiences from participation in post-conflict justice. In addition to measures 
of participation, I found that the types of violations people experienced (i.e., the death of 
a family member) influenced their views of justice. As in Rwanda, these findings lend 
support to the theorized relationship between exclusion and participation in post-conflict 
justice. 
While I have demonstrated the plausibility of the relationship between exclusion 
and participation, below I turn to a look at possible options for denial available to 
individuals in Rwanda and Northern Ireland who are excluded from the existing justice 
























Denying Justice in Rwanda and Northern Ireland 
Above I identified the ways in which exclusion from the conflict frame and 
subsequently the post-conflict justice processes in Rwanda and Northern Ireland have 
influenced people’s participation in and views of these processes. I found evidence to 
suggest that individuals who were excluded from the conflict frame were less likely to 
accept the post-conflict justice process. In my theory on exclusion from post-conflict 
justice, I argue that excluded individuals will be more likely to deny the process in some 
way. While I found evidence of resentment among victims of Abacengezi violence in 
Rwanda, I have yet to make the case for subversion. I turn to this now. 
In this section I explore the ways in which excluded individuals have chosen to 
deny the process in both Rwanda and Northern Ireland. As I argue in the theory in 
Chapter 3, people’s ability to deny the justice process and the options available for them 
to do so are highly contingent on the political structure within which they operate. I 
hypothesize that individuals who deny PCJ in an open society will be more likely to use 
public forms of resistance such as refusing to participate in the process or the creation of 
parallel processes (H3). I also predicted that in closed societies individuals would be 
more likely to use private forms of denial such as foot-dragging and reduced levels of 
participation (H4). 
While opposition to the conflict frame is a product of an individual’s ability to 
“veto” the government and that policy, denial of the post-conflict justice process is a 
product of the level of “voice” that an individual has within his/her society. As 
introduced in Chapter 3, voice is the degree to which the government is made 
accountable to its citizens (Davenport 2007). For the purposes of this project voice is a 
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measure of the political space available for individuals to challenge an exclusionary 
justice policy. Examples of voice include levels of access to independent media, 
regulations regarding civic organizing, independent human rights organizations etc. 
Below I look at patterns of denial in both Rwanda and Northern Ireland. 
 
Exclusion and Denial of Gacaca 
In the current political climate, opportunities for voice in Rwanda are limited. In 
part the RPF government has used the strong conflict frame as a justification for 
reducing political space and opportunities for denial and subversion within Rwandan 
society. The RPF government justifies these actions on the basis of national security; 
however, these restrictions have the effect of limiting political mobilization around 
issues of post-conflict justice. Above, I established that individuals whose experience 
with conflict is excluded from the Gacaca process are less likely to participate in the 
process and also express more negative views towards justice in Rwanda on a whole. I 
would therefore predict that this group would be more likely to attempt to deny the 
Gacaca process in some politically meaningful way. While victims of Civil War and 
Abacengezi violence participate in Gacaca in lower numbers, this excluded group has 
failed to mobilize. While I have argued that excluded individuals are more likely to 
attempt to deny the justice process, this has not been possible in Rwanda because of the 
restrictions on voice. In Rwanda, I find support for my hypothesis that deniers in a 
closed society will be more likely to use everyday forms of resistance. 
Political organization in Rwanda is limited to those groups who mobilize around 
the existing government conflict frame. In Rwanda, the largest and most powerful victim 
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group, IBUKA, is focused on the experiences of genocide survivors. IBUKA does not 
provide social or monetary assistance to individuals who experienced other types of 
violations. At the same time this group is a political lobbying organization that 
campaigns for the rights of genocide survivors. While IBUKA is a dynamic and 
powerful organization, there is no similar organization for individuals who had other 
experiences with the conflict (e.g. violations as a result of the Civil War or Abacengezi 
violence). In addition to the lack of victim organizations, there has been no measurable 
call for justice for victims of Civil War or Abacengezi violence from political parties, 
human rights organizations or national media outlets. Again, this is a product of the 
reduced political space that exists in Rwanda not a general satisfaction with the 
exclusionary post-conflict justice process. Faced with a lack of voice, excluded 
individuals in Rwanda are restricted to private acts of denial and subversion. 
I attribute the lack of measurable denial in Rwanda to the limitations of voice in 
Rwandan society. Denial of the Gacaca process by the excluded group has been entirely 
confined to everyday acts of resistance such as voicing resentment and a failure to 
dynamically participate in the justice process itself. Much like limitations to veto 
prevents the current Rwandan government from being responsive to potential challenges 
to an exclusionary conflict frame; limits on voice prevent overt challenges to an 
exclusionary justice process. While excluded individuals express resentment towards 
Gacaca they are not able to mobilize in any politically meaningful way. 
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Exclusion and Denial of Post-Conflict Justice in Northern Ireland 
Denial takes a different form in Northern Ireland. As I predicted in Chapter 3 the 
(semi) democratic system in Northern Ireland allows for higher levels of voice and 
subsequently there is a greater opportunity for civil participation and organizing. Higher 
levels of voice permit more public forms of challenge against the exclusionary justice 
package. Instead of expressing resentment through foot dragging and lack of 
participation in existing justice processes, individuals in Northern Ireland have a greater 
range of political activities available to subvert the British conflict frame.  
When asked about participation in public inquiries and the HET, respondents in 
Northern Ireland were also asked an open ended question about any other types of 
justice processes which they participated in. Here respondents listed book-writing 
projects, memorialization events such as the creation of a memorial garden as well as 
testimony and filming projects. Respondents frequently discussed the community-level 
information gathering necessary for these projects. For example, the Ardoyne 
Commemoration Project conducted over 300 interviews in the Ardoyne area and 
published a 500-page book recording the lives and deaths of the 99 people killed from 
the area. In the absence of state or government information projects individual 
organizations were able to address outstanding justice needs within excluded 
communities. Here, individuals and communities are able to use parallel justice 
processes to circumvent the lack of existing post-conflict justice.  
Higher levels of voice within Northern Ireland make these individual-level 
projects possible. As I hypothesized, the open society in Northern Ireland allows for 
more public displays of denial from excluded individuals. Instead of private displays of 
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resistance individuals in Northern Ireland are able to more openly challenge the British 
conflict frame. In the absence of post-conflict justice for excluded experiences, 
individuals are able to create parallel justice processes addressing needs of 
accountability and information. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I presented an overview of participation in post-conflict justice 
across groups who are included and excluded from the conflict frame and subsequently 
the mandate of the post-conflict justice process. In Chapter 3 I hypothesized that 
individuals who were included in the mandate of the post-conflict justice process would 
be more likely to accept the process and those that were excluded from the process 
would be more likely to deny the effort. In this chapter I presented evidence of the 
influence of inclusion and exclusion on PCJ participation and subsequent views towards 
justice in both Rwanda and Northern Ireland.  
In Rwanda, there was a meaningful difference in participation between those 
individuals who experienced genocide violations and those who experienced violations 
from other sources. Despite the call for all people to participate in Gacaca, those who 
experienced violations outside of the Rwandan government conflict frame were less 
likely to participate in Gacaca and more likely to express resentment towards the process 
and concerning justice in general. Participation in Northern Ireland was more difficult to 
measure because of the absence of post-conflict justice options available for people who 
experienced violations outside of the British conflict frame. Here, people who did not 
experience the death of a family member or violence from paramilitary groups have little 
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or no access to post-conflict justice. The British government’s focus on egregious acts of 
violence limits the ability for people to receive justice for daily, lower-level violations or 
violence from security forces and the British State. In both Rwanda and Northern Ireland 
I found evidence that being excluded from the government conflict frame has an effect 
on how people participate or interact with the post-conflict justice process and their 
views of justice in the country more generally. 
In addition to these findings about individual participation and exclusion, 
evidence of denial suggests that political structure matters. In Chapter 3 I hypothesize 
that in open societies individuals will be more likely to use public forms of denial while 
in closed societies denial is more likely to be private. Higher levels of voice in Northern 
Ireland gave excluded individuals opportunities for subversion through parallel “justice” 
processes such as book writing projects and memorialization. While the result in 
Northern Ireland is a highly contested political space with open challenges to the British 
conflict frame, excluded groups in Northern Ireland are able to gain some measure of 
justice through non-state processes. In Rwanda, however, these options are not available 
to people who experienced violence outside of the government conflict frame. Low 
levels of voice in Rwandan society prevent mobilization and broader information 
campaigns around issues of exclusion, perhaps explaining the expressions of resentment 
from the excluded group. 
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Chapter 8:  
Conclusions 
 
After the termination of a conflict, a government begins to rebuild. In this same 
period, the government may choose to implement a justice institution to address the 
legacies of human rights violations and abuse that people in the country suffered. We 
currently understand these justice institutions as altruistic, designed to further human 
rights and democracy within the country, but as I have demonstrated, this need not be 
the case. Post-conflict justice institutions are strategic institutions with political goals, 
subject to manipulation and subversion from both the government and the individuals 
that the institutions are purported to assist. In this dissertation I presented a theory for 
political exclusion from post-conflict justice that helps to make sense of the actors and 
motivations behind these institutions. I argue that political exclusion within post-conflict 
justice is both more prevalent and potentially more harmful than the current literature 
suggests. 
In this chapter, I conclude with a review of my dissertation and the main 
empirical findings. I argue that my theory of exclusion from post-conflict justice and 
findings are generalizable beyond the two cases that I use in this dissertation: Rwanda 
and Northern Ireland. I then turn to a final discussion of the importance of the study for 
post-conflict justice and post-conflict institutions more generally. I conclude this 
chapter, and my dissertation, with some closing thoughts.  
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Review of the Dissertation and Findings 
In the introduction of this dissertation, I set out to answer two research questions: 
(1) what accounts for the disjuncture between individual conflict experiences and those 
experiences addressed in the national justice process; and (2) what affect does this 
disjuncture have on future participation in post conflict justice and views of justice in 
general? 
To answer this first question, I develop a generalizable theory of the presence 
and effects of exclusion from post-conflict justice. I demonstrate that this disjuncture 
between individual experiences and the justice process arises when the government 
chooses to frame the conflict in a way that excludes an individual’s experiences. 
Conflicts are a complicated series of events and while it may not be possible for a 
conflict frame to capture all the experiences of all people across the course of the 
conflict, some governments construct deliberately exclusive conflict frames which seek 
to further political goals not justice goals. The construction of the conflict frame is a 
strategic choice on the part of the government that leads directly to the selection and 
implementation of a justice process which mirrors the exclusionary policies of that 
conflict frame. 
Through the cases of Rwanda and Northern Ireland I demonstrate the plausibility 
of this theory. I find evidence of a strategically constructed government conflict frame in 
both countries and suggest that this frame was politically motivated to exclude certain 
conflict experiences (and subsequently certain groups). Both the RPF government in 
Rwanda and the British government in Northern Ireland have political incentives to 
construct exclusionary conflict frames that focused on specific events and types of 
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violations. In Rwanda, the RPF government has focused the conflict frame exclusively 
on events and violations surrounding the 1994 Genocide. This conflict frame excludes 
violations and experiences from other periods of violence such as the Abacengezi period 
and the 1990 Civil War and has systematically overlooked potential violations on the 
part of the RPF itself. In Northern Ireland, the British government has focused its 
conflict frame on violations that occurred at the hands of paramilitary organizations. 
Here the British conflict frame strategically ignores violations committed by the British 
army, police or other branches of the security forces. The British conflict frame also 
focuses on egregious violations during the conflict, specifically people who were killed. 
These frames have been constructed to support the political goals of both the RPF and 
the British government, namely political consolidation. By carefully scripting what is 
and is not considered an event of the conflict each government is able to alienate 
political opposition and strengthen its own position in the post-conflict period. 
In both Rwanda and Northern Ireland, I find evidence that the justice process in 
each country was created to reinforce the conflict frame. The Gacaca process in Rwanda 
and the ad hoc justice processes in Northern Ireland uphold to the limited mandate put 
forth by the government conflict frame. It follows from here that the same group of 
individuals who are excluded from the government conflict frame are also excluded 
from justice processes created to adhere to that frame. Instead of providing 
acknowledgement and accountability, post-conflict justice in these countries further 
engrains feelings of alienation and exclusion. 
In the final section of my dissertation I turn to the second research question: the 
effect of this exclusion on participation and views of justice. To answer this question I 
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used individual-level interviews in both countries to understand people’s experience 
with the conflict and their subsequent interaction with the justice process. Through 
establishing an individual’s conflict experience, I determine whether their experience 
was included or excluded from the government’s conflict frame. I find evidence to 
support my hypotheses that individuals who are excluded from the conflict frame and 
justice process will be less likely to support the process than those individuals whose 
experience is included. If the creation of the conflict frame is strategic for the state, then 
individual interactions with that frame and justice process are an equally strategic 
response by the individual. I find further evidence that the form that this interaction 
takes is a product of the political space in each country, making denial of the process 
look differently in Rwanda to denial in Northern Ireland. Despite this difference the 
motivations for these actions are the same.  
In both countries, individuals who are excluded from the justice process fail to 
accept the process as given. Exclusion from post-conflict justice decreases participation 
for excluded groups. In Rwanda, people who experienced violations as a result of the 
Civil War or Abacengezi violence are less likely to participate in the community justice 
process, Gacaca. This group is more likely to foot-drag, not participating and failing to 
bring forth information that could be potentially relevant for the process. Excluded 
individuals in Rwanda also expressed resentment towards the justice process and were 
less likely to think that justice in Rwanda was possible at all. In Northern Ireland, 
excluded individuals are not able to participate in state justice processes (namely public 
inquiries and the HET). Unlike in Rwanda, the British conflict frame restricts post-
conflict justice to specific violations, namely criminal offenses and those individuals 
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who were killed. Subsequently, excluded individuals in Northern Ireland have subverted 
existing processes by creating parallel justice processes on the community level as a way 
of extending justice to a broader group of people and overcoming exclusion. Excluded 
individuals in Northern Ireland are less likely to view justice as heavier punishments or 
the rule-of-law and more likely to call for acknowledgement and accountability as a 
means of addressing past violations. 
I find evidence of these mechanisms across Rwanda and Northern Ireland. 
Below, I turn to the generalizability of these findings outside of the two cases. 
 
Generalizability of the Findings 
This dissertation uses individual level interview data from eighty people in two 
countries. These data were designed to be neither definitive nor are they meant to 
conclusively demonstrate the generalizability of these findings, rather this investigation 
was designed to be a probability probe into the general theory of this dissertation. We 
have very little existing theory about the government framing of conflict events, 
exclusion from post-conflict justice and individual level participation in justice 
institutions. This dissertation was designed, therefore, to present new theory and test the 
plausibility of these hypotheses in two cases.  
The findings in Rwanda and Northern Ireland demonstrate the plausibility of my 
theory in two distinct cases. I argue, however, that the findings reviewed above are 
generalizable beyond Rwanda and Northern Ireland. While both Rwanda and Northern 
Ireland represent unique experiences of conflict in many ways, the findings from both 
these countries are generalizable beyond this context. 
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So how do these mechanisms transfer across case? I contend that a post-conflict 
government will always have an incentive to frame the events of a conflict in a way that 
is politically beneficial to that government. Governments are concerned about 
maintaining power and will subsequently seek to portray the events of the conflict in a 
beneficial political light. What varies across case, however, is the ability of the 
government to do so. In a similar vein, individuals will always have a strategic reaction 
to exclusion. Individuals will weigh their political options and act accordingly. Again, 
what varies across case is the ability of individuals to act on this reaction. As I 
demonstrated in both Rwanda and Northern Ireland, the political space within a state is 
going to be an important indicator of an individual’s ability to respond to exclusion in 
the way that he or she may choose.  
My theory of political exclusion applies specifically to governments in the post-
conflict period. While governments may have similar political motivations at other 
points in time, the post-conflict environment offers a unique opportunity for both 
conflict framing and the creation of institutions. This theory also applies specifically to 
the creation of new institutions or sub-institutions in the post-conflict period. Depending 
on the severity of the conflict, rewriting existing legal or judicial code presents 
additional challenges to the government not theorized here. And finally, this theory 
applies specifically to individuals who have been violated or aggrieved in some way. If 
violence was not particularly widespread in a given conflict then the government may 
have greater success in creating an exclusionary policy without opposition. This theory 
only predicts the behavior of those who would have motivation to seek justice and 
therefore potentially choose to deny the justice process. 
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Despite the generalizability of these findings, a number of factors could 
potentially influence the predicted outcomes. Though not explicitly examined in my 
dissertation, I would expect state structure, the aggregated nature of the conflict itself 
and the level of international involvement to affect the process theories I share here. 
State structure influences the construction of the conflict frame through the 
political payoffs which result from exclusion as well as the individual opportunities 
available for denial. I observe that veto and voice in Rwanda and Northern Ireland are 
powerful indicators of the types of denial or alternative justice processes that are 
available to individuals who have been excluded from the conflict frame. This suggests 
that institutional and government structure will be an important indicator for 
understanding how individuals will participate in or potentially subvert an exclusive 
process. The degree to which the government is held accountable to its citizens also 
determines the level of inclusion and exclusion that the government is permitted to 
include in the conflict frame. 
The nature of the conflict itself is another potential source of variation. Rwanda 
and Northern Ireland are both examples of severe conflicts: Rwanda involving a large 
number of deaths and the conflict in Northern Ireland taking place over an extended 
period of time. The type of conflict (e.g. ethnic, territorial etc.), duration and severity 
will all impact the political structure in the post-conflict period influencing how the 
conflict frame is constructed, resources available following the conflict and ultimately 
the structure of the post-conflict justice process. 
Finally, I argue that the international community has an important role to play. 
The level of international involvement in a given country will help to determine the 
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ability that a state has to create an exclusionary conflict frame. International attention to 
a country in the post-conflict period will influence the events included in the government 
conflict frame. The funding that governments receive for post-conflict justice and other 
forms of foreign aid will also be important in understanding the influence of the 
international community. When there are high levels of foreign aid or other types of 
support for post-conflict justice, countries and organizations will be more likely to 
actively monitor the processes increasing the likelihood of a more inclusive mandate. 
The presence of international media is an additional component of international 
involvement. International media is less subject to the power of the domestic 
government and can influence the ability of the government to construct and enforce 
exclusionary conflict frames and subsequent justice policy.  
Despite potential for variation in this process, I argue that the mechanisms in 
each country for creating an exclusionary conflict frame function in the same ways, and 
individuals react in similar ways. But why are these findings important? I turn to this 
below. 
 
The Importance of Understanding Exclusion and Participation 
As I argued in the introduction of my dissertation, the investigation and 
understanding of post-conflict justice is important for three reasons. First, with the 
growing prevalence and international support for post-conflict justice and 
democratization institutions in general, it stands to reason that we should want to know 
how these institutions function. In recent years the reliance on PCJ institutions in the 
post-conflict period has grown (Lutz and Sikkink 2004; Binningsbø et al. 2010; Olsen et 
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al. 2010). In support of the creation of post-conflict justice institutions, both domestic 
and international organizations espouse goals of human rights, the rule-of-law and 
democratization yet we have done very little in the way of empirically testing the 
effectiveness of post-conflict institutions in achieving these goals.  
In this dissertation, I demonstrate that variation in government goals and 
individual participation in PCJ can have potentially negative affects on the overall 
success of the institution. Gacaca, for example, isn’t working as effectively as it could 
be. In this case, even if we are only interested in the justice outcomes for people who 
experienced genocide crimes, we should be concerned that Gacaca would have higher 
participation and subsequently more information if it was a more inclusive process or if 
a parallel institution existed for those individuals who experienced other violations. 
  In addition, if individuals fail to accept or attempt to subvert the process because 
of exclusion, PCJ will be less likely to accomplish its goals in the country on a whole. If 
the goal of post-conflict justice is to bring human rights, the rule-of-law and democracy 
to countries in the post-conflict period, then political exclusion and lack of participation 
can potentially undermine these goals. Gutmann and Thompson (2000) make the 
argument that transitional justice, particularly truth commissions, gives individuals an 
opportunity to learn democratic principles of civic engagement. Surely political 
exclusion from these processes teaches citizens the opposite. Political exclusion from 
post-conflict justice in Northern Ireland, for example, is strengthening overall distrust 
for the state. Instead of teaching civic responsibility and lessons about equal 
participation and democracy, exclusion from justice in Northern Ireland is reinforcing 
existing ideas of discrimination and majority rule. Furthermore, in addition to reduced 
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levels of participation in post-conflict institutions specifically, I would also expect 
excluded individuals to be less engaged in other civic activities, such as voting.  
Second, the study of post-conflict justice can tell us more about post-conflict 
institutions in general. In addition to the arguments in the dissertation being 
generalizable beyond Rwanda and Northern Ireland, I argue that the main findings of 
this project are generalizable beyond post-conflict justice. Understanding how 
individuals interact with justice institutions gives us greater leverage for understanding: 
(1) how the state asserts control through post-conflict institutions; (2) what affects how 
post-conflict institutions are implemented on the local level; and (3) what effect political 
exclusion has on the functioning of the institution on a whole. 
The international community has no mechanisms in place to observe or monitor 
government manipulation of post-conflict institutions, such as post-conflict justice. The 
widespread assumption in both the policy community and the academic literature has 
been that post-conflict justice is implemented based on an altruistic impulse on the part 
of the government. We have no mechanisms in place to counter government framing of 
conflict events or the potential political exclusion in regards to justice. This further calls 
into question the motivations behind other post-conflict institutions. If post-conflict 
justice institutions can be created and implemented for political gain then it stands to 
reason that this pattern could apply to all post-conflict institutions such as 
demobilization and reintegration programs, elections and election monitoring, human 
rights legislation etc. 
Finally, the investigation of post-conflict justice provides a unique angle from 
which to examine the post-conflict state and the ways that people interact with and 
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challenge that state. In most literature on institutions there is the assumption of uniform 
participation across the population, but when do people willingly participate and when 
do they challenge the state. In my dissertation I explored the ways in which people can 
behaviorally “act out” their acceptance or denial of a given process and examine the 
institutional structures which affect the opportunities available to individuals, namely 
veto and voice. Through demonstrating variation in participation, I challenge the 
assumption that once implemented individuals uniformly and willingly participate in 
state institutions. Subsequently this variation could undermine the functioning of the 
institutions themselves.  
 
Closing Thoughts 
I began this dissertation with a discussion of two women in Rwanda, Yvette and 
Geraldine, and sought to understand why justice in Rwanda seemed to benefit one and 
not the other, why Yvette was pleased and Geraldine was dejected and why one would 
later choose to participate and the other reject the process outright. In many ways this 
dissertation raised more questions than it answered. How does the government solidify a 
conflict frame? When is the frame most successful in this strategic pursuit? What 
mechanisms do individuals have to challenge exclusion from the government? When 
will individuals be successful? 
And I have not come much closer to understanding the cases themselves. Will 
the RPF be successful in consolidating its focus on genocide crimes? What are the long-
term effects of resentment among victims of potential RPF crimes? Will the British 
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government ever find it politically advantageous to turn over information about its 
potential involvement in the conflict?  
In closing, and instead of attempting to answer all these questions definitively, I 
would propose to use the findings of this dissertation as a call to critical consciousness. I 
effectively demonstrate that government manipulation of post-conflict institutions is 
both possible and effective. Through the successful framing of conflict events, a 
government is able to reduce the scope and mandate of justice in the post-conflict period 
and limit the involvement of excluded groups. I challenge scholars and policy makers 
alike to be critical of our understanding of conflict. Recent work has problematized the 
neutrality of the media when reporting contentious politics (Davenport 2010), but this 
should also apply to the government’s interpretation of these same events. Conflicts are 
a complicated and contentious series of events. Any attempt to suggest otherwise should 
be challenged. Simplification should suggest exclusion. 
In addition, I have demonstrated that post-conflict institutions are not politically 
neutral. Rather, these institutions are strategic tools that can be used by the government 
to further political goals. It should not surprise us that governments work to increase 
political consolidation and stay in power. These same motivations apply to institutional 
creation in the post-conflict period. No institutions should ever be considered all “good”, 
much like no institutions should ever be considered all “bad”. 
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Appendix 1. Cross Tabulations for Main Variables of Interest 
 
 
Appendix Table 1. Cross Tabulation of Conflict Frame and PCJ Participation, 
Rwanda and Northern Ireland 
 Did Not Participate in PCJ Participated in PCJ Total 
Experienced Conflict Frame 
Violations Only 30 (52.63%) 17 (73.91%) 47 (58.75%) 
Other Conflict Experience 27 (47.37%) 6 (26.09%) 33 (41.25%) 
Total 57 (100%) 23 (100%) 80 (100%) 




Appendix Table 2.  Cross Tabulation of Conflict Frame and PCJ Participation, 
Rwanda 
 Did Not Participate in 
PCJ Participated in PCJ Total 
Experienced Genocide 
Violations Only 8 (30.7%) 8 (57.14%) 16 (40%) 
Other Conflict 
Experience 18 (69.23%) 6 (42.86%) 24 (60%) 
Total 26 (100%) 14 (100%) 40 (100%) 




Appendix Table 3.  Cross Tabulation of Conflict Frame and PCJ Participation, 
Northern Ireland 
 Did Not Participate in PCJ Participated in PCJ Total 
Experienced Conflict 
Frame Violations Only 20 (64.52%) 8 (88.89%) 28 (70%) 
Other Conflict 
Experience 11 (35.48%) 1 (11.1%) 12 (30%) 
Total 31 (100%) 9 (100%) 40 (100%) 
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